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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Economics has been taught at the University of Tartu since its very 
foundation (1632). Initially, economic sciences did not constitute 
separate subjects but were lectured on as part of other subjects, for 
instance a professor of mathematics would also read a course on 
accounting. Importance of economics grew steadily with the 
development of market relations and after a break caused by wars 
when the university re-started activities in Tartu, four economics 
professorships at the Faculty of Philosophy were opened in 1803. One 
of these was the Chair of Cameralistics, Finance and Trade. We 
consider this event the beginning of systematic finance education at 
the University of Tartu.
Analogously to other transition countries major changes in the 
field of teaching and research of finance took place in the 1990s 
during transition to the market economy. It had to be studied and 
experience had to be shared. To that end international conferences 
provide excellent opportunities. Therefore the Institute of Finance and 
Accounting set a task to begin organising international conferences. 
The first of the kind was held in May 1994 on the topic “The Theory 
and Teaching of Finance and Accounting in a Transition Economy”. 
The following four conferences mainly continued dealing with 
financial and accounting issues of transition economies. The sixth 
conference was the first to differ from the previous conferences by 
focussing on accession with the European Union which was suppor­
ted by the peoples of the three Baltic States and which took place in 
October 2003.
The 7th International Conference of TU Institute of Finance and 
Accounting, which took place on November 16-17, 2006 was 
dedicated to the influences of enlargement the EU from May 2004 to 
the entrepreneurial finance and financial environment in the new EU 
member states. The present proceedings contain the best conference 
papers, which have been supplemented, and reviewers as well as 
conference discussions.
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The majority of the conference participants are teaching staff and 
scientist from EU member states universities. Additionally we had 
several professors outside of EU: three professors from Saint- 
Petersburg University of Economics and Finance (Russian Fede­
ration) and professor from University of Zagreb (Croatia). Totally the 
conference participants came to Tartu from five countries outside of 
Estonia. The editorial board has decided to maintain that division in 
the present collection as well. Here you find two plenary papers: 
Estonia’s Prospects to Join the Euro Area and Financial Services 
Environment in Estonia. Additionally these proceedings include 20 
papers from panel sessions.
The papers show that next to the renowned professors there is a 
young generation of masters and doctoral students among the authors. 
Thus a continuous development of financial science is secured, 
difficulties of reforms in economics in Estonia as well in other Baltic 
states notwithstanding.
We are grateful to the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration of University of Tartu, Professor Toomas 
Haldma for the welcome address and best wishes at the opening of 
the conference. We would like to thank the President of the Eesti 
Pank (central bank), Mr. Andres Lipstok who made an excellent 
presentation at the plenary session.
We would also like to thank the reviewers who read abstracts and 
papers and evaluated them.
The conference organisers would like to thank all participants who 
accepted our invitation and whose papers and very active discussions 
made the high level of the conference possible:
August Aarma. PhD, Associate Professor, Tallinn University of 
Technology. Andrus Alber. Advisor of Eesti Pank. Meelis Anger- 
ma. MA, PhD student, University of Tartu. Maria Astrakhantseva, 
PhD student, Saint-Petersburg University of Economy and Finance. 
Vladimir Cvijanovic. Assistant, University of Zagreb. Peter Fried­
rich. Dr. Professor, University of Tartu. Jelena Hartšenko. PhD 
student. Tallinn University of Technology. Aaro Hazak. PhD 
student. Tallinn University of Technology. Andres Juhkam. MA. 
Lecturer. University of Tartu. Kaia Kask. MSc. Lecturer. University 
of Tartu. Kiril Kondratov. University of Latvia. Margus Kõomägi. 
Lecturer, PhD student, University of Tartu. Laivi Laidroo. PhD 
student. Tallinn University of Technology. Andres Lipstok.
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Governor of Eesti Pank. Alexander Makienko. University of Latvia. 
Ekaterina Popova. Dr. Professor, Saint-Petersburg University of 
Economy and Finance. Katrin Rahu. PhD student. Tallinn Uni­
versity of Technology. Janno Reiljan. Dr. Professor, University of 
Tartu. Galina Reshina. Dr. Professor, University of Latvia. Inna 
Romanova. PhD student, University of Latvia. Priit Sander. MA. 
Lecturer. University of Tartu. Anna Stankova. University of 
Economics Prague. Dmitri Sokolov. PhD student. Tallinn University 
of Technology. Alexander Selishchev. Dr. Professor, Saint-Peters­
burg University of Economy and Finance. Mart Sõrg. DSc. 
Professor, University of Tartu. Elvira Zelgalve. Dr. Professor, Uni­
versity of Latvia. Janek Uiboupin. PhD. Researcher, Turku School 
of Economics. Jaan Vainu. PhD. Senior researcher, Tallinn 
University of Technology. Edgars Volskis. PhD student, University 
of Latvia.
This conference had to tackle financial issues accompanying any 
conference as well. A part of those was the conference fee borne by 
the participants. We also received financial assistance from the 
Faculty of Economics of TU. Many thanks to everybody, who 
provided financial assistance to the conference.
I wish all participants successful financial research in the future 
and hope to meet all of you at the next conference in Tartu.
Professor Mart Sõrg
Head of the Institute of Finance and Accounting
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PLENARY SESSION ARTICLES
ESTONIA’S PROSPECTS TO JOIN 
THE EURO AREA
Andres Lipstok
Bank of Estonia
The Estonian economic model has been in the centre of international 
interest and discussions as a model for a small open economy with a 
fixed exchange rate (1 euro = 15.6466 EEK). It has proved the 
currency board to be a splendid interim arrangement for achieving a 
stable exchange rate, decreasing inflationary expectations and 
responsible fiscal policy. Estonia has been able to show that a 
currency board arrangement can survive for more than a decade and 
be an important anchor to economic reforms.
Estonia introduced the kroon in a hyperinflationary environment 
and was able to reduce the inflation within one year from more than 
1000 percent to less than 100. A hundred percent inflation is 
extremely high as well but for Estonia it was a strong signal that 
things would start to improve. As can be seen from the Figure 1, the 
pace of inflation came down every year rather fast and in the last 
eight years Estonia has enjoyed inflation rates below 6 percent.
Figure 1. Inflation came down sharply
Source: Statistical Office o f Estonia
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One very important aspect of our success has been a clear orientation 
towards the EU and EMU membership. This attitude has been 
strongly entrenched in the minds of the society. So strongly that our 
course has not changed even despite frequent government changes. 
All government coalitions have accepted the principle that fiscal 
policy must be prudent in a currency board environment.
Outside politics, the anchoring of expectations towards the EU was 
crucial both for enterprises and the general public. They knew what to 
expect from the future. That helped to weather different reforms that 
were sometimes rather hard on people, but necessary in order to 
achieve what Estonia has achieved.
Looking at the past ten years, the Estonian economic growth has 
been the second fastest in the EU, right after the Celtic Tiger Ireland 
(Figure 2). And if we will redraw the same graph in a few years with 
updated figures, who knows, Estonia may end up first as our eco­
nomic growth has been over 10 percent for the last six quarters.
I------1 1995-2005 — 2005
12 ,------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .
Figure 2. Estonian economy has been one of the fastest growing in EU (Average 
Economic Growth in 1995-2005)
Source: Calculations of Eesti Pank
Fast growth has also improved our relative position among the EU 
members. While ten years ago Estonia’s GDP per capita was just one 
third o f the EU average, by the end o f the next year it may reach 
almost 70% and be at the same level with Portugal. It is also 
noteworthy to point out that Estonia’s starting point was lower than 
that of Poland, Hungary or Slovakia and the same as Lithuania’s but 
by now Estonia has leaped ahead. This means that we must have done
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several things right. Of course, economic growth is not something on 
its own, but clearly gives better possibilities for enterprises to expand 
their activities and for the Government to improve the social safety 
net, increase expenditures on education etc.
Recent developments and outlook
Estonia’s economic growth has been very strong in 2006, namely 
around 12 percent. But we believe that it has reached its peak and 
cannot be sustained at this level for any longer.
Together with rapid economic growth the labor market has 
witnessed several favorable developments as well. On the one hand, 
we have seen the unemployment level going down to the lowest 
levels since the beginning of 1990s. On the other hand, an increase in 
the labor participation rate can be detected. The problem of high 
unemployment has actually transformed into the problem of labor 
force shortages in some economic sectors.
One risk to our economy that has been present for more than a 
decade is the double-digit current account deficit. It is important to 
emphasize that in our case the problem does not stem from weak 
competitiveness but rather from very high investment activity, and 
more recently also strong consumption. Why do I believe that it is not 
about competitiveness?
First, our exports are growing fast and Estonian companies are 
actually increasing their market share in world trade. Second, a closer 
look at the balance of payments shows that almost half of the current 
account deficit is related to reinvested earnings. This denotes the high 
profitability of foreign investments that are reinvested in our country. 
If companies had problems with competitiveness, why would 
anybody continue to invest in Estonia? Furthermore, the inflow of 
foreign direct investment has not stopped and almost fully covers the 
current account deficit. Adding to this the long-term financing rela­
tions between Estonian banks and their foreign owners, it is evident 
that our current account deficit is not financed by short-term specu­
lative capital. Instead long-term strategic investors play a major role.
Estonia’s medium-term economic outlook seems also quite good, 
as the global environment and developments in Scandinavia are rather 
favorable. We expect the GDP growth rate to moderate somewhat
14 Andres Lipstok
next year but it should still remain above 7—8%. This can only be 
achieved by higher productivity, since we cannot compete with low- 
cost countries in Asia or in the Balkans.
Estonia has a number of short-term risks as well. In addition to the 
current account deficit also the high credit growth raises concerns. 
Moreover, labor shortages in some sectors may point to the risk of 
overheating. The rapid wage growth characteristic of the beginning of 
2006 will either continue or even pick up speed. Thus, in the future 
the main question will be how enterprises can increase productivity to 
cover their wage costs. But if economic growth will stay at around 7- 
8 percent for coming years and domestic demand decreases, these 
risks are manageable.
Outlook for euro adoption
The objective of the Government and the central bank is to introduce 
the euro at the first opportunity. We are of the opinion that small open 
economies who have successfully operated under the fixed exchange 
rate regime for more than ten years are natural candidates for joining 
the euro area.
As the exchange rate of our local currency, the kroon, has been 
pegged to the euro and markets have adapted to functioning flexibly, 
it is only natural for Estonia to change kroons into euros and make 
full membership in the euro area an exit strategy from the currency 
board arrangement. The changeover to the euro will be costless to 
policy-making -  Estonia does not need to abandon or completely 
change the main policies such as the exchange rate policy, interest 
rate policy, or fiscal policy. We have already made all the necessary 
changes to be politically ready along the way. That is why Estonia 
wants the changeover to take place as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, Estonia is veiy closely integrated with the EU and 
euro area economies. About 80 percent o f our foreign trade is related 
to the EU and two thirds of foreign trade transactions are handled in 
euros. A clear majority of foreign direct investment in Estonia has 
come from present and future euro area members. Estonia’s financial 
system is also very closely related to other EU members, as Nordic 
conglomerates dominate our banking system. Also, most of the loans 
are granted in euros.
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Estonia joined the EU and the exchange rate mechanism ERM II 
in the first half of 2004. As can be seen from money market interest 
rates (Figure 3), as well as from the assessments of rating agencies, 
Estonia’s accession to the EU and ERM II was a natural and expected 
step in our integration process. For the markets, it was basically a 
non-event as the interest rate convergence took place largely already 
in preceding years. As the local currency denominated money market 
is extremely thin, we have seen very bizarre incidents during the 
interest rate increase cycle of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
the last half-year when Estonian money market interest rates have 
been temporarily below the euro area rates. This proves that for the 
markets there is basically no exchange rate risk between the Estonian 
kroon and the euro and our strategy to join euro area as soon as 
possible is credible also in the eyes of the markets.
—  Estonia, Interbank Rates, ТА LIBOR 3 month, Fixing, EEK
-------Euro Zone, Interbank Rates, EURIBOR (360 Day) 3 month, Rxing, EUR
biro Zone, Policy Rates, ECB Minimum Bid Rate, EUR
Figure 3. EU and ERM2 accession had no major impact on money 
market rates
Source: Reuters EcoWin
Maastricht convergence criteria and Estonia
We have always kept our long-term macroeconomic policy goals in 
check. Estonia is expected not to have difficulties in meeting most of 
the Maastricht criteria. The budget has been in balance or in surplus 
for the last six years and will be in surplus also in 2007. The central 
government has not borrowed from the international markets since
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2001 and is not borrowing from the local market either. So, the debt 
level is the lowest among the EU members and decreasing further, 
being probably less than 3 percent of GDP by the end of next year.
Interest rates have decreased to the levels seen in most euro area 
countries. Although due to prudent fiscal policies, Estonia does not 
have government bonds used when assessing the interest rate 
criterion, we have reached an agreement with the European 
Commission and the ECB that in our case a proxy based on local 
private non-financial sector interest rates will be used.
The exchange rate stability criterion is not problematic either, as 
the kroon exchange rate has been fixed for more than 14 years now 
(to the euro for the last eight years).
This means that the only criterion difficult for Estonia to meet is 
that of price stability. I should stress right a way that the problem is 
really related to the fulfillment of the criterion and not to the price 
stability in the Estonian economy in general.
Looking at the inflation developments in Estonia, we can find 
several one-time exogenous factors, such as the EU accession related 
tax hikes, the introduction of quotas on imports from third countries 
in 2004, and higher energy prices in the last 12 to 15 months (Figure 
4). Nevertheless, domestic demand is playing a significant part in 
inflation and also core inflation has risen in the last months. But this 
should not be surprising either.
inflation (left scale) --------core inflation (left scale) fuels (right scale)
Figure 4. Inflation has been closely related to oil price developments 
Source: Calculations of Eesti Pank
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Estonia’s relatively high inflation rate reflects the catch-up effects 
associated with normal convergence process. If our price level is just 
60% of the EU average, it is difficult to expect that the inflation rate 
should be the same as, for example, in Germany.
As the inflation rate of the past six months has remained at a level 
higher than earlier forecast, it is not possible to meet the goal to 
launch the single currency at the beginning of 2008. Given the most 
recent prognosis, the same goes for 2009. Neither the Government 
nor the central bank plans to intervene in order to artificially reduce 
the inflation level. We believe that stable macroeconomic environ­
ment is of utmost importance for investors and any drastic policy 
change could undermine Estonia’s credibility. Moreover, such one- 
off changes might be difficult to reverse.
We do not expect any considerable problems in relation to a short­
term delay in the euro adoption. The Estonian economy is based on 
strong fundamentals and reasonable economic policy. Neither has the 
market behavior indicated any concerns about a short delay. Thus, it 
is recognized that although Estonia does not fulfill the inflation 
criterion, this does not arise from any potential weaknesses in our 
economy or economic policy. However, a longer delay in the euro 
adoption might be problematic. The risks concerning the willingness 
to channel foreign savings into the Estonian economy in similar 
amounts increase. Authorities remain vigilant in this regard.
Practical preparations
Apart from inflation, Estonia is economically and technically ready 
for the changeover: the National Changeover Plan has been drafted 
and approved, amendments to laws have been made, and enterprises 
and the general public are already being gradually informed about the 
euro related issues (see www.euro.eesti.ee ). This is also the reason 
why we consider the so-called big bang scenario (i.e. no transition 
periods for settlements, accounting, or other reasons) and a minimum 
parallel circulation period for two currencies as sufficient.
Considering the future of the central bank, no major changes will 
happen after the euro area accession. Eesti Pank will continue to 
perform the same tasks as today: we will handle cash distribution 
(together with the ECB, of course), manage payments systems, make
3
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economic analyses, collect statistics, etc. Our international role will 
increase, as we will start to participate in the euro area monetary 
policy decision-making. 1 would also like to dispel a myth that has 
been propagated by some Estonian politicians. Namely, no money 
will be “freed” from the balance sheet of the central bank for other 
purposes. In the euro area, the same general accounting principle 
applies: assets must cover liabilities. As kroon cash will be replaced 
by euro cash and liabilities to credit institutions will remain on our 
balance sheet, we will need reserve assets to cover them. Perhaps the 
biggest change will be a mental one: our presently euro-denominated 
assets will no longer be foreign assets, but will become domestic 
assets.
Concluding remarks
There are several reasons why Estonia has done so well during the 
last ten years. The importance of the institutional framework and the 
clear goal of integration with the EU and the euro area should not be 
underestimated. We have opened up various economic sectors to 
foreign investment, including the financial sector, and through that, 
we have been able to create strong competition and productivity 
growth in most sectors. Adding effective and flexible labor markets, 
we have established a good framework for preparing ourselves for the 
full membership in the euro area.
It is important to stress that until we have actually qualified for the 
full membership of the Economic and Monetary Union, Estonia 
continues to follow sound economic policy-making rules.
FINANCIAL SERVICES ENVIRONMENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTONIA
Mart Sõrg
University of Tartu
Introduction
Introduction of the market economy in transition countries takes place 
simultaneously with structural and legal reforms. Reforms of banking 
and financial systems and the creation of workable financial markets 
are among the biggest institutional changes of these states.
Financial sector reforms for transition countries are not an easy 
task for high speed of changes and for effects of economic and 
financial crises in this period. Therefore the risk management expe­
rience of the staff of banks is short and the banking regulations are in 
a forming stage.
Reforms in Estonia banking sector started in 1988, three years 
before restoring the political independence in August 1991.
The first period of development of new banking can be named as a 
“wild” banking period and ended with first banking crisis. Crisis 
started in autumn 1992 and decreased the number of operating banks 
twice. The second period can be called as a “naive-optimistic” 
banking period and was interrupted by second banking crisis in 1998. 
It led to the mergers of certain banks, the coming of foreign banks 
into Estonia as the strategic investors for Estonian banks and the 
bankruptcy of three banks. After this crisis in Estonia operated only 5 
banks and one branch office of a foreign bank and the market share of 
the biggest bank was over 50% by assets. After second crisis started 
the “modem” banking period in Estonia.
The main roots of the first crisis came from the deep crisis of the 
whole economy, poor bank management and weak supervision from 
the side of central bank. Reasons of the second banking crisis were 
pitfall in Tallinn Stock Exchange in autumn 1997 and financial crisis 
in Estonian important trade partner Russia in autumn 1998. The most
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notable similarity of both crises was that the banks with poor risk 
management and control levels suffered in harder troubles.
Banking crises initiated Bank of Estonia to improve the banking 
regulation and supervision. Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) passed 
several new acts concerning the financial sector. Credit Institutions 
acts were passed in 1994 and in 1999. Since January 2002 financial 
sector supervision establishments are merged in to one Financial 
Supervision Authority.
In our study we do not deal only with the success of the reforms of 
a banking sector from the aspect of the growth of assets but we also 
pay a lot of attention to the changes in quality. We research the extent 
of the growth of the banks’ creditability, the stability of their working 
results, the conformity of services to clients’ needs, the harmonization 
of banking regulations with the European Union’s requirements and 
the implementation of good banking practices.
Our research of banking reconstruction in Estonia shows that the 
legal environment of banking business reached quickly to the Wes­
tern standard and major banks have achieved the level of developed 
countries banks’ trustworthiness, novelty of products and standards. 
But the disadvantage of such rapid development is the extremely high 
concentration in banking that may decrease the level of competition, 
which is essential for ensuring stable development and stability of 
services and prices in the banking market.
“Wild” banking period 1988-1992
In connection with the separation from the economic room of the 
USSR and transition from a socialist command economy to a capi­
talist market economy the deep economic crises started both in 
Estonia and in other Baltic states. That was an extremely compre­
hensive period o f economic reconstructions when the production 
output was reducing dramatically for several years and the countries 
passed a hyperinflation period. In several years the volumes o f gross 
output lessened over 10%. Naturally we cannot talk about normal 
management of credit, interest rate and exchange rate risks in these 
conditions.
The situation can be observed in comparison with the banking 
crisis in the Nordic countries. Though only Finland and Sweden
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passed a GDP decrease, all the Nordic banks suffered big loan losses 
during the period of economic stagnation in 1991-1993.
Hansson and Tombak (1996) find that the major reasons for the 
Baltic banking crises were: unexpected changes in the macro- 
economic environment; inadequate enforcement of existing pruden­
tial regulations; abuse by “insiders” and reckless expansion of assets 
for credits.
Another substantial reason of the weakness of the banking systems 
in Estonia and other Baltic states was an extremely limited capacity 
of resources in that sector. The Bank of Estonia can be blamed here 
for issuing banking licences too easily, determining too low demands 
on equity capital requirements and tolerating the low level of 
professional skills of the bank managers, but Estonia did not have 
other alternatives and the critics cannot find them either. Yet it was 
Estonia’s aim in this period (since 1987) to gain economic inde­
pendence. In order to achieve the goal Estonia had to establish 
banking system, based on national private capital, to counterbalance 
the all-Union state owned banking system, governed by Moscow. Of 
course during that period the human and financial capital resources 
outside the all-Union banking system were limited. Therefore every 
initiative and capital investment in a banking sector was welcomed. It 
can be also added that the wages of this period did not allow hiring 
educated staff from abroad, nor even thinking about it.
On December 28, 1989 the Supreme Council passed the Banking 
Law. The Banking Law defined the functions of commercial and 
cooperative banks, the principles of bank operations, the role of the 
Bank of Estonia, and the rules governing property collateral and 
creditors protection. Minimum share capital requirement for 
commercial banks was 5 mln. roubles and for cooperative banks
2 mln. roubles.
Specifically, the law specified capital-asset ratios for commercial 
and cooperative banks at 1:20 and 1:12 respectively. Household 
deposits could not exceed 100 percent of capital for commercial 
banks or 50 percent for cooperative banks. The ratio of liquid assets 
to short-term liabilities must exceed 30 percent for banks providing 
cashier services or 15 percent for other banks. The ratio of long-term 
assets to capital plus long-term liabilities (over 12 months) could not 
exceed 100 percent. The law did not request provisions against
22 Mart Sõrg
doubtful loans and did not define clearly the rules on disclosure of 
financial information for bank supervisions (Estonia, 1993).
Hyperinflation had reduced the real value of the obligatory initial 
capital of the banks several times. Now those businessmen, who had 
made money with brokerage business and illegal transferring of 
government property, had a possibility to establish their own banks to 
pump supplementary resources into their business through their 
banks. In Estonia a boom in establishing banks was observed in the 
first half of 1992 when 21 new commercial banks were issued a 
license. Before the currency reform, the number of banks was the 
biggest, but at the end of 1992 the total number of commercial banks 
was 42. However, the banks were relatively small. The banks were 
also small with respect to the number of shareholders: 11 banks had 
less than 10 shareholders and among the others there were two banks, 
which had only one shareholder.
The Bank of Estonia was re-established in January 1990. During 
the first years of operation it developed its staff, created the norma­
tive basis for performance of banking system and established itself as 
a central bank. The Branch of the Soviet Union State Bank (central 
bank) practically stopped the supervision of the banks in the territory 
of Estonia in 1988. But in order to strengthen its position in the initial 
years the Bank of Estonia sooner allowed the commercial banks to do 
things prohibited by Moscow, than tried to reprimand them. For that 
reason a banking system created itself without the normal advice and 
supervision by the central bank.
In addition to the inability of the central bank to administer the 
banking system efficiently, the weakness of the central bank was 
assisted by the lack of Estonian own currency and extremely low trust 
in the inflationaiy rouble. Therefore the banks dealt with traditional 
banking operations modestly and were more interested in the business 
promising a good profit. Table 1 shows that before the currency 
reform in June 1992) the loan interest income of the commercial 
banks was only 5,3% of total returns.
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Table 1. Returns and Expenditures of Estonian Commercial Banks in 
1992
1st
half-year
2nd
half-year
Total
Returns, million EEK 605 887 1492
of which in %
income from floating exchange rates 76,1 24,5 45,4
income from foreign currency 
transactions (charge)
15,2 29,3 23,6
income from interests on loans 5,3 48,7 30,4
other income 3,4 -2,5 0,6
Expenditures, million EEK 572 827 1399
of which in %
losses due floating exchange rates 80,6 29,2 50,2
administrative expenses 3,3 17,7 11,8
expenses of foreign currency transactions 2,9 28,1 17,8
interest paid on deposits 1,9 9,0 6,1
other operating expenses 11,3 16,0 14,1
Profit, million EEK 33 60 93
Source: Sõrg, 1995.
Table 1 may also show light upon another cause of the banking crisis. 
Within the period of the 2nd half-year in 1992, just after the currency 
reform in Estonia, the share of interest returns in gross income of 
commercial banks grew 9 times, and opportunities to earn profit due 
to the currency exchange had reduced significantly. Some of the 
commercial banks were not able to survive the shock caused by the 
drastic change in the structure of earnings. It is one of the reasons 
why in Estonia the first banking crisis started in autumn 1992, 
whereas in Latvia and Lithuania that carried out their currency 
reforms later and stage-by-stage, the crises began later.
Consequently it can be stated that the banking crises in the Baltics 
were imminent, because the reorganization of banking coincided with 
the time of reorganisations in monetary and economic systems, i.e. it 
happened in the circumstances of deep economic recession and 
hyperinflation. In corresponding situations, with essentially smaller 
setbacks, even the banking systems of developed countries, that know 
and follow banking principles, have not been able to avoid crises.
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In order to limit the amount of cash in circulation, the Board of the 
Bank of Estonia established reserve requirements for commercial 
banks from the start of the currency reform. This ratio was to 
gradually grow from the initially effective 10% to 15% by December
1, 1992. The currency reform committee had with its decree of June 
17, 1992 invalidated from July 1 all bank operating licences and 
allowed the Bank of Estonia to extend the operating the old operating 
licences of commercial banks until January 1, 1993. This allowed the 
Bank of Estonia to nullify the right to operate of all banks, who had 
not actually started operation and forced the others to bring their 
operation into line with the new requirements.
As a result of the Estonian banking crisis in 1992-1994 the 
number of commercial banks in Estonia lessened more than twice due 
to the bankruptcies and mergers. The pressure of the crisis effected 
heavier on the large commercial banks more than small banks. Thus 
the crisis had much in common with the banking crises in the Nordic 
countries. Prof. John Skär (1995) claims that the bank crisis in 
Norway eventually turned out to be a crisis of the large banks. Anders 
Kjellmann reaches the same conclusions in a research on bank crisis 
in Finland (1994). The support of the Bank of Estonia and the 
government did not save all the large banks, not to mention small 
ones. After the first banking crisis, the share of state owned banks in 
Estonia once again increased significantly.
The characteristic feature of the first banking crisis in Estonia was 
the matter that it was caused by internal reasons and it was to be 
overcome with Estonia’s own resources and management skills. As 
there was the lack o f resources and abilities, the depositors’ losses in 
the banking crisis were significant. Money supply decreased, loans 
were appreciated and the trustworthiness of the banking system and 
reform policy fell down generally.
15 August 1994. The bank o f Estonia imposed moratorium on 
Eesti Sotsiaalpank, which from the beginning of 1993 until the spring 
of 1994 had been holding the position of Estonia’s largest bank. With 
the help of central bank’s liquidity aid and crisis programme, the 
bank restored operations in a month but in May 1995 the central bank 
was still forced to revoke the bank’s licence. The collapse o f Sotsiaal­
pank gave the Bank of Estonia a fresh impetus to improve banking 
supervision and prudential ratios.
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The case of Sotsiaalpank had a major impact on the Credit 
Institutions Act that took effect at the beginning of 1995 and was 
being prepared to be sent to Riigikogu during the crisis, and also on 
prudential ratios.
Some analysts even reproached the authors of the Act that they 
had based it on a single case. To some extent also Raimund Hagel­
berg who was closely related to drafting the Act admits it: “Since the 
preparations and the birth of the Act greatly overlapped with 
significant events in putting banking into order and occurred at the 
time when the problems arising from the activities of Tartu 
Kommertspank, Sotsiaalpank and others were being handled, it was 
oriented towards more extensive strictness in setting requirements for 
the activities of banks (Zirnask, 2002).
As to prudential ratios, the principle changes concerned credit risk 
ratios that the Bank of Estonia supplemented as soon as two weeks 
after proclaiming the moratorium on Sotsiaalpank:
1) the regulation under which the total of big loans, ie accounting for 
more that ten per cent of the bank’s equity capital, could not 
exceed the equity capital by more than eight times (ie the total of 
big loans/equity capital < 800%) remained unchanged);
2) the regulation under which the total of loans, guarantees, letters of 
guarantee, etc issued to one client could not exceed 50 per cent of 
the bank’s equity capital (ie the total indebtedness of one 
customer/equity capital < 50%) was changed; under the new 
regulation the total debt obligation of one customer or related 
customers could not exceed 25 per cent of the equity capital of the 
credit institution;
3) a regulation was added under which subordinate institutions of a 
credit institution, the parent company of a credit institution and 
other subordinate units of the parent company were not allowed to 
have debt liabilities to the credit institution related to them 
through ownership totalling more than the sum that corresponds to 
20 per cent of the equity capital of such a credit institution;
4) a regulation was added under which management members of a 
credit institution, other employees, credit institution shareholders 
representing five per cent or more of the paid-in capital or votes, 
also companies related to them cannot have debt liabilities to that 
credit institution in a sum that equals 20 per cent of the equity 
capital of the credit institution.
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Briefly — commercial banks could not grant big loans to their staff 
and owners any more. Also the possibility to grant big loans to 
persons not directly related to the bank decreased (Zirnask, 2002).
“Naive-optimistic” banking period 1993-1998
In April 1993, the Bank of Estonia, scared by the striking banking 
crisis, announced a stabilisation period in banking, during what the 
issuance of new banking licences was frozen and for the existing 
banks, which held the licences, the central bank established a 
schedule of gradual rise in the minimum share capital up to ECU 
5 mln. As far as issuing licences was concerned the period of 
stabilisation lasted much longer a new licence was issued only on 
23 September 1999 to Preatoni Pank.
The schedule of raising share capital left the small commercial 
banks some hope to survive, but due to the crash of the Social Bank 
of Estonia in 1994, which was the biggest bank in the state, the Board 
of the Bank of Estonia hardened the prudential ratios for banks on 
Sept, 2 1994 and passed extra demand on equity capital (Table 2).
Table 2. Minimum capital requirements for Estonian commercial banks 
(mln. kroons)
Year Minimum share capital Minimum 
equity capital2for operating banks1 for granding licence
1994 6 15 -
1995 15 25 -
1996 25 35 50
1997 35 35 60
1998 35 35 75
1 As for April 1th
2 As for January 1 th
Source: Board o f Eesti Pank decisions
Thus, by January 1, 1996 the equity capital of a bank, whose share 
was EEK 15 mln, had to be EEK 50 mln. The demands on the growth 
of equity capital forced the small banks to merge at the end o f 1995 
and at the beginning of 1996.
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The above-mentioned activities of the Bank of Estonia in 
following the advice of foreign experts have been criticised several 
times. So Velio Vensel, the Professor of statistics of the Tallinn 
University of Technology, has written: “Forcing the consolidation of 
the banking sector by increasing gradually the demands on equity 
capital into the level of EU can be regarded as a false solution by the 
Bank of Estonia ...The continuous raising of demands on capital 
caused that small banks lost the ground under their feet, their main 
task was to provide additional capital by all means, ignoring the 
related risks. The normal smooth development was retarded; 
otherwise it would have forced ineffective small banks to leave the 
market themselves.” (Vensel, 1998).
The central bank and government tried to support mergers 
financially. For instance, when the Industrial Bank of Estonia, not 
sufficiently capable of development, merged with the Estonian 
Savings Bank the Bank of Estonia guaranteed the bad loans in EEK
90,6 mln. and sold the shareholders of the Industrial Bank its shares 
in the Savings Bank (1 mln. shares) at a nominal price, i.e. three times 
lower than a market price. At the beginning of 1997 when the Union 
Bank of Estonia merged with the North Estonian Bank, whose 
shareholders were the government and the Bank of Estonia, they 
wrote off their share capital and gave the Union Bank a guaranty on 
the scale of all the doubtful loans of the North Estonian Bank loan 
portfolio. The Land Bank of Estonia, which was established by the 
merger of four banks at the beginning of 1996 and suffered a setback 
as a result, was helped by the state-owned Fund, created for crediting 
agriculture and rural life in Estonia, that put EEK 25 mln into the 
share capital of the Land Bank (ca 10% of the Fund).
Bank mergers gave a great push to the rise in assets of the banking 
sector. Table 4 shows that since 1994 the rise has increased in 
progressive rate. In 1997 the growth was even 76,8%, and in previous 
three years the indicator was ca 50% a year. Due to such a rapid 
growth the Estonian banks became the biggest banks by assets in the 
Baltics.
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Table 3.The growth of assets of the commercial banks in Estonia, 1994 
1998
Year Number of 
banks
Bank assets Assets per bank
bln EEK growth % mln. EEK growth %
1994 24 10.067 57.8 419 44.8
1995 18 14.857 47.6 825 196.9
1996 13 21.902 47.4 1685 204.2
1997 11 38.755 76.9 3523 209.1
1998 6 40.004 5.8 6832 193.9
Source : Bank o f Estonia data; completed by author.
At the beginning of 1996 banks had accumulated a great part of 
national financial resources. Besides they had a key position in 
privatizing the state-owned property, because the Privatization 
Agency required from those, who had made an application for 
privatizing, the existence of bank guarantees in addition to a business 
plan. Thus there was a solid basis for growth in the ambitions of the 
executive boards and owners of banks to convert their real power in 
Estonia into profits and expand their impact into neighbouring 
regions.
The result of the development of the whole economic situation 
and the management quality of banks is that the profitability of banks 
was high. In 1997 the ROE was 34,9%. It tempts the top executives 
of some banks to get rid of the owners who share a part of profit. The 
managerial staff of the Estonian Investment Bank was successful in 
doing so (profit per employee was veiy high -  over EEK 1 mln). In 
autumn, 1997 when the shareholders of the Investment Bank intended 
to sell the bank to the German Schleswig-Holstein Landesbank, the 
top executives threatened to hand in a collective resignation and so 
the bank was sold to them for EEK 310 mln, though there was a hope 
to get more from foreign investors (up to EEK 500 mln). The top 
executives borrowed the necessaiy money from the Union Bank of 
Estonia. The top executives of the Tallinn Bank, who forced to leave 
G. Sammelselg, the chairman of the supervision board and the major 
shareholder in the mentioned bank, used the same scheme. They 
received money from the Estonian Investment Bank to acquire the 
share of G. Sammelselg in the Tallinn Bank and his post in the 
supervision board as well.
Financial Services Environment Developments in Estonia 29
The aforesaid examples refer to the big possibility of the 
management’s buy out in the Estonian banks due to the weakness of 
the owners’ control. Here comes the conclusion that the top 
management of a bank can take high risks. When the risks do not 
justify themselves, the owners are those who lose their money. But if 
the risks justify themselves, there can be a situation when the owners 
are displaced.
Another direction of the commercial banks is to absorb into non­
banking business. For instance, at the end of 1997 the Land Bank of 
Estonia, whose share capital had to be recruited by the Estonian Rural 
Credit Fund, owned seven subordinate establishments and related 
companies, which dealt with leasing and investing, and with anything 
else but banking: hotels, processing agricultural products, 
broadcasting etc. Several credit institutions hold quite a long list of 
subordinate establishments (over 50% of a share capital) and related 
companies (20-50% of a share capital). For instance, the Union Bank 
of Estonia mentions 11 subordinate establishments and 18 related 
companies in its report on October 1, 1997. In many countries in 
continental Europe, control and finance are institution-based; banks 
and other financial institutions are major shareholders in nonfinancial 
corporations and perform an active role in supervising and managing 
them (Pradhan 1995). It appears that Estonia is not exceptional.
The third direction for the Estonian banks to realize their power is 
to expand to the eastern market, where the interest rates and possible 
profitability are high. Besides buying the banks in the East, the 
Estonian banks make powerfully their way into the securities markets 
of that region. The first boom of establishing independent investment 
funds in Estonia burst in 1994-1995. The crashes in 1995 did not 
bring people to the streets, as it happened in Albania, but lessened the 
popularity of these institutions. Now the banks took the reins and 
established their own investment funds. At the end of 1997 the total 
assets of the investment funds managed by credit institutions was 
94% of the whole market. Besides, more than EEK 2 bln. of the 
amount of the securities private portfolios belong to the subsidiary 
companies.
The year 1997 was of great importance for the development of 
investment funds. The rapid rise in prices in the local securities 
market and the expanding of the local funds into East increased their
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assets by the end of 1997 ca four times comparing to the end of the 
year 1996.
As the banks took high financial risks through investment 
companies and their subsidiary companies to get a big profit, then at 
the end of 1997 the fall in prices on share markets reduced essentially 
the profit of the banks. And during some period at the end of 1997 
and in 1998 several banks operated in losses. The consolidated profit 
and loss report in 1997 shows that comparing with the previous year 
the profit grew about 90% but it would have grown double if the 
profit from financial investments had not decreased by ca EEK 50 
mln. (Table 4). As for other profits and losses, the part of losses has 
grown essentially in comparison with the previous year, foremost due 
to the decrease in the immaterial assets value and losses from off- 
balance liabilities.
Table 4. Estonian commercial banks’ profit account (mln. EEK)
1996 1997 1998
Interest income 1722,9 2658,5 3085,3
Interest expense 697,0 1217,2 1693,9
Net interest profit 1026,0 1441,3 1391,4
Income from financial investments 166,4 117,2 21,3
Commission income 449,4 799,1 699,3
Commission expense 132,7 250,8 227,7
Net profit on financial operations 371,4 715,1 -235,1
Administrative expenses 1027,1 1244,0 1069,0
Net other income and expenses -289,3 -509,0 -1309,3
Profit before taxation 564,1 1068,9 -501,4
Income tax expenses 50,2 104,6 -2,9
Profit on reporting period 513,9 963,1 ^98 ,5
Source: Bank o f Estonia; completed by author.
But in 1998 the banking sector of Estonia ended a fiscal year in a loss 
of 0,5 bln. kroons. And again the reasons are not hidden in traditional 
bank services (depositing, lending, and transactions) but in new and 
risky financing business. Therefore the following opinion, given by 
Prof. Risto Tainio (1995) in connection with the banking crisis in 
Finland, will be suitable for Estonia; “In general, the banks responded 
to the banking crisis by going back to basics, returning from new
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businesses to old alternatives, rationalizing operations and cutting
costs.”
The main reasons of the banking crisis in 1998-1999 were 
excessive financial risks taken by the banks primarily on the stock 
exchange. The burst of a market bubble on the Tallinn Stock 
Exchange, caused by the impact of the financial crisis in the East 
Asia, started a chain of negative results:
a) banks were not able to realize their stock issues to the estimated 
extent and prices;
b) stock portfolios, whose profitability had been raised by financial 
leverage, began to produce losses;
c) liquidity of banks was decreasing as the short-time resources, 
borrowed from the Western market, had been given out as long­
time loans, and it became more and more difficult and expensive 
to provide new resources from abroad;
d) the lop-sided expansion of banks towards the East (especially after 
the burst of financial wreck in Russia) raised credit risks and 
produced losses through subsidiaries;
e) depositors lost trust in banks and began to withdraw their money 
from banks. The polls showed that in the opinion of 25% of the 
questioned people the reliability of banks had declined, and in this 
group 34% of the people had stopped saving at all and 28% were 
keeping their savings only at home (EKI test 1998, 1999).
Consequently some of the reasons of the banking crisis in 1998-1999 
were similar to those of the first crisis, i.e. management faults, 
consisting of underestimation of risks and excessive optimism 
concerning the developments of market. The new key reasons were 
the influencers from international markets:
a) international stock market crisis;
b) financial crisis in Russia;
c) appreciation of loan resources in international markets and hard 
terms.
When in autumn 1997 the economic environment changed, then the 
excessive expansion of securities and loan portfolios, lop-sided 
orientation towards the Russian market, lending short-time cheap 
foreign resources as long-time credits, and the other same type 
mistakes began to generate losses to the extent of previous big profit.
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The leaders of the Savings Bank of Estonia and Tallinn Bank realized 
to offer their banks for mergers with stronger banks almost at the last 
moment. But the Land Bank of Estonia, Estonian Forekspank, 
Estonian Investment Bank, EVEA Bank and ERA-Bank did not feel 
the real dangers and they were too late. The Investment Bank and 
Forekspank were saved by the support of the central bank, but the rest 
will be probably added to the list of the failed banks in Estonia.
The essential difference of the banking crisis in 1998-1999 from 
the previous one was the fact that the Swedish banks SE Banken and 
Swedbank were involved in saving the two major banks of Estonia, 
the Hansabank and the Union Bank of Estonia. Those banks had just 
merged with weaker banks and now their share in the banking market 
of Estonia was res. 50% and 30%. They had also been evaluated by 
international rating agencies. As they were not able to carry on 
business independently any longer, the owners and managers had to 
look for strategic investors. The troubles had lowered the price, so the 
international banking found it the right time to come to help. The 
small banks of Estonia also looked desperately for partners, but as 
their market share was small and they did not own international 
ratings, they were not able to draw international interest.
Conclusively it can be said that the main difference between the 
banking crises in Estonia was the fact that the first crisis was a local 
occasion but the second crisis was of international nature, where the 
impelling forces came from outside and the normal situation was 
restored also by foreign support.
The indirect reason of the second banking crisis was the rapid 
growth of bank assets, caused by several factors, which weakened the 
banks. Obviously in other transition countries the essentially faster 
growth in banking sectors comparing with real sectors has weakened 
banking sectors and made them more vulnerable. Mikhail Dmitriyev 
(1998) describes the development of a banking sector in Russia as 
follows: “The peculiar nature of the current Russian banking system 
has been linked inseparably with the very rapid growth o f banks that 
took place during 1987-1995.” Probably one of the roots of the deep 
banking crisis in Russia in 1998 lies also in the rapid growth of banks 
in previous years.
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Modern banking since 1999
Estonian banks have by now learnt the lessons of two crises. These 
crises filtered out the banks with worse risk management systems and 
only the best survived. The crises taught both big and small banks 
that it is not secure to rely on help from the central bank. The small 
banks also learnt that even foreign investors aren’t interested in their 
fate.
The mergers of banks and bankrupts enabled the banks’ 
employees to see the sad consequences of underestimating risks and 
the bank owners and the management, to leave only the most 
professional on the payroll. Therefore, it can be said that Estonian 
banks’ personnel is now sufficiently professional to act in case of 
future financial shocks.
The central bank of Estonia has been much criticized for the 
untimely recognition of the last banking crisis and late and inadequate 
measures. This lesson has been learnt.
The reporting and prudential ratios that took effect in the second 
half of 1999 differ substantially to the ratios valid in 1993. Besides 
considering credit risks, complicated calculations for talking into 
account the off-balance-sheet liabilities, securities portfolios and 
other risks of commercial banks were added. Also the new Credit 
Institution Act amended and supplemented the chapters on 
guaranteeing the reliability of credit institutions and protection of 
customer interests, accounting, reporting, and supervision. If the 
cooperative capital of a bank shall be at least EUR 1 million in 
Finland (Koskenkylä, 2003) then for Estonian cooperative banks shall 
to be EUR 5 million. Reserve requirement for commercial banks is 
15% what is mush higher than in any new EU country (in EU 2%).
One that kind of result is the unification of financial supervision 
institutions (banking, insurance, securities market). The leading banks 
also have their foreign strategic owners who supervise proper 
functioning of risk management systems in Estonian banks. All this 
allows to claim that there is no danger of a banking crisis due to 
factors internal to Estonia. Also, the ability of Estonian banking 
sector to resist foreign shocks is significantly better than in 1997—
1998. Therefore, the likelihood of a banking crisis in Estonia due to 
external factors is also quite small.
5
34 Mart Sõrg
In 2002, the Financial Supervision Authority (FSA) was set up at 
Eesti Pank as an independent agency for supervising the entire 
financial sector. As a result, the central bank is no longer directly 
involved in the supervision of credit institutions, but focuses on 
ensuring systems financial stability. At the same time this means that 
the central bank has to cooperate with the FSA in analysing the 
financial sector and making policy decisions.
The Financial Supervision Authority (FSA) rights and duties are 
regulated by the FSA Act and detailed in ten other acts governing the 
operations of financial sector enterprises (Table 5).
Table 5. Laws on which the activities of the Financial Supervision 
Authority are based
Title of Act Effective (since)
Financial Supervision Authority Act June 1, 2001
Credit Institutions Act July 1, 1999
Insurance Activities Act August 1, 2000
Insurance Act1 January 1, 1993
Motor Third Party Liability Insurance Act June 1, 2001
Investment Funds Act May 19, 1997
Funded Pensions Act October 1, 2001
Securities Market Act January 1, 2002
Estonian Central Register for Securities Act January 1,2001
Deposit Guarantee fund Act2 May 23, 1998
Guarantee Fund Act July 1,2002
Money Laundering Prevention Act July 1, 1999
1 Repealed on 1 July 2002
2 Repealed on 1 July 2002
Source: Estonian Financial Supervision Authority, 2002.
On the basis of an analysis of the transparency for the central banks a 
hypothesis has been formulated that the central banks which do not 
supervise the banking system pursue a more open information policy 
as regards the financial system stability than those involved in the 
supervision. The average value of the index for the central banks 
performing supervisory functions is 3.6 points, whereas the 
corresponding value for the central banks not involved in supervision 
is 5.7 points. A statistical analysis confirms the existence of a relation 
between the supervisory functions of the bank and the value of the
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transparency index (Sotomska-Krzysztofik and Szczepanska, 2006). 
This analysis showed that Estonian bank clients get now more open 
information about financial system stability than before establishing 
FSA.
Table 6. Growth indicators of commercial banks in Estonia 1998-2005
Year Total assets by the end 
of the year, bill. EEK*
GDP (current prices, 
bill. EEK)
Banks assets, 
% of GDP
1998 41.0 78.0 52.6
1999 47.1 81.8 57.5
2000 57.8 95.5 60.5
2001 68.4 108.2 63.2
2002 81.7 121.4 67.3
2003 98.6 132.9 74.2
2004 133.6 146.7 91.1
2005 185.1 173.1 106.9
* incl. branches o f foreign banks 
Source: Bank o f Estonia.
After second banking crisis in Estonia started rapid growth of assets 
(Table 6). At the beginning of this year the sum of assets of banks is 
over one hundred billion kroons. This growth strengthened the 
profitability and efficiency of the banking sector. Regardless of fast 
growth, capitalisation has remained strong, being supported by 
consistently good profitability.
Entry into market by banking market participants from the Nordic 
countries has characterised Estonian banking from the mid-1990s. 
This is accompanied by cross-border integration which shows in a 
relatively great dependency of liquidity and risk management on the 
Nordic parent banks. In 2005, Swedbank obtained 100% of 
Hansapank’s shares through the takeover bid. Consequently, 99% of 
the banks in Estonia belong to Nordic banking groups today. The 
future development of the Estonian banking market is affected by the 
operations and objectives of foreign banking groups. This is an 
important prerequisite for the implementation of the financial policy. 
On the other hand, increasing integration is definitely positive for 
financing economy (Eesti Pank Annual Report 2005, 2006).
Competition on the Estonian banking market tightened further 
after joining Estonia to the EU. The last half-year saw the addition of
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new branches of foreign credit institutions that commenced 
operations in Estonia as well as credit institutions expressing their 
desire to provide cross-border service from their country of origin. As 
at 31 March 2006, seven companies licensed as credit institutions in 
Estonia and branches of seven credit institutions licensed in another 
European Union Member State were operating in Estonia. Five 
foreign credit institutions had representative offices in Estonia and 97 
foreign credit institutions had submitted an application for providing 
cross-border services (Financial Stability Review, 2006).
In light of rapid growth, the quality indicators of loan portfolios 
have remained on an aggregate basis good also in case of banking 
groups. By the end of the first quarter of 2006, the ratio of the stock 
of provisions for loan losses decreased to 0.7% of the loan portfolio, 
whereas the share of loans overdue for more than 60 days declined as 
well (to 0.4%). Consequently, at the end of the first quarter the 
aggregate stock of provisions made by banking groups exceeded the 
volume of loans overdue for more than 60 days by more than 1.7 
times.
Although indicators vary across banks as well as banking groups, 
the provisioning practices of Estonian banks may generally be 
considered rather conservative in comparison with the rest of Europe. 
According to the European central Bank, the EU-25 average of non­
performing and doubtful assets comprised 2.7% of banks’ loans an 
advance in 2004, while the average ratio of the stock of provisions 
amounted only to 2.0% in Estonia in the first quarter of 2006 
(Financial Stability Review, 2006).
The quality indicators of the Estonian banking sector may be 
considered relatively good (Table 7). Owning to the strong growth of 
net interest income net interest margin degreased minimally. 
Similarly to the banking sectors solo indicators, the figures of the 
return of assets and asset utilisation of banking groups also continued 
decreasing in 2005.
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Table 7. Estonian banks’ profitability indicators (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005
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Asset utilisation 9,3 7,9 7,4 6,7
Return on assets 1,55 2,12 1,70 2,07 2,13 2,22 1,96 2,08
Profit margin 16,8 21,7 28,8 29,4
Return on equity 14,7 20,3 14,1 20,0 20,0 22,8 21,0 23,5
Cost-income ratio 61,6 60,9 53,0 52,3 45,8 49,7 45,6 46,6
Net interest margin 3,59 4,55 2,91 3,94 2,39 3,42 2,04 2,89
Spread 3,44 4,41 2,78 3,80 2,30 3,28 1,95 2,76
Source: Financial Stability Review, 2006.
Despite the high quality of the loan portfolio of Estonian banks the 
most significant amendment in the banking regulation in 2005 was 
the increase of the risk weighting of housing loans from 50% to 100% 
in calculating capital adequacy. Consequently, banks need to increase 
the share of own funds (i.e. financing by owners) in housing loan 
activities. Given the impact of the close cross-border relations of the 
Estonian banking system on the domestic loan market, a proposal was 
made to institutions that supervise foreign banks with branches in 
Estonia and relevant central banks in other countries to consider the 
application of 100% risk weighting in regard to housing loans issued 
to Estonian residents.
Another amendment related to updating was the exclusion of the 
exchange rate mechanism ERM 11 currencies from the prudential 
ratios that establish limitations to foreign currency open positions. 
For currency risk Estonia has double regulations: first, the prudential 
ratios which set limitations to foreign currency open positions, and 
second, the requirement for additional own funds, which depends on 
the size of the open currency position, included in the capital 
adequacy calculation. As the two regulations imply different calcu­
lation on consolidated basis, some distortions in the currency risk 
calculation occurred for large banking groups. Since the problems 
mainly concerned the national currencies participating in ERM II for 
which the currency risk is limited by an agree fluctuation band, it was
38 Mart Sõrg
decided to exclude them from the prudential ratio calculation setting 
the limitation.
Very rapid credit growth is signalling that Estonia may face a 
serious risk of economic overheating, which may be accompanied by 
a future pick-up in inflation and a steep slowdown in economic 
growth. To prevent the risk of overheating Eesti Pank increased the 
reserve requirement for commercial banks from 13% to 15% from 1 
September 2006. The aim of this measure is to curb the risks to 
Estonia’s economy caused by the rapid growth of domestic demand 
of loans. So the reserve requirement in Estonia is the highest in EU 
where the minimum reserve is 2% from the assets. Raising the 
reserve requirement to 15% means banks have to put aside a total of
3,6 billion kroons (230 mln €) to their resources, which helps reduce 
the amount of money lent out (www.eestipank.info/pub). So we may 
conclude that the banking sector reform in Estonia is finished. This is 
also the opinion of EBRD (Appendix 1) who calculated, that in 2004 
it happened. So Estonia is among four transition countries (also 
Croatia, Czech Republic and Hungary), who already succeeded fully 
to end the banking sector reconstruction.
Conclusions
Estonian commercial banks were established 12-15 years ago. 6 
banks and one foreign bank branch office has remained from these 
more than 50 licensed banks, the rest had not been able to continue in 
the conditions of economic crises independently or have failed. 
Taking too high risks has also plaid a role in this process. After 
joining the EU started the new wave of bank establishment in 
Estonia.
The analysis of the development of commercial banking in 
Estonia points out several features, which are typical of the starting 
period of commercial banking in transition countries.
First. The assets of the banks grow much faster than GDP. The 
main reasons are the high inflation rate and the expanding develop­
ment strategy of banks. The number of operating banks is decreasing 
constantly; therefore the growth rates of the assets of major banks are 
significantly higher than that of the average.
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A rapidly growing bank requires the development of a manage­
ment system, and the new products and services need the existence of 
relevant risk management systems. But the development of these 
systems cannot keep pace with the needs. Hence the imminence of 
bank failures and the strong probability of a banking system crisis in 
a transition economy leading to a high banking concentration and on 
the other hand high risks for depositors.
Secondly, banking crisis initiated the central bank to improve the 
banking regulation and supervision. It became even more tight than in 
developed banking markets. The legal environment of banking 
business reached quickly to the western standard and major banks 
have achieved the level of developed countries.
Third. Banking sector on a transition country is opened to the 
invasion of foreign banks due to the openness of the economy and 
taken excessive risks. After banking crises the major commercial 
banks go over to the ownership of foreign banks. Local shareholders 
hold only banks that have a marginal share in the market.
Fourth. A transition economy selects quickly in quite a rough way 
the very limited number of prosperous banks and displaces a great 
bulk of weaker banks from the markets, which remained in the major 
banks’ way and were not ready to take sufficiently high risks or were 
unsuccessful in their risk management. Only the top ambitious 
business plans can be successfully realized and these banks are now 
modern and competitive on international level. In experts’ opinions 
Estonia is the most “westernized” country of the three Baltic 
Republics (Kozimiriski and Yip, 2000). It can be experienced also by 
using the services of Estonian banks.
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Appendix 1. EBRD rating* of banking sector reform
Country 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
Azerbaijan 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,3
Belarus 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,7 1,7 1,7
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1,0 1,0 1,0 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,7 2,7
Bulgaria 1,7 2,0 2,0 2,7 3,0 3,3 3,7 3,7
Croatia 1,0 2,7 2,7 2,7 3,3 3,7 4,0 4,0
Czech Republic 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,7 3,7 4,0
Estonia 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,7 3,7 4,0 4,0
Serbia and 
Montenegro 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 2,3 2,3 2,7
FYR Macedonia 1,0 2,0 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7
Georgia 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,7 2,7
Hungary 2,0 3,0 3,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0
Kazakhstan 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,7 3,0 3,0
Kyrgyz Republic 1,0 2,0 2,0 2,7 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3
Latvia 2,0 3,0 3,0 2,7 3,0 3,7 3,7 3,7
Lithuania 1,0 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,7
M oldova 1,0 2,0 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,7 3,7
Poland 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,7
Romania 1,0 2,0 3,0 2,3 2,7 2,7 3,0 3,0
Russia 1,0 1,7 3,0 1,7 1,7 2,0 2,0 2,3
Slovak Republic 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 3,0 3,3 3,7 3,7
Slovenia 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,3
Tajikistan 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,7 2,0 2,0
Turkmenistan 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Ukraine 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,3 2,7
Uzbekistan 1,0 1,0 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7
* The transition indicators scores from 1 to 4 with a 0,3 decimal points added or 
subtracted for + and -  ratings that were first introduced.
Source: EBRD Transition Report 20025
6
PANEL SESSION ARTICLES
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING 
OF DEVELOPMENT 
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Abstract
The main purpose of the paper is testing possibilities of treating a 
bank as an enterprise that produces services and for which the same 
laws are valid (at least in Estonia) as for the other enterprises. As 
Estonia is a small country, the banks here can be considered small or 
medium-sized but highly profitable enterprises.
Banks and other financial institutions are a unique set of business 
firms whose assets and liabilities, regulatory restrictions, economic 
functions and operation make them an important subject of research. 
Banks’ performance monitoring, analysis and control deserve special 
attention in respect to their operation and performance results from 
the viewpoint of different audiences, such as investors/owners, 
regulators, customers, and management.
Keywords: production function, trendlines, harmonious component, 
regression models, forecasting
Theoretical background
As far as we know, nobody has earlier used the existing information 
about banks to construct production function type econometric 
models treating banking as a separate sector of economy (Aarma and 
Vainu, 2003, 2004, 2005).
One can ask what is the production or product of a bank? In our 
opinion the product of the bank is the amount of the services, the
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volume of which can be measured by the total income of the bank, 
which is the measure of the amount of production.
We selected the total income of the banks (y) as the output 
variable (dependent variable) and used profit earning assets (xi), 
equity (x 2), liabilities (x 3) and fixed assets (X4) as factors (independent 
variables).
The time series were treated as consisting of three components:
(1) y(t) = f(t) + h(t) + et
where y(t) -  the actual time series;
f(t) -  the linear trend in the time series;
h(t) -  the harmonious component in the time series;
et -  residuals.
The harmonious component is determined as Fourier’s series:
k t in
(2) h{t) -  a0 + ^(<ary cos#  + b/ sin or), a  = j ------
M  T
Where j -  the number of harmonious components, 
t -  time,
T -  length of the time series (the number of periods).
We chose the power function as the type of the model.
(3) у  = a xa z ß , a  + ß  = 1.
To estimate the parameters a and a with the method of least squares, 
it was first necessary to find logarithms of the primary data. Then, 
according to the rules of analysing time series, we checked the 
existence of a trend and harmonious component in the time series of 
the logarithms of the selected parameters.
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The following results were obtained:
Table 1. The strength of the relationships between the selected variables 
(correlation matrix)
Estonian banking system
У x 2 x 3 x 3 X4
У 1
XX1 0.759241 1
Xx2 0.747643 0.968621 1
Xx3 0.76713 0.990951 0.959944 1
xx4 0.585279 0.620257 0.702202 0.66935 1
Hansabank
У Xi x 2 x 3 x 4
У 1
Xi 0.924698 1
x 2 0.921711 0.994211 1
X3 0.929342 0.999193 0.992265 1
X4 0.683433 0.621776 0.639226 0.646848 1
SEB] Estonian Union Bank
У Xi x 2 x 3 x 4
У 1
Xl 0.9131 1
X2 0.8989 0.9740 1
Хз 0.9205 0.9995 0.9739 1
x 4 0.9050 0.8882 0.9417 0.8973 1
Source: authors’ calculations
1. Trendlines
Estonian banking system
(4) f(t): lny = 6.3032 + 0.0359t 
lnxi = 9.266 + 0.0601t 
lnx2 = 7,1509 + 0.0678t 
lnx3 = 9.4392 + 0,054t 
lnx4 = 7.605 + 0.0179t
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Hansabank
(5) f(t): lny = 5.4304 + 0.055 lt
lnxi = 8.4217 + 0.0819t 
lnx2 = 6.5457 + 0.0851t 
lnx3 = 8.41 + 0 ,0779t 
lnx4 = 6.3085 + 0.0374t
SEB EstonianUnion Bank
(6) f(t): lny = 4.9676 + 0.0393t
lnx! = 8,2197+ 0.0597t 
lnx2 = 6,1324+ 0.0608t 
lnx3 = 8,2951 + 0.0556t 
lnx4 = 6,5119 + 0.0240t
2. Harmonious components 
Estonian banking system
(7) h(t): ln y -f ( t)  =-0,1178cosa + 0,0279sina-
0,0785cos3a- 0,1248sin3a
lnxi - f ( t )  = -0.1491cosa + 0.0733sina- 
0,0866cos2a- 0,0745sin2a + 0,0586cos3a -  
0,0734sin3a
lnx2 -  f(t) = -0.3301 cosa + 0.00606sina -  
0,0646cos2a -0 ,161  sin2a
lnx3 -  f(t) = -0 ,1355cosa + 0,078sina + 0,0713cos3a
-  0,0795sin3a
lnx4 -  f(t) = -0.2705cosa -0 .0934sina
Hansabank
(8) h ( t) : lny -  f(t) = -  0.0.299cosa -  0.0194sina
lnxj -  f(t) = -0.2804cosa + 0.0554sina 
lnx2 —f(t) = -0.5078cosa -  0.0189sina 
lnx3 — f(t) = -0.2415cosa + 0.0739sina 
lnx4 — f(t) = —0.3923cosa +0.1566sina
SEB Estonian Union Bank
(9) h(t) lny -  f(t) = -0.3558cosa + 0.1356sina
lnxi -  f(t) = -0.2318cosa + 0.1304sina 
lnx2 -  f(t) = -0 .1505cosa -  0.1458sina 
lnx4 -  f(t) = -0.4252cosa + 0.0756sina
We treated all possible combinations of the factors and obtained the
models that proved to be statistically significant:
Estonian banking system
(10) у = 0.1697х104379х20 5621ехр [0.3686cosa -  0.1038sina -  
0,0022cos2a + 0.1231sin2a + 0,0528cos3a + 0.1569sin3a -  
0.0285t]
(11) у = 0.27lx207998x3° 2002 exp [0.1733cosa -  0.0362sina + 
0.0517cos2a + 0.0928sin2a -  0,0928cos3a -  0,1089sin3a 
+ 0.0793t]
Hansabank
(12) у  = 0.065214xi°861 2x 2° 1388 exp [0.1296cosa -  0.057sina — 
0.0272t]
(13) у = 0.0 8 5 0x20 2762x3° 47238 exp [0,0161cosa -  0.0289sina — 
0.0248t]
(14) у = 0.0 3 2 8x20 8520X4° 12480 exp [0.1917cosa + 0.0123sina -  
0.03229]
SEB Estonian Union Bank
(15) у = 0.121 l x j ^ V ’^ ex p t-O .O lH co sa  -  0.0979sina + 
0,0638cos2a + 0,0618cos2a -  0,0043cos3a + 0,0606sin3a -
0.0216t]
(16) у = 0.7195x30’79,8x4°’2082exp[0.0516cosa -  0.4983sina -
0.0159t]
Analysis and Forecasting o f Development o f the Estonian Banking 47
48 August Aarma, Jaan Vainu
The smallest standard error was shown by models (11), (14) and (16). 
It indicates that in all sets the same factor (independent variable) -  
equity -  is the most significant.
At forecasting the total revenue for the next period we assumed 
the same trendlines and regularities. The forecast of the total revenue 
for the Estonian banking system was y(44) = 2301.69 thousand EEK, 
in fact it was 2412.2 thousand EEK. The forecasted value was by 
4,6% lower.
The forecasting of the total revenue for Hansabank gave a 
considerable mistake: the forecasted value of the total revenue was 
1858.08 thousand EEK while the real figure was 1458,5 thousand 
EEK. In fact there occurred a random deviation (random great jump) 
from the trend. Extrapolation of the linear trend of the total revenue 
gave 1714.03 thousand EEK as the amount of the total revenue, 
which is much closer to the value prognosticated by the production 
function.
The forecasting of the total revenue for the SEB Estonian Union 
Bank failed totally.
Of course our time series are very short for such analysis and 
parameters of functions are very sensitive to changes and random 
fluctuations (jumps). Still, in our opinion such analysis gives much 
information.
Conclusions
1. It is possible to treat banking as an independent sector of the 
economy of a country.
2. The power type econometric model can be used and is useful for 
econometric modelling of the development of the banks and the 
banking system of a country as a whole.
3. Econometric modelling of the main indicators of the economic 
system of a country as whole or of separate sectors can give 
important information for practising managers and public 
policymakers.
Analysis and Forecasting o f Development o f the Estonian Banking 49
References
1. Aarma, A. and J. Vainu, “Production Functions of Estonian Banking
1995-2002”, Finance in EU Accession Countries: Experiences and 
Solutions, VI International Conference, Tartu, 17-18 October 2003. 
TU Press, 2003. 265-272.
2. Aarma, A. and J. Vainu (2003b), “Possibilities of Using Econometric
Models in Bank Analysis”, Papers o f 14th Annual COPE 
Conference, Global Business: Economic, Political, Social and 
Cultural Issues, Mexico City. 2003. 223-238.
3. Aarma, A. and J. Vainu , “Econometric Models of Estonian Banking
System’s Development”, Navigating Crisis and Opportunities in 
Global Markets: Leadership Strategy and Governance, Cape Town, 
South Africa, 2004. 886-891.
4. Aarma, A. and J. Vainu, “Using Econometric Models for Forecasting 
the Amount of the Banking Services”, Emerging Markets: Social, 
Political, and Economic Challenges, S. Rudolf (ed.), Lodz-Cairo: 
Lodz University Press, 2004. 431^36.
5. Aarma, A. and J. Vainu, “Using Econometric Models for Forecasting
the Amount of the Banking Services”, [in:] New World Order: 
Economic, Social, and Political Tendencies at the Beginning o f Third 
Millennium. S. Rudolf (ed), Lodz -  Santiago de Chile: Lodz 
University Press. 2005. 1041-1048.
7
ESTONIAN BANKING SYSTEM 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS 1995-2005
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Abstract
The paper is the fifth part of a planned series of papers discussing 
possibilities of using econometric models for analyzing banking 
systems as well as for forecasting their development. The first fourth 
parts of this series were presented at the COPE International 
Conferences in Mexico City (COPE 2003), Cairo (COPE 2004), 
Santiago de Chile (COPE 2005) and Bejing (2006)
The main purpose of the paper is testing possibilities of treating a 
bank as an enterprise that produces services and for which the same 
laws are valid (at least in Estonia) as for the other enterprises. As 
Estonia is a small country, the banks here can be considered small or 
medium-sized but highly profitable enterprises.
Banks and other financial institutions are a unique set of business 
firms whose assets and liabilities, regulatory restrictions, economic 
functions and operation make them an important subject of research. 
Banks’ performance monitoring, analysis and control deserve special 
attention in respect to their operation and performance results from 
the viewpoint of different audiences, such as investors/owners, 
regulators, customers, and management.
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Development of the Estonian Banking System
The first commercial bank (Tartu Commercial Bank) on the territoiy 
of the former Soviet Union was established in Estonia in 1988. This 
bank went bankrupt and was liquidated in 1992-1993. As there was a 
great demand for banking services by the emerging private sector, the 
maximum number of commercial banks operating simultaneously in 
the small Estonian banking market was 42 in 1992. Some of them 
were liquidated during the banking crises in 1992-1994 and in 1998— 
1999, and some of them were merged into larger commercial banks.
Up till 1997, the development of the Estonian banking sector was 
characterized by a rapid nominal growth of total assets and loan 
portfolios. The year 1997 is also the beginning of a new stage in the 
development of the Estonian financial sector, especially in inter­
national context, which is confirmed by investment grade credit 
ratings assigned to Estonia.
In 1998, a wave of mergers and restructuring took place in the 
Estonian banking sector. After the completion of these mergers, 
Scandinavian banks started to show greater interest in the Estonian 
banking market. We may say that the Estonian banking sector became 
healthier when Swedish banks and other Nordic investors joined the 
circle of bank owners, improving the future outlook of the banking 
system; for example, by supporting and helping in the case of crises.
Estonia has experienced two serious banking crises during the 
about 12-year period of its banking sector development and 
restructuring, the first crisis in 1992-1994 and the second in 1998-
1999. The first banking crisis occurred during the hard period of 
starting drastic economic reconstruction when production was 
reducing dramatically and the country underwent a period of 
hyperinflation. A characteristic feature of the first banking crisis in 
Estonia was that it was caused by internal reasons and it was 
overcome with Estonia’s own resources and management skills. The 
main causes of this banking crisis were severe problems in the whole 
economy, poor bank management and lack of professional skills, 
weak supervision both from the side of the central bank and owners. 
The depositors’ losses in the banking crisis were large, the money 
supply decreased, many loans were depreciated, and the trust­
worthiness of the banking system fell significantly. As to the second
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crisis of 1998-1999, looking back it is possible to establish some
signs of the crisis:
(1) Estonian banks took extraordinarily high financial risks through 
investment companies and their subsidiary companies to get large 
profits via speculating in the securities market -  rapid fall in prices 
on the share market in autumn 1997 reduced significantly banks’ 
profits and at the end of 1997 and in 1998 almost all banks 
operated in losses;
(2) to the changed environment with increasing interest rates from the 
second half-year of 1997;
(3) Commercial banks absorbed heavily into non-banking business -  
for example, the Land Bank of Estonia, which later crashed, 
owned seven Banks held very high negative level of gap (interest 
rate sensitive liabilities exceeded significantly rate-sensitive 
assets) for earning excessive profits in the environment where 
interest rates steadily decreased during the previous years and they 
were not able to adjust subordinate establishments and related 
companies, which dealt with leasing and investing, and with 
anything else but banking (hotels, processing agricultural pro­
ducts, broadcasting etc). Also other banks were absorbed in risky 
non-banking business;
(4)The decision to expand to the Eastern market (Russia and other 
Baltic States), where the interest rates and possible profitability 
seemed to be higher, was also too risky and premature, especially 
in the framework of the Russian crisis in 1998;
(5)There were various disputes and conflicts of interests between the 
owners and management, which led to wrong decisions (mis­
management). Good examples should be the Land Bank of Estonia 
and the Estonian Investment Bank -  for example, the shareholders 
of the Investment Bank intended to sell the bank to the German 
Schleswig-Holstein Bank in autumn 1997, but the top executives 
threatened to hand in a collective resignation and so the bank was 
sold to them;
(6)Sometimes there were inadvisable relations between the bank 
management and political powers, and corresponding political 
pressure -  a typical “political” bank was the Land Bank of Estonia 
where almost all financial risks were ignored and later the 
Government lost its deposits in the bank amounting to more than 
800 million Estonian crowns, EEK (more than 50 million euros).
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The authors are on the opinion that the currency board arrangement 
helped in Estonia to resolve banking crises rapidly and mostly 
effectively without remarkable rehabilitation costs. The main 
instruments for anticipating banking crises are tightening of 
prudential requirements and strengthening of banking supervision. 
Recent changes in the operational framework for monetary policy and 
banks’ prudential ratios in Estonia were aimed at enhancing financial 
stability and increasing the liquidity buffers of the financial system. 
In short-term, the priority focused on restoring foreign investors’ 
confidence in Estonian economic viability.
We may argue that the currency board practically did not help 
banks fallen into trouble because its resources are intended for 
guaranteeing the local currency and the central bank is not acting as 
the lender of the last resort. The currency board is not able to avoid 
banking crises and cannot guarantee a “soft landing” and 
rehabilitation of banks in trouble. At the same time, the currency 
board arrangement supported and strengthened the discipline and 
responsibility of the main actors -  banks, the central bank, depositors, 
and the Government. A stable currency and presence of respective 
financial safety net compensated the absence of classical lender-of- 
last resort facility and ensured the development of the generally 
reliable banking sector.
The structure of the Estonian banking sector has changed 
fundamentally during the last years. Today, the banking system is 
highly concentrated and two Swedish-owned banks dominate in the 
market. The consolidation process continued throughout the second 
banking crisis in 1998-1999 resulting in fundamental reorganizations. 
We can notice all three worldwide trends in the financial con­
solidation process also in the Estonian market: domestic con­
solidation, foreign entry and cross-border consolidation, and the 
formation of financial conglomerates and bank assurances. Some 
characteristics of the development of the structure of the Estonian 
financial market are presented in Table 1. Some more interesting 
conclusions from Table 1: the banking market concentration reached 
89.9% at the end of 2005; foreign banks’ share in the total assets of 
Estonian commercial banks increased dramatically amounting to 
99.4% at the end of 2005; the Estonian financial sector is clearly bank- 
oriented -  the bank assets to GDP ratio was 113.1% and the banks 
assets share in the total financial assets was 50.6% at the end of 2005.
Table 1. Some Indicators of the Development of the Estonian Banking and Financial Sector
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 05/97
Number o f  commercial banks 11 6 7 7 7 7 7 9 10 0.909
Number o f  private banks 11 5 6 7 7 7 7 9 10 0.909
Number o f  foreign banks 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 7 7.000
Concentration index C3, % 69.7 93.0 92.4 91.1 91.1 90.4 90.3 89.9 88.8 1.274
Concentration index C5, % 83.4 99.4 98.9 98.8 98.9 99.1 99.2 98.6 98.1 1.176
Total assets, EUR m 2594 2620 3008 3695 4372 5221 6314 8537 11830 4.560
Total assets/GDP, % 59.2 52.6 57.6 62.2 65.5 69.9 77.6 94.4 113.1 1.910
Foreign ownership in total assets, % 2.3 90.2 89.8 97.4 97.5 97.5 97.5 98.1 99.4 43.22
Private credit by banks, EUR m 1362 1527 1704 2189 2601 3193 4420 5914 8018 5.887
Private credit by banks/GDP, % 31.1 30.6 32.6 36.8 38.9 42.8 54.3 65.4 76.6 2.463
Leasing and factoring portfolio, EUR m 315 399 433 644 893 1232 1491 1589 1727 5.482
Leasing and factoring/GDP, % 7.2 8.0 8.3 10.8 13.4 16.5 18.3 17.6 16.5 2.292
Stock market capitalization, EUR m 837 531 1913 2095 1999 4570 5565 7163 6036 7.211
Stock market capitalization/GDP, % 19.1 10.7 36.6 35.3 30.0 61.2 68.4 79.2 57.7 3.021
Insurance gross collected premiums 70 81 83 98 112 134 168 203 253 3.614
Gross collected premiums/GDP, % 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 1.500
Investment funds’ assets, EUR m 97 23 73 95 193 280 464 705 1175 12.11
Investment funds’ assets/GDP, % 2.2 0.5 1.4 1.6 2.9 3.7 5.7 7.8 11.2 5.091
Total financial assets, EUR m 2458 2912 5550 6727 7748 11551 14107 18318 21329 8.677
Total financial assets/GDP, % 56.1 58.4 106.3 113.3 116.1 154.7 173.4 202.7 203.9 3.635
Total private credit, EUR m n.a. 1902 1709 2089 2601 3282 4194 5527 8357 4.393
Total private credit/GDP, % n.a. 38.1 32.7 35.2 39.0 43.9 51.6 61.1 79.9 2.097
GDP, EUR m 4380 4984 5223 5936 6672 7468 8133 9038 10460 2.388
Source: Bank o f Estonia
Note: Foreign banks consist o ffo re ign  banks ' branches in Estonia and the banks majority owned by foreign  banks
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Theoretical Background
The development of banking can be analyzed with the help of various 
methods. It is possible to apply ratios (for example, DuPont Financial 
Ratio Analysis) or to use a Matrix Approach etc. As far as the authors 
know, nobody has yet used econometric models for analyzing 
information provided by banks for public use.
Econometric modeling is a process of building and applying 
models that reflect economic phenomena and economic processes, 
which is based on economic-theoretical standpoints, empirical data 
and mathematical and statistical methods. In econometric studies the 
model is mostly presented as a mathematical model that consists as a 
rule of algebraic equations or equation systems.
The number of econometric models offered is innumerable. In the 
present econometric project we have a production function. Basing on 
empirical data selected, a two-factor Cobb-Douglas functional 
equation has to be built.
y  = Axaz ß (1)
where у -  dependent parameter,
A -  free member of the equation, 
x and z are independent factors 
a and ß are elasticity coefficients.
We set an additional condition that
a + ß = 1 and 0 < a  and ß < 1.
Analysis of time series is important for investigating economic 
growth, planning and forecasting. Economic processes are extremely 
complicated in nature, but very often the interrelationships involved 
can be successfully described using methods of the time series theory. 
The time series theory belongs likewise to the field of mathematical 
statistics, being one of its youngest branches that have been rapidly 
developing in recent years.
As the empirical basis, quarterly data of Estonian banks for the 
period 1995-2006 were used. Quarterly data had to be used because 
banks usually publish their income statements once a quarter and thus 
a shorter period (e.g. a month) could not be used and if a year was 
taken as the time period, our time series would have been too short.
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The time series were treated as consisting of three components:
y(t) =f(t) + h(t) + et (2)
where y(t) -  the actual time series;
f(t) -  the linear trend in the time series;
h(t) -  the harmonious component in the time series;
et -  residuals.
The harmonious component is determined as Fourier’s series:
k f 2  7Г f
h (t) = a 0 + ^  {a j cos a  + Ъ} sin a  ), a -  j  — W  
j = 1 T  
where j  -  the number of harmonious component,
/- t im e ,
T -  length of the time series (the number of periods).
To find the elasticity coefficients a  and ß , it is first necessary to 
find logarithms of the time series of all the selected parameters. The 
use of the logarithms of the initial data is necessary because the 
selected function (Cobb-Douglas production function) is nonlinear 
and the method of least squares can be applied for finding parameters 
only in the case of a linear function. With the help of logarithms the 
function is transformed into a linear one and then the parameters can 
be found using the least squares method.
After that, according to the theory, the trend has to be separated 
(subtracted) from the data of empirical time series. By trend we refer 
to tendency, and with its subtraction we liquidate autocorrelation in 
the time series. Autocorrelation means a relationship between the 
members of the same time series.
As the next step, we subtract the harmonious component. The 
harmonious component is periodic oscillation in the time series. It 
means either one oscillation or the sum of several ones. Subtraction 
of the harmonious component from the time series means that if 
multicolinearity exists, it is liquidated.
Finally, as a result of calculating the regression, suitable factor 
pairs are found. The values of their determinants satisfy the initial 
conditions set above: a  + ß  = 1 and 0 < a  j a  ß  <1
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As empirical data, we chose total income (as a dependent variable, 
designated as y) and profit earning assets, equity, liabilities and fixed 
assets (as independent variables designated respectively as x l, x2, x3 
and x4) calculated on the basis of data obtained from the balance 
sheets and income statements of seven Estonian banks. We have 
already calculated econometric models analogously for several time 
series of different length (Aarma and Vainu, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 
2004b, 2005, 2006). The length of the time series for the econometric 
model calculated in the present study is 45 time sections. The time 
period is 1995-2006. The year 1995 was chosen as the initial year 
because by that time the Estonian banking had already stabilized.
Trendlines'.
lny = 6,312+0,0353 (4)
In xl -  9,2669 + 0,06/ (5)
In x2 = 7,1934 + 0,065/ (6)
lnx3 = 9,4331 + 0,0544/ (7)
lnx4 = 7,6372 + 0,0157/ (8)
Harmonious components'.
u\ny  = In y - f i t )  = -0,1151cosö' + 0,0323sinör 
-  0,0987cos3or -  0,1035sin3or
и lnx. = -0,131 lcosa + 0,0817sina -  0,0803cos2or
1 (10)
-  0,0666sin2a + +0,0475cos3or -  0,09538^3«
и lnx2 = -0,3406 cos a  + 0,0575 sin a. (11)
и In x, = -0,1102 cos a  + 0,0906 sin a
. (12) 
+ 0,0568 cos 3a  -  0,1052 sin 3a
и lnx4 = -0,2677 cos a  + 0,0868 sin a  ., (13)
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It is possible to form six different versions of pairs of the chosen four 
variables. The calculations revealed that the elasticity coefficients of 
only two pairs -  xl and x2, and x2 and x3 -  satisfy the predetermined 
conditions a  + ß  = 1 and 0 < a  and  ß  < 1 .
We treated all possible combinations of the factors and obtained 
two models that proved to be statistically significant:
Model I:
In у  -  -2 ,16% 3  -  0 ,0 2 5 2 / + 0 ,035  cos a  -  0 ,0472  sin a  +
+ 0,0731 cos 2 a  +  0 ,0606  sin 2 a  -  0 ,0432  cos 3 a  +  0 ,0867  sin 3a  + ^  ^  
+ 0,91 In Xj + 0 ,09  In x 2 ,
° .91 „0 ,0 9 .-0 ,0252 exp
0 ,0 3 5 c o sa  -  0 ,0 4 7 2 5 ^ (2  +
+  0,073 lc o s 2  a  +  0 ,0606sin  2 a  
-  0 ,0 4 3 2 c o s3 a  +  0 ,0867sin  Ъа
Model II:
In у  = -0 ,9 5 8 2 -  0,0214/ + 0 ,2128cosor-0 ,0302sin  a  + 
-  0,0987 cos Ъа -  0,1035 sin 3«  + 
0,8269 In x2 + 0,1731 In x4,
0,2128cosor -0,0302sinor +
у  = 0,271 2 x 2°’8269x 40,173V”0,0214 exp
(15).
0,0987 cos3a -  0,1035sin 3 a
(1 6 )
.(17)
Both models show well the dynamics of the total incomes of banks, 
and we can say that equity (x2) has been the most important factor in 
the formation of the total incomes of banks. During the period under 
study equity increased 21.3 times.
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Figurei. Agreement of model (15) with the initial data
Source: authors’ calculations
Figure 2. Agreement of model (17) with the initial data
Source: authors’ calculations
The authors calculated the elasticity coefficients of the econometric 
models for 16 time periods (T = 3 0 ^ 5 ). The results are presented in 
Table 2. In all cases total income (y) is the dependent variable and 
independent variables are pairs formed of four factors (equity (xl), 
profit earning assets (x2), liabilities (x3) and fixed assets (x4)). The 
table includes only the elasticity coefficients of independent paired 
factors that satisfy the initial conditions of constructing the model. 
Thorough analysis of the results presented in the table is a topic of 
our continuing research.
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Table 2. Elasticity coefficients of paired factors satisfying the initial 
conditions of the model
T Xlx2 xlx3 xlx4 x2x3 x2x4 x3x4
30 a
P
** 0.5414
0.4586
** ** ** **
31 a
P
0.9210
0.0790
** ** ** ** **
32 a
P
** ** ** ** ** 0.1675
0.8325
33 a
P
0.4023
0.5977
** 0.0787
0.9213
0.4067
0.5933
** 0.1334
0.8666
34 a
P
0.5275
0.4825
** 0.0487
0.9513
0.3837
0.6163
** 0.1093
0.8907
35 a
P
** 0.9179
0.0821
** 0.8447
0.1553
** 0.0782
0.9218
36 a
P
0.8289
0.1411
0.9082
0.0918
** 0.8458
0.1542
** 0.0739
0.9261
37 a
P
** 0.9237
0.0763
** 0.8386
0.1614
** 0.0854
0.9146
38 a
P
0.9417
0.0583
0.5263
0.4737
0.3320
0.6680
0.1045
0.8955
** 0.3528
0.6472
39 a
P
0.9861
0.0139
** 0.5922
0.4078
0.0223
0.9777
0.0605
0.9395
0.5984
0.4016
40 a
!'
0.6832
0.3168
** 0.3350
0.6650
0.8076
0.1924
0.1072
0.8928
0.3404
0.6596
41 a
P
0.5263
0.4737
0.8960
0.1040
0.8019
0.1981
0.6011
0.3989
0.7375
0.2625
0.5849
0.4151
42 a
P
0.1953
0.8047
** ** 0.8519
0.1481
** 0.9422
0.0578
43 a
P
0.4379
0.5621
** ** 0.7998
0.2002
** **
44 a
P
0.1192
0.8808
0.5391
0.4609
** 0.4401
0.5599
** 0.9545
0.0455
45 a
P
0.9100
0.0900
** ** ** 0.8269
0.1731
**
** The calculated elasticity factors do not satisfy the initial conditions o f the 
model.
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THE EFFECT OF ASSET PRICE 
MOVEMENTS ON FINANCING 
OPPORTUNITIES IN ESTONIA AND 
OTHER CEE MARKETS
Meelis Angerma
University o f Tartu
Abstract
In this article the mechanisms will be analysed how low interest rates 
and increased offering of funds in the economy influence financing 
opportunities in Estonia. The main channels are increased interest 
towards Estonian companies from funds targeting emerging market 
countries, lower required rates o f return and higher property prices. 
The relationship between asset price level and financing opportunities 
comes already from Tobin’s q theory.
High prices for properties have improved creditworthiness of 
several companies and entrepreneurs due to higher collateral values. 
As a result from the macro perspective Estonian individuals should be 
able to finance larger investment projects than before.
Lower required rates of returns are visible on the stock market 
where implied expected rates of returns have decreased. As a result 
investors are more eager to invest in companies providing slightly 
better return than the market. Therefore appetite for risk has 
increased.
Author thinks that currently in Estonian economy availability of 
funds is not the most limited resource, but rather the number of 
business ideas and capable management teams. Institutional investors 
such as pension funds would invest more in Estonia, would there be 
more investment-worthy companies listed on the stock market. 
Author thinks that entrepreneurs should exploit currently favorable 
environment for selling equity and debt.
Keywords: Asset prices, Capital flows, Emerging Markets
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Estonia is benefiting from emerging markets boom
Estonian economy, similarly to other Eastern European emerging 
economies, has experienced large foreign capital inflows during 
recent five years. But massive capital inflows have not been limited 
to Eastern European emerging economies. It also applies to Latin 
America and other emerging markets. Asset price increases in those 
countries have been glaring. Taste for emerging market assets have 
increased due to lack o f attractive investment opportunities in low- 
interest rate environment financial markets in developed countries. 
Global central banks began stimulative monetary policy after stock 
market bubbles crashed in 2000-2001.
Global oversupply o f money leads to search for hedges to 
inflation. Traditional hedges for money inflation have been gold, 
properties and other commodities. Incidentally emerging market 
countries have large primary sector, namely mining, agriculture and
oil drilling. These countries hold the keys for global energy and 
metals production. Increasing demand for inflation hedges, increasing 
construction demand and thurst for energy in rapidly growing Asia 
lead to booming commodity prices. For example about 30% o f US 
demand for copper comes from housing construction. It happened 
especially in environment where investments into these industries had 
been low and supply limited.
Combination o f commodity boom and globally low interest rates 
were both very positive for emerging markets. Fear o f investing in 
emerging markets receded step-by-step as positive signals came in 
from these countries. Emerging market risk premium has decreased to 
levels not seen after 1997.
These global developments had strong influence on open Estonian 
economy. By nature economic activity in economy using currency 
board system is very sensitive to foreign influences. Reflection o f 
these global trends is massive foreign capital inflow into Estonian 
economy, booming housing market, booming asset prices and rapidly 
growing wages. As taste for emerging market assets among 
investment funds has increased, Estonian companies have more 
financing opportunities than ever. This means lower required rate o f 
return and higher market values o f companies. The relationship 
between asset price level and financing opportunities comes already 
from Tobin’s q theory.
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According to the theory Tobin’s q values in Eastern European 
emerging capital markets should currently be high and new 
investments in business assets attractive. This is reflected in large 
capital inflows into Eastern European equity markets from developed 
world countries. Another reflection is unprecedentedly large number 
o f new IPO-s1. In the first stage o f this rise in activity stock prices 
climbed up and in the next stage companies responded with large 
offering o f shares.
As above described scenario may sound up to the end positive, 
history has proved changes in direction o f global capital flows 
unexpected and vigorous. This fact is demonstrated by high volatility 
o f emerging market asset prices. Relatively good times have been 
alternated by several out-of-favor periods. Last time it happened 
during Asian and Russian crisis. Possible initiators o f capital outflows 
are increase in global interest rate level, the end o f current commodity 
cycle or correction in some emerging market due to too fast 
exaggeration in price level o f  assets and costs. Risk aversion towards 
emerging markets will come back.
Estonian entrepreneurs should take into account that currently we 
have favorable period in economic activity and financing oppor­
tunities. When situation changes, interest rates and required rates of 
return will be higher for companies acting in developing countries. 
Tobin’s q will decrease and financing opportunities in emerging 
markets worsen. Demand for emerging market assets will be just 
smaller.
Current suspicion about possible exaggeration in asset prices in 
Eastern Europe comes from sensation that economic agents 
extrapolate current favorable environment into farther and farther 
future. It is similar to stock markets bubble in late 1990-s when 
investors discounted future cash flows from farther and farther future 
and utilised unfoundedly low required rate o f return in their DCF 
analysis2. Strong increase in Central European stock markets is 
demonstrated on chart 1.
1 IPO -  Initial Public Offering
2 DCF -  Discounted Cash Flow
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Chart 1. CECE EUR Index3 performance 1999-2006
Theoretical background
Emerging markets and global capital flows are closely related phrases 
financial literature. Emerging markets attract important proportion o f 
global direct and portfolio investments. According to the theory 
global capital mobility should improve productivity and allocation of 
resources. In countries were capital is scarce and interest rates high, 
interest rates decline and economic growth accelerates. Costs o f 
financing corporate projects should decline and the value o f Tobin q 
should rise. In normal stock market this means that for companies it is 
worthwhile to issue new shares and invest into new business projects. 
The value o f entrepreneur’s assets would grow in this transaction as 
for every invested dollar more than one dollar market value will be 
created.
3 The CECE EUR index is a capitalization weighted index of shares 
belonging to the Czech Traded Index, the Hungarian Traded Index and 
the Polish Traded Index.
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In literature McKinnon and Shaw (1973) established thesis that 
linked closely financial system and economic growth. They suggested 
opening up regulated and closed domestic financial markets in order 
to avoid distortions. They supported financial liberalization in the 
sense o f limits to interest rates and fixed exchange rates. Removal of 
real interest rate distortions was meant to influence positively 
investments and savings. Therefore economic growth o f financially 
liberated country should benefit.
M cKinnon and Shaw stated that interest rates in developed 
countries were artificially low and financial liberalisation would lead 
to higher investments and GDP growth. Liberalisation directed 
financial assets toward more productive projects. They said that 
higher real interest rates following liberalisation would enlarge 
savings and credit supply and support economic growth.
Situation in Eastern Europe is somewhat similar to situation in 
emerging markets after financial liberalisation. But instead of 
financial regulators and monetary policy cutting domestic individuals 
o ff from global financial markets, the factors cutting off were general 
distrust and lack o f links to Eastern European emerging markets. The 
macroeconomic effects to emerging market economies are quite 
similar.
During capital control periods the link between savings and 
investments is closer. Therefore it is normal to see lower savings rate 
due to lower real interest rates which discourage domestic savings 
and higher capital inflow in terms o f higher current account deficit 
because the marginal product o f capital is higher than in developed 
countries. More than often financial liberalisation goes together with 
removal o f credit and liquidity constraints which is followed by 
consumption boom and lower domestic savings. During financial 
liberalisation balance o f bank loans increase, asset prices ballooned 
and consumption increased. During this period private savings 
decreased. Often these scenarios lead to financial crisis. (Khanna 
2004).
On the following Chart 2 cumulative fund flows into emerging 
markets and Eastern European emerging markets mutual funds are 
depicted. It shows that until market correction in spring 2006, asset 
volumes grew rapidly and then turned negative. By now capital 
inflow has stopped and market participants are waiting for new 
direction.
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BRIC fund flows---------CEE fund flows
Chart 2. Cumulative capital flows into mutual funds investing in CEE 
and BRIC4 markets weeks from November 9 2005-0ctober 11 2006
Source: Emergingportfolio; author’s calculations.
In addition financial liberalisation or opening the markets for 
international capital flows influences cost o f capital for enterprise 
sector. This is measured by Tobin q ratio. Entrance o f foreign 
portfolio investors should lower cost o f capital and raise Tobin q for 
domestic companies. Tobin q is ratio o f market value o f invested 
capital and its replacement value. I f  q increases, companies should 
start to invest more (Khanna 2004).
In addition, during financial liberalisation systematic risk on 
domestic stock market decreases and stock prices increase. Chari and 
Henry showed that during 1980-1994 financial liberalisation 
increased Tobin q by 40%. The reasons were that stock market risk 
decreased and cost o f capital decreased (Chari et al. 2002).
Economic agents should take into account that attitude on Eastern 
European markets depend on general attitude toward large emerging 
markets such as Latin America and Asia. According to the data 
monthly correlations between emerging market yields are 0 .7-0.9 
(Kulikov).
4 BRIC -  Brazil, Russia, India, China
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IPO boom in Eastern Europe
Lower required rates o f returns are visible on the stock market where 
implied expected rates o f returns have decreased. As a result investors 
are more eager to invest in companies providing slightly better return 
than the market does. So-called valve o f the hot capital market are the 
new IPO’s. But IPO ’s have strong influence on the real economy. 
These companies which add to the equity capital will invest in real 
assets and increase to the supply o f their products o f  services. 
Currently it seems that in Eastern Europe mainly materials and 
energy sector are increasing their supply investing new funds into 
business assets.
According to the Tobin q theory stock price reflects market 
participants expectations towards company’s current and future 
profits. Market value can be substantially different from tangible and 
real physical assets o f company due to know-how, extranet and 
reputation. Tobin q is ratio o f company’s market value and value of 
invested capital. Q-theory o f investments relates the amount of 
investments to Tobin q. If  q > 1, then the capital invested into the 
company is worth more than cost o f acquisition o f these assets. 
Therefore investments increase as it is useful to invest into new 
business assets. Due to decreasing returns to scale, return on invested 
capital decreases as total amount o f business assets increase. Tobin q 
ratio also decreases and attractiveness o f new investments decreases. 
Companies put an end to new investments when q = 1. If  q < 1, it is 
more useful to sell business assets than run the business. Should the 
sale o f business assets be impossible, companies should stop inves­
ting and allow assets erode through depreciation. In the real world 
price-to-book ratio is close to Tobin q indicator. On the following 
chart 3 dynamics o f  price-to-book ratio for Hungarian large pharma­
ceutical company Gedeon Richter is depicted. Relatively important 
assumption o f stable return on equity is satisfied. It is visible that 
price-to-book ratio has generally increased during past three years 
making issuing new shares more attractive.
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■Pnce-to-book (left) Share pnce (right)
Chart 3. Gedeon Richter’s price-to-book ratio and share price 1998— 
2006
Tobin q directly relates real interest rates negatively to investments. 
In addition to real interest rate q comprises also positive effect of 
marginal product o f capital on q, future expectations and uncertainty.
Generally IPO’s have strong positive effect on companies 
undertaking this. For example large Estonian construction company 
Merko Ehitus got head start over other construction companies in 
Estonia due to successful IPO in 1997. The head o f competing 
company Eesti Ehitus admitted this positive influence on Merko Ehi­
tus and tryed to repeat this positive development after IPO o f Eesti 
Ehitus. Therefore it is competitive advantage being listed on the stock 
market.
In the beginning o f year 2006 there were suspicions whether 
emerging market investors will be able to purchase all public stock 
offerings on Russian market. There was information available that 
about 50 Russian companies planned to offer their shares in 2006, but 
only ten did so in first half o f 2006 (Vedomosti). Smaller number o f 
issues was probably due to market correction in spring. Earlier times 
it was almost certain that participating in IPO-s was profitable. Now
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when the number o f IPO’s have increased, it is not so certain 
anymore.
Summer correction on Russian and Eastern European stock 
markets made some IPO’s unsuccessful on secondary market and for­
ced to postpone other IPO’s. For example IPO of ОАО Magnitogorsk 
Metallurgical Plant was postponed from July 2006. STS Media Inc. 
was forced to lower price range from $ 16—$ 18 to $13.5—$ 15.5. The 
size o f offering was also reduced from 29.4 mln stocks to 24.7 mln. 
Although most companies were able to increase their market values 
through IPOs, there were outstanding losers. According to the BDO- 
Yunikon study market value o f ОАО Comstar-UTS declined from 
$3.03 bln to $2.34 bln, ОАО Veropharm declined from $280 mln to 
$250 mln, ОАО Magnit declined from $1.9 bln to $1.5 bln and ОАО 
Cherkizovo from $904 mln to $728 mln.
Table 1 shows the largest and the most important share issues 
during past 1.5 years. It can be seen that share offerings have con­
centrated into energy and materials sectors by volumes. It is expected 
result because these sectors have been driving emerging market stock 
markets growth. Consumer sector IPO’s in Poland and Russia may be 
related to rapid growth o f wages and favorable stock market situation 
for equity sales.
Especially hot was IPO o f DOM Development -  Polish real estate 
development company. This company is related to especially hot real 
estate market. Property market in Poland is getting tighter and 
companies related to property development or construction had strong 
rallies on the stock market. The price o f DOM Development share 
achieved first day gain o f over 50% after IPO. Other hot companies in 
construction sector were Mostostal W arszawa and Polimex-Mostostal 
Siedlce. These price levels attract large amounts o f new capital into 
real estate related industries.
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Table 1. Recent and concurrent IPO’s and SPO’s in Eastern Europe
Issuer________________ ________Count 17_______________________________ Pricing date_______mln USD
TMK R ussia Materials Novem ber 2006 900
Bioton Poland Healthcare March 2005 25
Rambler M edia R ussia Consumer discretionary June 2005 30
Pyaterochka R ussia Consumer Staples M ay 2005 598
Lebedyansky R ussia Consumer Staples March 2005 151
Tallinna V esi Estonia Utilities M ay 2005 70
LOTOS Poland Energy M ay 2005 306
UKRPRODUCT GRP Ukraine Consumer Staples February' 2005 11
Severstal-avto Russia Materials April 2005 135
Sistema JSFC R ussia T elecom February 2005 1560
EVRAZGDR Russia Materials June 2005 422
A SS T A R M A N Estonia Consumer discretionary June 2005 13
Tallink Estonia Industrials December 2005 100
Eesti Ehitus Estonia Industrials M ay 2006 19
Olympic Casino Estonia Consumer Discretionary October 2006 68
Opoczno Poland Consumer discretionary June 2005 137
Polmos Bialystok Poland Consumer Staples M ay 2005 95
Zelmer Poland Consumer Discretionary January 2005 70
Eurocash Poland Consumer discretionary January 2005 55
rNG IBank Slaski Poland Financials March 2005 300
Polmos Lublin Poland Consumer discretionary February 2005 57
MOL Hungaiy Energy 1H 2006 1000
M echel R ussia Materials r2004 291
Kalina R ussia Consumer discretionary r2004 25
PGNiG Poland Utilities September 2006 840
Open Investm ents Russia Financials *2004 70
Pulawy Poland Materials 110
Pols at Poland Consumer discretionary 250
LOT Poland Industrials
VSMPO-Avisma Russia Materials 225
Vneshtorgbank Russia Financials r2007
A& D Pharma Romania Healthcare October 2006 100
Sky Europe Slovakia Industrials 60
Russian Alum inium (RusA l) Russia Materials 2000
Severstal R ussia Materials November 2006 1803
M egafon R ussia Telecom November 2006 1000
R aspadskayaM ine Russia Materials November 2006 260
ChelZinc Russia Materials November 2006 295
Phannstandard Russia Healthcare November 2006 600
Source: Emerging..., Bankier.pl, author’s calculations.
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Influence through higher property prices
High prices for properties have improved creditworthiness o f several 
companies and entrepreneurs due to higher collateral values. As a 
result from the macro perspective Estonian individuals should be able 
to finance larger investment projects.
Real estate has been another segment where booming economic 
activity is visible. On the negative side it attracts much capital and 
entrepreneurial resources away from industries producing other goods 
and services. For example one Estonian businessman said that he is 
wealthy because he did not start developing property lots and old 
buildings in his possession. He just waited until these became very 
valuable and did not risk with loans and liquidity crunch.
As higher property prices increase the possible size of credit 
through its wealth effect, investments o f real assets increase and it 
should support GDP growth.
On the other hand institutional investors have moved part o f their 
assets from pure financial assets into commercial properties. The 
share o f commercial property has increased from below of assets 5%. 
Investors lost their belief in shares after 2000 internet stock bubble. 
Earlier property was boring part o f company’s assets. Now these are 
viewed as valuable investment objects. In most countries earnings 
from properties have not increased as much as prices. The price of 
property should reflect future incomes from this asset. Rising 
property prices have influenced GDP growth through wealth effect 
and increased consumption. People have changed their houses ATM’s 
increasing mortgages. For companies properties are also the most 
important pledge for loans. Therefore commercial property prices 
influence corporate investments. Similarly decreasing property prices 
should influence corporate investments negatively. When property 
prices fall, the value o f collaterals decrease and companies credit­
worthiness worsens. (Woodall 2003)
One reason why property prices have boomed in emerging and 
developed markets is that there has been global boom in materials and 
energy. Both are important inputs in housing construction. In addition 
there is significant inflation risk. As hedge for inflation gold has been 
among investors favorites. Housing is another possible hedge for 
inflation. In the centre o f global inflation w ony is the decline in 
dollar value.
The Effect o f  Asset Price Movements on Financing Opportunities 73
There has been also boom o f IPO-s o f real estate investment 
vehicles in Eastern Europe. Table 2 gives short overview o f new 
share offerings o f real estate-related companies in past o f couple 
years. Although many o f these companies have headquarters in 
Western European countries, all these are very active on Eastern 
European property markets.
Table 2. IPO’s of real estate companies
Issuer Country Offer date Issue, mln $
Lewis Charles Sofia Property Bulgaria September 2005 67
Open Investments Russia November 2004
Open Investments Russia 2006 1000
Akmerkez Turkey April 2005 201
ECO Business Immobilien Austria March 2005
Тек-Art Turizm Turkey July 2000
Global Trade Centre Poland Mav 2004
XXI Century Invs Publ UK December 2005 139
Dom Development Poland October 2006
Echo Investment Poland 2004 7
Trigranit Hungary planned
Sistema Hals Russia planned
Immoeast Immobilien Anlagen AG Austria December 2003
Meinl European Land Austria November 2002
Black Sea Property Fund UK March 2005 90
Eastern Property Holdings Switzerland August 2005 40
Raven Russia Ltd Russia August 2005 286
Orchid Developments Group UK July 2005
Source: The REX..., author’s calculations.
Discussion
Emerging market asset prices have been characterised by high 
volatility in history. Relatively good times have been alternated by 
several out-of-favor periods. Currently we have in-favor period. The 
situation may change when higher interest rates in developed 
countries will increase required rates o f return in emerging markets 
increase, Tobin q ’s shrink and financing opportunities worsen.
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What are current proposals? Entrepreneurs should exploit current 
favourable situation for financing. In authors opinion Estonian 
entrepreneurs does not need currently so much financial support than 
education and general supporting framework.
Author thinks that in Estonian economy availability o f funds is 
not the most limited resource, but rather the number o f business ideas 
and capable management teams. Institutional investors such as 
pension funds would invest more in Estonia, would there be more 
investment-worthy companies listed on the stock market.
Conclusions
Estonian entrepreneurs should perceive that current environment for 
economic activity and financing is favorable. If possible, availability 
o f funds should be used but with high degree o f care. Entrepreneurs 
should take into account that demand for their products or services 
could be much lower. For example when global demand for 
commodities falls and capital flow entering Estonian economy 
decreases and local residents would have possibly less purchasing 
power. Foreign capital has already stopped massive inflow into CEE 
emerging market stock markets. Increased supply o f new shares 
through IPO’s by companies have created risk that there may not be 
enough new funds to purchase all new issues and provide power to 
the market to move decisively higher. Change in supply-demand is 
visible in attitude towards new share issues. Earlier IPO’s were 
treated as hot events but latterly IPO’s have not created such 
euphoria. Successful IPO is very positive for entrepreneur and his or 
her company.
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THE WAYS FOR FUNDING MORTGAGE 
LENDING IN RUSSIA
Maria Astrakhantseva, Ekaterina Popova
Saint-Petersburg University o f Economy and Finance
Abstract
The Russian mortgage market booms headily and requires the long­
term funding. At the same time mortgage lenders are liquidity and 
capital constraint. There is a variety of instruments of long-term 
funding for housing capital markets in industrial and emerging 
markets. This article shows the possible ways for funding mortgage 
lending in Russia: corporate bonds, whole loans sales, securitization 
and asset management instruments.
Key words: Mortgage, mortgage market, Russian mortgage market, 
funding for mortgage lending, funding for housing, mortgage-backed 
security.
Introduction
The Russian mortgage market develops intensively during last years. 
There w asn’t any legal private markets in the closed economy of the 
Soviet Union. After collapse o f the Soviet system market institutions 
began to develop in Russia. Economic reforms moved changes in 
many sectors including hosing finance.
As emphasized by some researchers, a necessary government 
involvement to generate capital market funding o f housing is creation 
and maintenance o f a strong legal system supporting collateralized
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lending1. The current Russian legal framework for mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities includes Civil Code, Civil Procedure 
Code, Federal Laws “On M ortgage” and “On Mortgage-Backed 
Securities”. But legislation should be improved, and a number o f new 
legislative proposals (for example, on escrow accounts, taxation) are 
currently under discussion. Unfortunately, the independence o f the 
judicial system and its immunity from economic, political and social 
influences in Russia remains uncertain and the court system is 
generally understaffed and underfunded2.
In 1 Quarter 2006 there were 395 credit organizations originating 
mortgage loans in Russia. At the same time the consumer loans for 
home-buying were lent by the 662 credit organizations3. The Russian 
mortgage market is highly concentrated: about 70% o f mortgage 
loans volume is lent by 2 stated-owned banks (Sberbank and 
Vneshtorgbank)4.
According to the Central Bank o f Russia, as o f 1 January 2006 
mortgage loans outstanding equaled about 2 billion U.S. dollars. 
About 58% mortgage loans are denominated in U.S. dollars5. 
Mortgage loans denominated in US dollars are popular in Moscow 
and Saint Petersburg; in other regions borrowers prefer national 
currency (rubles) for all payments.
It is important to note that when we say “mortgage” in Russia we 
mean “residential mortgage”, commercial mortgages are not spread 
yet.
In spite o f development Russian mortgage market remains small -  
in March 2006 Russia’s outstanding mortgage loans accounts only 
1.4% o f its GDP; outstanding all home-buying loans equals 2.3% of
1 Chiquier L., Hassler O., Lea M. Mortgage securities in Emerging 
Markets. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3370. August
2004.
2 Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A. Prospectus dated 18 
July 2006.
33 Bulletin of the Banking Statistics №3(154). Central Bank of Russian 
Federation. Moscow, 2006.
4 Structured Financing in Russia and UIS. Moody’s Investors Service 
quarterly report. 2006.
5 Bulletin o f the Banking Statistics №1(21). Central Bank of Russian 
Federation. Moscow, 2006.
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GDP. This level is less than in Poland (5.5%), Czech Republic (7.6%) 
and Estonia (16.6%) and much smaller than in West European 
countries (for example, 52.4% in Germany)6.
Search o f the effective instruments for funding mortgage lending 
is an actual problem for lenders because o f capital and liquidity 
constraining. The main factors affected on this process in a particular 
country are legal framework, level o f the banking system and 
securities market development, social and economic conditions, 
investment climate, mortgage lending practice and government 
regulation.
A well-known American author F. Fabozzi writes that primary 
(mortgage) market provides the actual loan to a borrower, whereas 
the secondary market channels liquidity into the primary market by 
way o f purchasing packages o f loans from lenders7. In international 
practice there are different instruments which are used by mortgage 
originators for funding: whole loans, covered bonds, mortgage bonds 
(on-balance securitization), mortgage-backed securities (of-balance 
securitization).
Each o f the above-named instruments has many varieties. This 
article shows how the mortgage loans are funded in practice and 
which ways o f funding are theoretically possible in Russia.
1.1. Role of Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending 
and using corporate bonds for funding mortgage loans
In the early beginning Russian government found a formula for 
arrangement o f  favorable conditions to mortgage borrowers, main­
taining liquidity in mortgage market and managing the risks of 
lending. A decision was reached to set up a bi-level mortgage 
financing system.
In 1997 Russian government established the Agency for Housing 
M ortgage Lending (AHML) as an operator o f the secondary mortgage 
market. The primary intent o f  the AHML is arrangement of
6 International Securitisation Report, Emerging Europe Roundtable: 
Grassroots Growth. June 2006.
Fabozzi F. The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities. McGraw- 
Hill, 2001.
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conditions for development mortgage lending. AHML buys the pools 
o f mortgage loans from regional operators (intermediaries), which in 
their turn buy mortgages from banks. At the same time banks can sell 
pools o f mortgages to AHML directly. All mortgages must meet 
AHML standards by document forms and underwriting requirements.
AHML issues corporate bonds guaranteed by Russian govern­
ment. The working scheme o f AHML is shown in the scheme 1.
Today the AHM L’s nominal capital equals 163 million U.S. 
dollars8. Government grants preferences to AHML by guaranteeing o f 
its bonds. This is a significant competitive advantage; it allows 
borrowing long-term financing on relatively low interest rates. By 
2010 government is planning to grant to the AHML about 5.6 billion 
U.S. dollars9. Now AHML is planning to issue mortgage bonds 
according Federal Law on Mortgage-Backed Securities.
However, some authors note that government support o f AHML is 
rather inadequate. In such way G. Souvorov writes: “The basic 
meaning o f the mortgage-backed securities is financing mortgage 
lending by attracting financing from secondary securities market but 
it isn’t wasting o f budgetary funds and state guarantees. State efforts 
directed to effective securitization legislation will effect much more 
for mortgage business development in Russia, and finally for housing 
affordability instead o f the thoughtless billions o f state guarantees”10.
Similar question is brought up regarding to an institutional frame­
work o f the U.S. mortgage market. A number o f American analysts 
point out that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (organizations in U.S. 
like AHML) have an anomalous status o f being nominally private 
forms that nonetheless are perceived by capital market to have ties 
with the federal government that allows them to access to funds more 
cheaply than any potential competitors11.
x http://www.ahml.ru/about/history.shtml
9 Conception o f unified system of the refinancing housing mortgage 
loans in Russia.
10 Suvorov G. Remarks for the Conception of unified system of the refi­
nancing housing mortgage loans in Russia / http://rusipoteka.ru
11 Green R., Wächter S. The American Mortgage in Historical and Inter­
national Context. Journal of Economic Prospectives. Volume 19, number
4, 2005.
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Scheme 1. Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending.Scheme
From author’s point o f view the state plays an inestimable role in 
arrangement favorable conditions for many sectors o f economy. 
There are many positive examples o f government support mortgage 
market development both the development countries and the 
emerging markets. At the same time government interference in 
economy shouldn’t infringe upon interests o f  the independent market 
participants.
Besides AHML collateral corporate bonds are issued by credit 
organizations and regional operators. In that case the issuer owns 
collateral (mortgage pool) and obliges to pay interest payments and 
face-value on bonds to investors.
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1.2. Whole loans sales
Nowadays whole loans sales are considered as attractive funding 
instruments both in U.S. and Europe. Whole loans sales markets first 
emerged in the U.S. shortly after World W ar II. More recently this is 
not considered the main driver. During recent years the whole loan 
sales market is in a stage o f growth in Europe.
E. Bradley and B. Kane define that a whole loans transaction 
involves the sale o f a pool o f loans from a mortgage lender to another 
institution, providing benefits to both parties12.
M. Dennis and T. Pinkowish consider that “the third-party origi­
nators are mortgage brokers and loan correspondents who sell 
mortgages they originate to acquiring mortgage lenders called whole 
sale lenders”13.
Whole sale is one o f the simple ways for funding mortgage 
lending in Russia. The characteristic feature o f whole loans is absence 
o f unified standard. Some o f banks complete agreements with 
AHML/regional operators and work according AHML standards. 
Other banks develop their own mortgage products, which differ each 
from other in Loan-to-value (LTV) level, currency, maturity, scoring 
system and other characteristics.
The key players in the whole loans sales Russian market are 
mortgage lenders. Usually large banks buy pool o f mortgages for own 
balance or for further securitization. Each buyer o f whole loans 
selects mortgages according his own requirements. Small and average 
banks sell mortgage portfolio for funding mortgage origination.
Whole loans are traded by retail and whole-sale, for resale and 
following securitization. For example, whole loans sales allows buyer 
to add missing volume o f mortgages in securitized pool.
In such situation the originator benefits from an immediate profit 
by selling the pool o f loans for a price greater than the face value. The 
buyer o f the pool is willing to pay this premium in order to gain the
12 Bradley E., Kane B. Europe’s Whole Sales Market Burgeoning As 
Mortgage Credit Market Comes O f Age. Standard & Poor’s. June 6, 
2005.
13 M. Dennis, T. Pinkowish. Residential mortgage lending. South- 
Western. 2004.
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opportunity to securitize the pool to earn a return on the capital 
m arkets14.
Unfortunately there is no correct disclosed information about 
volume and number o f the whole loans sales in Russia. The scheme 
o f the whole loans sales is shown in scheme 2.
It is really important for parties o f whole sales transactions to 
make correct estimations about originator’s mortgage operations for 
further selection and pricing mortgages. Mortgage market transpa­
rency and all-round automation o f mortgage operations are among 
favorable factors for whole sales development.
Also the servicing is a key issue in the whole sales market. In 
some whole loan sales, the buyer o f the loan portfolio will take on the 
servicing o f these loans, while in other cases, the buyer will outsource 
the servicing to a third party15.
Scheme 2. Whole loans sales.
14 Bradley E., Kane B. Europe’s Whole Sales Market Burgeoning As 
Mortgage Credit Market Comes O f Age. Standard & Poor’s. June 6,
2005.
15 Bradley E., Kane B. Europe’s Whole Sales Market Burgeoning As 
Mortgage Credit Market Comes O f Age. Standard & Poor’s. June 6
2005.
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1.3. Securitization
Securitization is a great financial innovation o f XX century. Asset 
securitizion is becoming one o f the dominant means o f capital 
formation in the United States16. S. Schwarcz remarks that not only 
asset securitization is one o f the most important financing vehicles in 
the United States, but its use is rapidly expanding worldwide17.
Some authors distinguish on-balance and off-balance securi­
tizations. In on-balance securitization the lending institution sets up a 
fund and then issues securities: assets remain the property o f the 
issuer and remain on its balance sheet, along with securities, which 
are shown on the liabilities side. Off-balance securitization is when 
the lending institution isolates the assets backing the issue from the 
rest o f its assets by selling them to a special purpose vehicle, which 
then issues the securities18.
Other researches mean under “securitization” only subtypes o f  the 
off-balance securitization. J. Tanega holds an opinion that securi­
tization is the packaging o f income producing assets underwritten and 
sold in the form o f asset-backed securities normally secured over 
those assets19. S. Gangwani defined that securitization is a pooling o f 
“homogeneous”, “financial”, “cash flow producing”, “illiquid” assets 
and issuing claims on those assets in the form o f marketable 
securities. Using securitization, financial institutions and industrial
90firms can make certain assets suitable for sale in the capital markets .
Author offers to define mortgage securitization as process o f 
transformation illiquid mortgage assets in liquid marketable secu­
rities. Thus according last definition we can combine mortgage- 
backed securities (off-balance securitization) and mortgage bonds
16 Securities and Exchange Comission (1992).
17 Schwarcz S. The Alchemy of Asset Securitization // Stanford Journal 
of Law, Buisness & Finance. Vol. 1:133, 1994.
18 Suarez J.L., Vassalo A. European mortgage market: an overview 
1992-2003. WP №562. June 2004.
19 Tanega J. Russian Mortgage-Backed Securitisations. Analysis o f Legal 
Structures and Risks. Russian Structed Finance Investment Forum. Sep­
tember 10-11, 2006.
20 Gangvani S. Securitization 101 // Speaking of securitization. Vol. 3 
Issue 4—1. July 20, 1998.
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(on-balance securitization) as “mortgage securities” . Off-balance 
securitizations are highly developed in U.S.; on-balance securi­
tizations are more typical for Europe. Such approach is not dis­
paraged specific character and complication o f the off-balance 
securitization, at the same time we can consider and compare diffe­
rent ways o f funding mortgage origination from securities market.
Total volume o f securitized transactions in Russia equals about 
3.2 billion U.S. dollars. Among realized securitizations in Russia 
there are auto loans, lease receivables, future flow, consumer credits 
and residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) transactions. 
The share o f RMBS securitizations equals about 5% o f total volume 
o f securitized transactions in Russia .
In 2006 the first off-shore securitization transactions o f Russian 
mortgage loans were launched: Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 
2006-1 S.A. (88.3 million U.S. dollars) and Citymortgage MBS 
Finance B.V (72.6 million U.S. dollars). The state-owned Vnesh­
torgbank and private City Mortgage Bank were as originators in these 
transactions. The structure o f the transaction Russian Mortgage 
Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A. (originator -  Vneshtorgbank) is 
illustrated in the scheme 3.
Above-named transactions clearly show strengths and risks related 
mortgage business in Russia (see table l ) 22.
21 Baklanova V. Securitization and MBS in Russia. Moody’s Investors 
Service. 2006.
22 See Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A. Prospectus 
dated by 18 July 2006; Citymortgage MBS Finance B.V. Prospectus 
dated by 10 August 2006.
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Scheme 3. Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A.23
23 Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A. Prospectus dated by
18 July 2006.
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Table 1. Strengths and risks relating to Russian MBS
Strengths Risks
• Strong underwriting and 
servicing requirements;
• acceptable LTV (Loan-to- 
V alue Ratio) and DTI (Debt-to- 
Income Ratio) o f  mortgage 
loans in portfolios;
• insurance coverage for 110 
percent o f  the loan outstanding 
for the w hole life o f  the loan 
against the fo llow ing risks: 
borrower’s death or disability; 
property title loss;
• appraisal o f  property by 
independent licensed appraisals;
• state registration o f  
mortgages transfer from the 
Originator to the Issuer and 
borrower notification o f  sale;
• presence o f  credit 
enhancement in securitization 
structures;
• financially sound parties o f  
transactions.
General risks relating to Russian 
Federation includes:
• social and econom ic instability;
• lack o f  independence o f  the judicial 
system , the difficulty o f  enforcing court 
decisions;
• Russian law and court practice on 
assignm ent is either unclear or 
inconsistent; securitization structures are 
new  in Russia and have not been properly 
tested in the Russian courts;
• possibility o f  the political 
intervention (the Yukos Oil 
Company affair).
Risks relating to the Russian taxation:
• underdevelopment o f  the Russian 
taxation system and possibility o f  the 
changes, which could have an adverse 
effect on the mortgage portfolio;
• payments on the mortgage loans 
may be subject to Russian withholding 
tax;
• tax may be withheld on disposal o f  
the N otes in Russia, reducing proceeds 
from disposal;
• V AT may be due on the sale o f  the 
receivables by the originator.
Risks relating to the Russian mortgage 
market and mortgage portfolios:
• limited secondary market for 
mortgage loans;
•  lack o f  the historical data relating to 
prepayments and defaults o f  mortgage 
loans;
• presence o f  currency mismatch 
between loan payment in U SD  and 
borrower’s incom e in RUR.
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The Russian legal framework for mortgages and mortgage-backed 
securities remains underdeveloped. “Countries around the world are 
changing laws to facilitate securitization. There is an abundance o f 
different types o f assets in different countries, the biggest challenges 
lie in developing legal and regulatory frameworks”24.
On the one hand, “the development o f instruments o f the securi­
tization o f financial asses and o f the market o f  mortgage securities” is 
one o f the main directions o f the Russian state policy on the 
development o f the financial markets in 2006-20082 . On the other 
hand, there is no any special legislation on securitization in Russia.
In 2003 the Federal Law “On mortgage-backed securities (MBS)” 
was passed, it should lay the foundation o f mortgage securitization in 
Russia. The law distinguishes following types o f MBS:
a) mortgage bonds, issued by the Mortgage Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) or any lending organization;
b) mortgage participations.
Unfortunately none o f mortgage-backed securities hadn’t been issued 
according to the law. All researches agree in opinion that the main 
reason for current situation is incompleteness o f Russian legislation. 
The significant amendments to Law on Mortgage securities were 
passed in December 2005 and in July 2006. The most essential o f 
them are following:
a) cancellation o f obligatory borrower’s life insurance;
b) possibility to issue subordinated tranches o f mortgage bonds;
c) reduction o f mortgage bonds overcollateralization requirements 
from 30% up to 20%;
d) collateral shouldn’t include mortgages without real estate in­
surance for more than 6 months;
e) right conferred to investors on prepayments mortgage bonds if it 
accords to decision o f issue.
24 Gangvani S. Securitization 101 // Speaking of securitization. Vol. 3 
Issue 4-1. July 20, 1998.
25 Order of the Government of Russian Federation “Strategy of the 
development o f the financial market of the Russian Federation in 2006- 
2008” №793-r dated by 1 June 2006.
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In September 2006 Russian government allows to invest pension 
savings in mortgage securities. Residential mortgage securities can be 
included in pension investments after listing o f the stock exchange26. 
However Russian legislation on MBS needs further improvements.
1.4. Asset management instruments
Instead o f national mortgage-backed securities other funding ways 
(forms o f asset management) are intensively developed in Russia: 
closed end unit investment trusts (CUIT) and common fund of 
banking asset management (CFBM).
Closed end unit investment trusts are established by Federal Law 
“On Investment Funds” . The working scheme o f mortgage closed end 
CUIT is shown in the scheme 4. For joining to the UIT’s asset 
management agreement potential shareholder should buy shares 
issued Management Company. The CUIT’s property is a common 
shared property o f shareholders; share o f CUIT is a registered non­
issuing security without face value.
The term o f the asset management agreement is concluded for 1- 
15 years27. It is a weakness o f CUIT because it can’t include long­
term mortgage loans over 15 years. An investment interest to mort­
gage CUIT increases; thus shares o f CUIT’s most likely will replace 
mortgage participations.
In 1997 Central Bank o f the Russian Federation issued Instruction 
relating to CFBM 28. The institute o f the CFBM looks like CUITs, but 
there are some differences:
26 Resolution of the Government o f Russian Federation №379 dated by
12 September 2006.
Federal Law “On investment funds” №156-FZ dated by 29 November 
2001.
"8 Instruction of the Central Bank of Russian Federation “On procedure 
of the implementation of asset management operations and their 
accounting by credit organizations of Russian Federation” №63 dated by
2 July 1997.
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Scheme 4. Closed End Unit Investment Trust.
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• The sharing certificate is confirmed transfer o f the property under 
asset management. But unlike o f the CUIT’s share the CFBM 
sharing certificate isn’t a property and can’t be used for sale, other 
deals;
• Credit organization -  asset manager isn’t able to lend loans at the 
expense o f the CFBM;
• Instruction o f Central Bank prohibits transferring the property 
from credit organization -  asset manager under asset management 
o f other credit organization.
CUITs are more development instruments in comparison with CFBM. 
CUIT’s shares can be bought or sold on a stock exchange unlike of 
sharing certificates o f CFBM. Thus, CUIT’s shares are more liquid 
instrument.
Conclusion
To sum up there are different ways for the funding mortgage lending 
in Russia, which are represented in the summary table 2.
Table 2. The financial instruments for funding mortgage lending in 
Russia
Financial instrument Presence in Russian 
economy
Corporate bonds In practice
Whole loans sales In practice
Mortgage securities according Federal Law 
(National securitization)
In theory
Mortgage-backed securities (Off-shore 
securitization)
In practice
Closed end unit investment trusts (CUIT) In practice
Common fund of banking asset 
management (CFBM)
In practice
Thus, Russian legislation should be improved to make instruments for 
mortgage funding perfectly clear to investors. At the same time the 
development o f mortgage business depends on general conditions 
such as stability in economy, politics and society.
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Abstract
As a transition economy, Croatia faces a daunting economic struggle 
if it is to realize the hoped for advances which are expected to accrue 
from its admittance to the European Union within the next decade. 
Principle among these challenges is to find ways of expanding the 
rate of increase in its gross domestic product and still maintain the 
relative price stability it has enjoyed through most of the transition 
era. But in order to achieve these advances, most agree that an 
increase in domestic capital investment will be required and that in 
accomplishing this a fluid and efficient market for venture capital in 
the country must be developed.
In the present study the market for venture capital in Croatia at the 
present time is analyzed through a series of interviews and 
calculations with respect to each of the suppliers of venture capital in 
the country. Conclusions are arrived at which seek to determine the
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relative balance between the supply and demand for venture capital. 
We then look to the reasons behind any imbalance which is found, 
seek to understand the likely consequences of this imbalance, and 
suggest means by which the imbalance might be redressed.
Keywords: venture capital, transition, Croatia
1. Introduction
The purpose o f this paper is to give an account o f venture capital in 
Croatia at the present time and suggest what could be done to 
improve the flow o f this vital cog in the wheel o f economic growth in 
the country. We define venture capital as funds provided to seed, 
startup and expansion firms with high prospects for growth, though 
encumbered with considerable business risk, and, in thin capital 
market countries, such as Croatia, also subject to considerable doubt 
as to the efficacy o f the exit mechanism'. In addition to direct and 
initial financing, venture capitalists provide entrepreneurial firms 
with trenches for subsequent direct financing, contacts and sources of 
additional financing, help with indirect financing (such as trade 
credits), management and other advisory services, technical expertise 
and a vast array o f other useful services2. Venture capitalists are 
therefore an important determinant o f establishment and growth of 
small and medium size enterprises (see Timmons and By grave, 
(1986)).
In order to undertake the present study, the authors conducted a 
series o f detailed and extensive interviews with all venture capital 
entities the authors are aware o f which operated in this capacity (in 
any o f its many forms) in Croatia at the present time (May, June, July 
and September 2005). The interviews were semi-structured and 
incorporated, among other things, a detailed series o f questions about 
the size o f the fund in terms o f presently employed, committed and 
available capital, the total number o f  venture capital investments, the
1 For a useful discussion and analysis o f venture capital exit mechanisms, 
see, Dubil (2002).
2 For an interesting analysis of venture capitalists’ role as monitors of 
managers o f private firms which they help finance, see Lerner (1995).
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average size o f the investment, the industries (if  any) in which these 
investments were concentrated, the average rate o f return sought and 
that achieved, its total number o f employees and the capacities in 
which they operate, their investment criteria, the system of exit 
mechanisms typically engaged in, their view o f the problems faced by 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in Croatia at the present time 
and means for their alleviation and many other like inquiries.
This paper is structured as follows: firstly, we look at some o f the 
relevant prior literature on the subject at hand. Then, we seek to 
determine which is more predominant at the present time, the supply 
or the demand for venture capital in Croatia. Next, we attempt to 
explain the reasons we find for the current imbalance between the 
supply and the demand for venture capital in the country and look to 
the likely consequences o f this imbalance. Finally, conclusions follow 
in which we suggest measures designed to redress present differences 
between the supply and the demand for venture capital in Croatia.
2. Relevant prior literature
The greatly disparate size o f the Croatian economy and that o f the 
US3 must initially compel one to look elsewhere for examples o f 
international guidance. In a study by Hindle and Wenban (1999) o f 
the Australian venture capital market (an economy far greater than 
that o f Croatia, but with less o f a disparity than the US), the authors 
find that the informal venture capital market in that country is 
comprised principally o f high net worth non-institutional private 
equity investors (or Angles as the term is commonly employed) who 
provide the bulk o f high risk capital directly to new and growing 
businesses. The funds provided by these sources are considerably 
more significant than institutional investors as a source o f direct 
financing for entrepreneurial firms. However, while considerable 
individual high net worth capital is currently at hand in Australia, in 
Croatia as the result o f the economic ravages o f the transition era, 
little such capital is currently available. Moving to an economy far 
closer to Croatia (both geographically and historically as well as in
3 Far more research as to the nature and size of US venture capital has 
been conducted than with respect to any other country.
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terms o f economic traditions, though still far greater in terms o f size), 
Germany, and seeking to uncover differences between the venture 
capital market in that country and that in the US, a striking difference 
between US and German venture capital is observed in terms of the 
prime sources o f funds for this latter market. While pensions account 
for the bulk o f venture capital resources in the US, they contribute 
very little in Germany. Banks and insurance companies are more 
important in this capacity in Germany relative to the US. In addition, 
in the US, government agencies did not contribute at all to the venture 
capital market4, while in Germany this source represented 8% of total 
venture capital funds5. The above is significant to the present study in 
that, while Croatia falls well within the Germanic tradition of a 
financial market largely dominated by debt and banking sources of 
funds, rather than by equity and ownership financing, only two of the 
venture capital entities we were able to identify in Croatia got some 
funds from domestic banks (but none were venture capital arms of 
banks)6. This is so in spite o f the fact that the vast preponderance of 
the banking assets in Croatia are German and/or Austrian owned and 
controlled. Also interesting, is that the authors were able to uncover 
and interview one governmental quasi venture capital program in 
Croatia.
Key to an understanding o f the venture capital market in any 
country is an appreciation o f the crucial nature of the contract which 
specifies the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist and the typical such contracts which are drawn in the 
country. In a landmark study o f this vital contractual relationship 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) compare the characteristics of real 
world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting 
theory. To do so they study the actual contracts between entre­
4 For a noteworthy exception to the above, see Lemer, (1999))
5 Black and Gilson, (2005).
6 This can be explained by the fact that the functioning o f foreign venture 
capital funds on the domestic market (because o f the non-existent regu­
latory framework) was, at least until December 31, 2005, much easier 
than the functioning o f domestic venture capital funds. Consequently, the 
authors discovered that there was only one domestic venture capitalist in 
the Croatian market, which was really comparable to a venture capital 
fund in developed countries (see below).
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preneurs and venture capitalists and then interpret their results in 
relation to existing financial contracting theories. Their findings 
show a rather close association between theory and practice in this 
area and demonstrate why the nature o f these contractual relation­
ships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in the US have 
become a model to be emulated in much o f the rest o f the world 
which is seeking to develop an active venture capital market. One o f 
the issues we stressed in our interviews was the nature o f the typical 
contracting relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
in Croatia. While the character o f the information we obtained in this 
area was not uniform across our interviews, we feel we were able to 
understand much about the nature o f  the contractual relationships o f 
this type which are common in the country. (For more on this key 
contractual relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist, particularly when the various financings are to come in 
differing stages, see, Booth, Dalgic and Young, (2005a), and Booth, 
Dalgic and Young, (2005b)).
3. Venture capital in Croatia at the present time
Croatia is a Southeast European country in transition and an official 
candidate for the European Union. It has 4,4 million inhabitants and a 
GDP o f about $34,99 billion (2005 est.) (CIA, 2006). Although 
economic growth Croatia has experienced since the stabilisation 
program was implemented in 1994 has on average been 4,4%, large 
part o f it has only compensated for a huge output loss due to the 
initial ‘transition recession’ and war from 1991 till 1995. Inflation in 
the span o f last 10 years (1996-2005) has on average been 3,5%. 
However, an average administrative unemployment rate from 1998 
till 2005 has been 20%7. In addition, Croatia has a weak compe­
titiveness position which has been reflected in the widening trade 
deficit with the EU (Croatia’s principal trading partner) since 1993. 
Hence, Croatia has seen an enormous increase in foreign indeb­
tedness, which now exceeds more than 80% o f its GDP.
In order to achieve admittance to the European Union, Croatia 
needs to have, according to the Copenhagen criteria, “a functioning
7 Authors’ calculations based on data from the Croatian National Bank.
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market economy” which should be able to cope with the competitive 
pressures o f the EU ’s internal market. In other words, Croatia needs 
to strengthen its competitiveness. Although a lot has been done in this 
respect in the past several years, Croatia is still struggling. For 
example, World Economic Forum ranked Croatia 61s’ in 2004 and 
62nd in 2005 according to the Growth Competitiveness Index (out of 
117 countries)8.
There are four venture capital organizations in Croatia at the 
present time. Their names are as follows: SEAF Croatia, Horizonte 
Venture Management, Copernicus Kapital and Quaestus Private 
Equity Partneri. Horizonte Venture Management and Copernicus 
Kapital are firms that act as intermediaries between foreign venture 
capital firms and investees9, SEAF Croatia is organized as a 
representative office o f a firm principally based in Washington DC. 
In addition, there is Vienna Capital Partners, which is not exclusively 
a private equity firm, but which operates in some of its capacities as 
such. M oreover, although by no means a source o f private equity 
venture capital, also to be included in this general area as well as 
within the scope o f our interviews is the Croatian Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and its Equity Programme10. 
Pertinent qualitative and quantitative information on the above 
entities is provided in Appendix 1.
8 This index rests on the following three factors: “the quality of the 
macroeconomic environment, the state of the country’s public insti­
tutions, and, given the importance of technology and innovation, the 
level o f its technological readiness.” (World Economic Forum, 2005: xiv; 
emphasis original).
9 Due to inadequate legal regulation, foreign venture capital funds were, 
until December 31, 2005, preferred to domestic ones. Simply put, 
because venture capital funds in Croatia were, until then not regulated. A 
domestic venture capital fund would pay more taxes than a foreign 
venture capital counterpart that invests in Croatia (cf. HVCA, 2005).
10 In the following, for the sake o f brevity, we will refer to all six as 
venture capitalists, although two of them function more as private equity 
firms -  Quaestus Private Equity Partneri and Vienna Capital Partners. 
However, these two firms have also had venture capital investments. We 
can define private equity as a term that includes not only venture capital, 
but also leveraged buyouts, consolidation, mezzanine financing, 
distressed debt investments and hybrid financing (cf. Lemer, 2000: 520).
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Contrary to our initial expectations, based upon the notion that 
capital is generally a rather scarce commodity in transition eco­
nomies, some o f our interviewees stated that at present there was an 
excess o f supply over demand for venture capital in Croatia. There 
are two fundamental reasons why we believe this is so. The first is 
that there is a big difference between venture capital funds committed 
and venture capital funds invested to date. In addition, we found that 
venture capitalists in Croatia usually look for entrepreneurial firms 
themselves (by paying finders fees, telephone solicitations, word or 
mouth and other such techniques), instead o f waiting for entre­
preneurs to apply for financing. We take this as a prim a facie  sign o f 
an excess o f supply over demand for venture capital. We will exa­
mine each o f these two reasons in turn.
From the six venture capitalists, three could be considered to have 
invested the total amount o f funds directly available to them 11. These 
three are SEAF Croatia, Copernicus Kapital and Vienna Capital 
Partners. The three others, Horizonte Venture Management, Quaestus
Private Equity Partneri and the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and
12Development, still have funds to be invested . Although we cannot 
estimate the exact size o f the excess supply (because o f the 
proprietary nature o f these figures), Appendix 1 indicates that these 
funds are likely considerable.
It has been shown from US experience that when the supply o f 
venture capital exceeds demand, venture capitalists have tended to 
take on riskier projects (see for example, Gompers and Lemer, 
(2000)). This condition, which is potentially deleterious for an 
advanced economy such as the US, is especially hazardous for 
weaker transition economies, such as Croatia. It is also pernicious for 
the future o f venture capital in general. When the supply o f venture 
capital grows relative to the demand for this financing source, lower 
rate o f return, riskier and more questionable projects are taken on by 
venture capitalists. There tends to be more bankruptcies and lower 
returns to venture capitalists (giving them less capital for future 
activities). Adding to this problem is the condition that venture capital
11 Or, of disposable money, in the case of Vienna Capital Partners.
12 However, the equity programme of the Croatian Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development has not been active for more than two years and it 
is possible that it will not be active again.
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needs to be committed and is constantly seeking high return invest­
ments. As a result, since the less risky, higher return projects will be 
financed first, only lower return, higher risk projects are then 
available. In the US, when this happened in the early years of this 
century, more risky projects initially tended to be taken on by venture 
capitalists, with an eventual decline in venture capital funds 
committed. More projects were accepted as a percentage o f those 
seen, and this resulted in the risk -  return curve tending to shift so as 
to include more high risk, low return projects. This is potentially very 
dangerous for Croatia, particularly at this very delicate stage of its 
transition process.
As we learned from the interviews with venture capitalists, they 
usually search for investees themselves, which means that supply 
quite likely exceeds demand. Investees are usually found in business 
databases or through referrals from business people. However, there 
are also situations when potential investees apply themselves. Further 
indicating the excess o f supply over demand for venture capital in 
Croatia is that as told to us in our interviews, venture capitalists 
frequently pay finder’s fees for successful referrals. As venture 
capitalists generally do not advertise, companies rarely know of their 
existence, so there is informational asymmetry.
In addition, Croatia is largely a banking culture in the Germanic 
tradition. Since it is by historical and socio-economic background a 
debt, rather than an equity culture, entrepreneurs generally think of 
financing their business ventures in terms o f debt and banks, rather 
than equity and venture capitalists. This lack o f an equity culture 
results in a general failure on the part o f entrepreneurs to understand 
the meaning and use o f  this form o f financing. As recent research of 
high-technology firms based in Zagreb shows, 60.53% of the firms 
surveyed answered no to the question o f whether they had any 
interest in a private equity financing o f their larger investment 
projects (Grupe, 2004: 20). The entrepreneurs rejected private equity 
financing “ ... mostly due to the fear that they might lose their 
independence” (Grupe, 2004: 20), and presumably also due to the 
fear o f some loss o f control o f  their firm. The above was so although 
many such firms suffered from a liquidity problem and a lack of 
ready financial resources. The aforementioned study found only 
21.05% o f entrepreneurs expressing a general interest in private 
equity financing and a miniscule 2.63% who actually attempted to
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obtain private equity financing, all without success. These findings 
are consistent with what an interviewee venture capital firm told us, 
that in Croatia there was a lack o f “... knowledge about venture 
capital as well as the absence o f a mindset conducive to this form o f 
financing”. The aforementioned points to the fact that the problem of 
informational asymmetry is huge.
4. Conditions which might enhance the venture 
capital market in Croatia
Our interviews and study o f legal, accounting and other institutionally 
relevant factors uncovered several conditions which might increase 
the flow o f venture capital in Croatia. Speedier litigation procedures 
and a more efficient court system could result in more rapid contract 
enforcement and a greater willingness o f venture capitalists to take on 
more projects. One venture capitalist we spoke to indicated that they 
would welcome a greater system o f regulation o f their industry, if  this 
would enable and stimulate domestic investors to invest in venture 
capital funds. In addition to this venture capitalist, the Croatian Pri­
vate Equity and Venture Capital Association also lobbied for a 
regulatory framework for the same reasons -  growth o f the domestic 
venture capital market. Additional considerations potentially helpful 
to the venture capital industry in the country lie in the legal 
environment, which might be improved by the new regulation on 
venture capital in the Law on Investment Funds, to be discussed 
below. The small size o f the country’s economy results in a lack o f 
sufficient economies o f scale for the establishment o f business 
brokers. Perhaps by grouping nearby countries such as Slovenia, 
Hungary, etc., regional business brokerage services could be 
established.
The interviewee venture capitalists were uniform in their 
complaints about the questionable enforceability o f their contracts, 
since court procedures appear to be excessively lengthy. One venture 
capitalist expressed the opinion that “contract enforcement is almost 
impossible” and went on to do a contract with an investee in London, 
as opposed to closing it in Croatia. This is consistent with findings 
about the inefficiencies o f the Croatian judicial system and the 
questionable enforceability o f its judgm ents (European Commission,
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2004). It is also in accord with more general conclusions as to the 
overall inefficiency o f the Croatian legal system and its “complicated 
and lengthy administrative procedures” (see, Social Development 
Report -  Croatia 2001, as referred to in Singer et al., (2003), 37).
It was not until January 1 200613, that Croatian Law formally 
spelled out and individually specified venture capital in the Law on 
Investment Funds. Accordingly, venture capitalists functioning in the 
country could, until the end o f 2005, not operate as such on a de jure 
basis. The new Law on Investment Funds has been amended and 
updated and it now incorporates venture capital funds. However, tax 
laws on venture capital activities should also be altered so as to 
enhance the desirability o f the use o f this activity both from the 
perspective o f the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist.
The lack o f transparency o f entrepreneurial activities is another 
problem hindering a larger flow o f venture capital. All our inter­
viewees objected to this. Entrepreneurial firms often lack the 
necessary transparency and openness that stimulate venture capital 
investments. Also bearing on the transparency issue, especially in a 
relatively small country such as Croatia, is the quality o f the human 
factor as well as the building o f relationships o f real trust between 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, which will be enhanced by this 
greater transparency and which is crucial in making the investment 
decision-making process in Croatia more efficient.
There are additional reasons for the underdevelopment of the 
venture capital industry in Croatia. One o f the most significant 
amongst these is that, as further described in Švaljek (2005), pension 
funds were unable until the end o f 2005 to invest in private equity or 
venture capital funds. Additionally, insurance companies are allowed 
to invest in private equity or venture capital funds only up to a certain 
specified limit. Further, the lack o f a concessionary corporate tax rate 
for small and medium size companies is a considerable detriment to 
such firms as they attempt to compete with the greater economic 
power wielded by larger firms. Moreover, there are no tax advantages 
offered to individual investors who might then think more favourable 
o f placing their funds into private equity or venture capital funds. 
Finally, the cumbersome and lengthy procedures required for both the 
founding and bankruptcy and/or liquidation o f firms, places
13 The date when the new Law on Investment Funds came into force.
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undesirable encumbrances on both entrepreneurial and venture capital 
activities.
The new Law on Investment Funds, that came into force on 
January 1, 2006, regulates venture capital funds for the first time. 
This law will definitely facilitate the founding o f new venture capital 
funds, although there are some caveats. Namely, only “qualified 
investors” can invest into venture capital funds, meaning that there is 
a threshold both for individual and institutional investors into these 
funds. In our opinion, this threshold is set extremely high for 
individual investors14. In addition, investment limits are set regarding 
the maximum amount o f  money to be invested in an industry (venture 
capital funds are not allowed to invest more than 40% o f the fund’s 
capital in any one industry). Moreover, venture capital funds are 
supposed to make at least 5 investments from the day they are 
founded15. Furthermore, the Law stipulates that venture capital funds 
should report to the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency 
(CFSSA), and that CFSSA should enact by-laws which would further 
regulate venture capital funds in a way that is unpredictable at the 
present time. Also, the Law forbids venture capital funds from 
advertising themselves.
5. Conclusions -  redressing the imbalance between 
the supply and demand for venture capital 
in Croatia at the present time
This study’s intention was to describe the venture capital industry in 
Croatia, to investigate the manner in which it performs and to suggest 
means by which performance might be enhanced. Although the 
Croatian venture capital industry has been concluded to be less 
developed than its counterparts in nearby other transition economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, as 
discussed in Grupe, 2004) and in spite o f our findings as to factors 
hindering its further development, there appears to be a clear excess
14 Private individuals who want to invest into (domestic) venture capital 
funds need to have at least 2.7 million euro of net assets and at least 1.35 
million euro of cash for investments into venture capital funds.
15 Shares of any one investee should not exceed 33% of the fund’s size.
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o f supply o f such capital over demand. Ultimately, this phenomenon 
is potentially dangerous for the future o f the venture capital industry 
in Croatia and for its economy as a whole. This is the case, among 
other reasons, since as found for other countries venture capitalists 
tend to take on riskier and less promising projects when the supply of 
venture capital exceeds its demand. Accordingly, the development of 
the venture capital industry in Croatia requires improvements both on 
the supply and demand sides. We trust that the supply side will be 
assisted by the measures suggested above. Unfortunately, measures 
undertaken so as to assist the demand side will likely be the more 
difficult to successfully realize. For as developed above, this lack of 
demand seems to be rooted in historical socio-economic conditions 
which are likely to only change more slowly and over a considerable 
period o f time through education o f the entrepreneurial class in the 
country as to the benefits o f proper techniques for the use o f equity 
and venture capital.
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APPENDIX 1: Venture Capitalists in Croatia
Table 1: Pertinent Information on Venture Capitalists in Croatia16
Name of
management
company
Size o f  fund 
or o f dis­
posable 
money 
(in millions)
Average 
size of 
investments 
(in millions]
Total size of 
all invest­
ments to 
date 
(in millions)
Total 
number o f  
invest­
ments to 
date
Total 
number of 
venture 
capital 
invest­
ments17
Horizonte
Venture
M anagement
€ 2 0 .0 n/a n/a 2 2
SEAF Croatia $ 8.2 $ 0.3 $ 8 .018 21 21
Copernicus
Kapital
$ 30.0 n/a $ 3 0 .0 19 Approx 6 most 
o f  them
Quaestus Pri­
vate Equity 
Partneri
€ 3 5 .0 ca. €  2.92 ca. €  
11.67
4 4
Vienna Capital 
Partners
€ 3 5 . 0 -
40.0
€ 9 .0 € 3 8 .0 4 1
Croatian Bank 
for Recon­
struction and 
D evelopm ent20
€  8.22 € 0 . 5 1 €4 . 1 8 8
Source: In-person interviews conducted by authors during May, June, July and 
September 0 5
16 As of July 15, 2005, except for Quaestus Private Equity Partneri (as of 
September 28, 2005). In euro or US dollars, as stated.
17 Only seed, start-up and expansion-phase investments are noted here.
18 Included in this total are $ 1.0 million of operational costs, mostly 
attributable to fund management.
19 Included in this total are $ 4.0 million of operational costs mostly 
attributable to fund management.
The Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development is a state 
owned development bank and not a venture capital fund as such. Instead, 
this is a government run programme which makes equity investments in 
Small and Medium Enterprises.
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Abstract
The common EU financial services’ market creates new 
opportunities to the Baltic States. At the same time the adoption of 
the common European currency in Baltic countries is possible 
only when they fulfil certain economic criteria, namely, a high 
degree of price stability, a sound fiscal situation, stable exchange 
rates and converged long-term interest rates. For that it must be 
strong and competitive financial sector in every new member 
country as well as an efficient and stable common market for 
financial services. New currency will affect on economic inter­
mediaries such as banks, payment system, financial markets, 
regulatory agencies and enterprises. The use of the euro will 
strengthen Baltic countries’ attractiveness for investment and 
encourage their trade relations, and in the long run will create 
more favourable conditions for the development of the national 
economies. Banks and financial sector are sufficiently controlled; 
therefore transition to euro can be predicted and carried out with a 
high reliability. In this paper are presented financial institutions 
across the Baltic countries. The aim of the paper is contribute to 
better understanding o f these intermediaries before of European 
currency in the Baltic countries.
Keywords: financial sector, banks, financial institutions
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Introduction
The financial and banking sectors occupy a pivotal position in the 
global economy. These sectors has been subject to many external and 
internal forces in many countries, particularly in the Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania since the 1991s. O f the external forces, technological 
change is likely to have the most far-reaching impact on the sectors. 
Internal change has been greatly amplified by increased customer 
influence. The synergies o f these forces will bring about a major 
transformation o f the financial (and especially banking system) 
sector.
The financial sector is very important for capital allocation, 
financial intermediation, transformation o f savings into investments, 
risk sharing and risk diversification. Well-developed financial 
markets and bank activities also improve productivity and signi­
ficantly affect economic growth. (Kulhanek 2004). Therefore, the 
analysis o f the financial sector and its role in financial intermediation 
is very important for new accession countries in the context of the 
European Union enlargement. In addition, the relation between 
banking intermediation and intermediation performed by financial 
markets is becoming increasingly noticeable.
The common EU financial services’ market created new oppor­
tunities to the Baltic States. But the weakness o f financial sector 
doesn’t allow achieving expected growth and improving the pro­
ductivity. Based on above, the main objective o f this paper is to learn 
about the development o f the financial and banking sector in the 
Baltic States. In this paper are given a brief overview of the develop­
ment o f the financial and banking sector in the Baltic States.
The Structure of Financial Sector
Financial sectors and banking systems in the Baltic States have 
undergone fundamental changes since the beginning o f the transition 
process about fifteen years ago. All three countries belong to the 
group o f transition economies which evolved from centrally planned 
to market economies. There were no financial markets, and banking 
sectors were formed almost entirely by so-called monobanks. Upon 
transition, the following key reforms were implemented:
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• monobanks were abolished and two-tier banking systems with the
• central bank and commercial banks were introduced;
• sectoral restrictions on specialized banks were relaxed;
• the licensing policy for most kinds o f banking business was 
liberalized;
• privately owned banks were admitted and the privatization o f the
• state-owned banks was initiated;
• foreign banks and joint ventures were granted access; and
• the legal framework and supervisory system were introduced and 
adjusted (Kulhanek 2004).
Financial market involves three main groups o f participants: final 
lenders, final borrowers and financial intermediaries (financial insti­
tutions and monetary financial institutions). For statistical purposes, 
all entities o f the national economy are grouped into sectors 
according to their economic activity. According to the guidelines o f 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central 
Bank (ECB), monetary financial institutions and other financial 
institutions are central banks, credit institutions, money market funds, 
insurance companies, pension funds, companies engaged in financial 
leasing and crediting against customer’s right o f claim, companies 
financing exports and imports, pawnshops, investment funds, stock 
exchanges, brokerage companies, companies engaged in currency 
exchange, and management companies that exercise direct manage­
ment and control o f subsidiary undertakings involved in financial 
intermediation (Zubkova 2003).
According to ESA 95 (the European System o f Accounts) the 
definitions o f monetary financial institutions (MFI), money market 
funds (MMF) and other financial intermediaries (except insurance 
corporations and pension funds; OFI) were introduced on January 1, 
2005 in Latvia.
The classification o f participants in the Baltic States is presented 
in the Table 1 (with accordance with ESA 95). The main financial 
market participants are banks in the Baltic States.
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Table 1. Monetary Financial Institutions and other intermediaries in the 
Baltic countries, 2006
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
MFI Bank o f  Estonia, Bank o f  Latvia Bank o f  Lithuania
Commercial banks Commercial banks Commercial banks
Foreign bank 
branches
Foreign bank branches Foreign bank 
branches
Representatives o f  
foreign banks
Electronic money 
institutions
Central Credit 
Union
Credit unions Credit unions
M oney market funds M oney market 
funds
OFI Insurances
companies
Corporations engaged in 
lending
Insurances
companies
Investment
Institutions
Investment funds Investment
Institutions
Management 
companies. Pension  
Management 
companies
Securities and 
derivatives dealers
Guarantee Fund Investment management 
companies
Insurance corporations 
and pension funds
Source: Bank o f Estonia, Bank o f Latvia and Bank o f Lithuania
At present, there are already financial sectors in these countries. It 
characterized by overall financial stability. Some characteristics of 
the Baltic financial sector are following. Firstly, the population of 
three Baltic States is totally 7,5 mln. inhabitants. All three countries 
belong to open economies. At the same time, economic integration 
within Baltic countries is very limited. Fourthly, the legislative 
framework for banking meets EU requirements in all three countries. 
Then, the Baltic banks have a significant share o f foreign assets and 
liabilities. Foreign investments were made primarely by investors 
from the Nordic countries. Some banks have full ownership of 
Scandinavia banks. Moreover, in all three countries growth rates is 
still high and markets are still emerging. In addition to mentioned 
above, cost o f IT development is low and World class Internet 
banking is available. So local banks provide high quality banking
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services. This indicates that the national banking sector is already a 
constituent part o f the global financial environment.
Banking Sector
Initially the Baltic countries have selected and introduced in life a 
model o f a universal banking, in which the separation o f banking and 
securities is not mandatory and different segments o f the financial 
market are integrated, giving banking groups the leading position in 
financial intermediation. The history o f the Baltic banking was rooted 
in 1990s (after acquiring the independence). The stages o f  develop­
ment o f banking system a little differ than other countries with 
transition economy. In the beginning new banks have appeared one 
by one, whose careless activity has led to the events which have 
shocked all banking system (the moratoriums were declared to many 
banks). In time banking system gradually has improved, the process 
of licensing and banks merger led to a few banks for the moment (see 
the Figure 1 ).
The overview o f the current number o f banks is presented in the 
next Table 2. There were 7 commercial banks and 7 branches o f 
foreign banks in Estonia by the late 2006s. Currently, 10 commercial 
banks holding a license from the Bank o f Lithuania, 2 foreign bank 
branches, 3 foreign banks representative offices, Central credit union 
of Lithuania and 62 credit unions are operating in the country.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
Figure 1. Number of banks in the Baltic States from 1990 until 2005. 
Source: Bank o f Estonia, Bank o f Latvia and Bank o f Lithuania
■ Estonia 
H Latvia 
С Lithuania
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In Latvia, a credit institution may operate as a bank, or a branch of a 
foreign bank. At the end o f 2006 there were 22 commercial banks and 
one branche o f a foreign bank, 5 representative office o f foreign 
banks and 34 credit unions are operating in the country.
Table 2. The number of credit institutions in the Baltic States in 2006
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Number o f commercial banks 7 22 10
Branches o f foreign banks 7 1 2
Representative offices of foreign banks 5 5 3
Credit unions - 34 62
Source: Bank o f Estonia, Bank o f  Latvia and Bank o f Lithuania
As stated above, the Baltic banking has changed dramatically since 
the new economic and legal framework was introduced in the early 
1990s. Consolidation was followed by an inflow o f foreign capital 
from Scandinavia. Swedish banks acquired majority stakes in 
Estonia’s two biggest banks, increasing the market share o f foreign- 
owned banks to more than 98 percent. The banking sector with 
foreign capital is about 67,8 percent in Latvia. Foreign capital comes 
to the banking sector mainly from the Scandinavian countries and 
Germany. The 5 largest banks account for 2/3 o f total bank assets, 
with many o f the smaller banks targeting niche markets. Currently in 
Lithuania 87.3 percent o f foreign investors owned the local banks. It 
is about two times bigger than in 1998.
Foreign presence is very large in most New Member States 
(NMSs) o f the European Union. On average, more than 70 per cent of 
bank assets are foreign-owned. Foreign presence is notably high also 
in Estonia. Correlation between foreign ownership and ROA in 
NMSs is 0.78 (ECB 2005).
However, most empirical evidence seems to point toward a 
positive association between foreign ownership and banking sector 
performance in transition countries. This is also borne out by the 
evidence in Figure 2 for the banking sectors o f the NMSs. The chart 
suggests a positive relation between foreign ownership and ROA for 
the year 2003. It should be acknowledged, however, that banks’ 
performance may vary substantially within the different NMSs, 
depending not only on ownership, but also on the specialisation and
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strategy o f the individual banks. Foreign presence is very large in 
most NMSs, mainly in the form o f subsidiaries o f foreign banks. On 
average, 72 per cent o f bank assets are foreign-owned. In general, 
NMS banks have a limited presence abroad which more often occurs 
via branches in neighbouring regions, but some banks also have 
equity participations in foreign banks. The market structure o f NMS 
banking sectors is generally characterised by relatively high con­
centration. On average, the largest five banks hold 72 per cent o f  total 
banking sector assets in the NMSs. Given the high concentration in 
most o f the NMSs, potential concerns may arise as regards the degree 
of competition (Naaborg et al. 2004).
Foreign ownership is beneficial for the banking systems o f 
(former) transition countries since it involves a transfer o f technology 
and human capital, which increases the operational capacity o f local 
banks. In particular, foreign ownership is widely believed to have 
contributed to an improvement o f the risk profile, reputation and risk 
management o f local banks and hence to financial stability in NMSs 
and a convergence with Western standards.
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Figure 2. Foreign ownership and banking sector performance in 2003 
Source: European Central Bank, 2005
There are only few studies on the profitability and efficiency o f the 
banking sector in the transition economies. Green et al. (2002) 
estimate the efficiency o f domestic and foreign banks in CEECs, in 
terms o f economies o f scale and scope. They find that foreign banks
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are not really different from domestic banks and that bank ownership 
(foreign versus domestic) is not an important factor in reducing bank 
costs.
Naaborg et al. (2004) examine to what extent foreign banks are 
more efficient and profitable than in transition countries, they 
investigate a number o f indicators at the aggregate level for both 
foreign and domestic banks. The first indicator reflecting banks’ 
profitability is the return on assets (ROA). Figure 3 gives the average 
ROA for foreign and domestic banks. It appears that the average 
ROA o f foreign banks is higher than the average ROA of domestic 
banks.
2 ,0%
1,0%
0 ,0%
- 1,0%
-2 ,0%
-3,0%
-4,0%
-5,0%
ROA Domestic Banks — ■—  ROA Foreign Banks
Figure 3. Return on assets of banks in CEE countries: foreign vs. 
domestic banks, 1995-2000
Source: Naaborg et al. 2004
The picture is severely affected by bad results for domestic banks in 
1998 and 1999. In all other years, the ROA o f domestic banks did not 
diverge much from that o f foreign banks. Figure 3 shows that the 
ROA o f domestic banks tends to converge to the average ROA level 
o f foreign banks. The general conclusion can be that both for 
domestic and for foreign banks there is an upward trend in ROA, 
while domestic banks were more sensitive to the economic and 
financial crisis in 1998 (moratorium from the Russian debt crisis) 
than foreign banks.
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The Assessment the Level of Development 
of the Financial Sector in Baltic States
However, financial sectors in most o f the CEC are still relatively 
small in comparison to the economic activity, size and depth o f 
financial sectors in developed countries (Polouecek, S. 2004). Batic 
States are not exception. At present, there are already financial 
sectors in these countries, but they are relatively young and small. 
The overview of the current state is presented in this chapter.
To assess the level o f development o f the financial sector in the 
Baltic countries Polouecek applied the ratio o f broad money (М2) to 
GDP and banking assets to GDP, loans to GDP.
The indicator М2/ GDP as a common indicator o f bank 
development (depth o f bank). In all three countries the level o f 
financial intermediation, measured by this indicator, is almost similar 
(Table 3).
Even after more than a decade o f transition and bank restructuring, 
this ratio in Latvia and Lithuania is still under 50 per cent. In Estonia, 
the ratio o f М2 to GDP had distinctively increased from 27 per cent 
in 1998 and in the year 2005 had achieved around 50 per cent. 
However, Czechoslovakia entered transition with a very high ratio o f 
М2 to GDP, and this was reflected in high ratios when it split into the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (74.4 per cent and 70.5 per 
cent in 2001, respectively) (Polouecek, S. 2004).
Table 3. Broad money (М2) in the Baltic States (% of GDP, 1998-2005)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estonia 27% 32% 35% 39% 39% 39% 41% 50%
Latvia — — 29% 33% 35% 33% 34% 44%
Lithuania 19% 21% 23% 27% 30% 32% 36% 42%
Source: author’s calculations according to data from Bank o f  Estonia, Bank of  
Latvia and Bank if Lithuania
As is evident from Table 3, the higher ratio o f broad money to GDP 
in the Estonia. The low ratio o f  broad money to GDP indicates a low 
monetary depth o f the economy. It stems not only from the low initial 
level o f this indicator at the beginning o f the transformation but also 
from many other factors. Inflation played a crucial role.
i s
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The second indicator is the ratio o f banking assets to GDP. It 
confirms that the levels o f financial intermediation in the Baltic States 
are relatively low. These banking sectors are currently still small 
relative to economic activity.
Tabel 4. Banking asssets in the Baltic States (% of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estonia 53% 58% 62% 65% 70% 77% 94% 112%
Latvia — - 56% 77% - 84% 91% 122%
Lithuania 28% 27% 29% 32% 33% 39% 47% 64%
Source: author’s calculations according to data from Bank o f Estonia, Bank of 
Latvia and Bank if  Lithuania
In 2005 the ratio o f banking assets to GDP ranged from as low as 64 
per cent in Lithuania to well above 112 per cent in the Estonia (Table 
4).
The low share o f domestic credit in GDP or relatively low loans to 
the GDP ratio could also illustrate the limited level of banking 
intermediation (Polouecek, S. 2004).
The last indicator is the ratio o f loans to GDP has better 
information capability in comparison with the domestic credit to GDP 
ratio and other traditional financial depth indicators. This indicator 
was 135 per cent o f GDP in the euro area. The ratio o f loans to GDP 
was substantially lower in Estonia in 1998, but reached 74 per cent by 
the end o f 2005. The level o f this indicator is still low in Lithuania, 
but it was increasing last years. This development is illustrated in 
Table 5.
Tabel 5. Loans in the Baltic States (% of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estonia 30% 32% 35% 37% 41% 52% 63% 74%
Latvia — — 22% 31% 0% 41% 51% 78%
Lithuania 12% 12% 11% 14% 16% 23% 29% 41%
Source: author’s calculations according to data from Bank o f Estonia, Bank of 
Latvia and Bank if  Lithuania
Rapid growth o f lending activities was facilitated mainly by the 
substantial increase in deposits, which demonstrated reinforcement of
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public confidence in the banking sector in Estonia and Latvia. The 
establishment o f  a deposit insurance scheme, started in 1998, conti­
nued to increase this confidence.
In conclusion, the financial sector o f the Baltic States has 
undergone considerable transformation over the last decade. These 
countries have made a considerable progress and has created an 
institutional structure and legislative framework to support a market- 
oriented financial system. The Baltic financial market is consolidating 
and attracting considerable foreign investment. The entiy o f 
strategically important foreign investors into major Baltic banks has 
made the sector more resilient to general external shocks and 
increased banks’ dependence on the developments in the global 
financial market.
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LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON COMPANIES’ 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE: EU BASED 
EMPIRICAL SURVEY
Aaro Hazak, Mari Mäe
Tallinn University o f Technology
Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the impact of statutory 
minimum share capital and equity requirements, dividend restrictions 
and thin capitalisation rules on capital structure. Comparative 
overview of respective legislation in the EU countries is provided. 
The empirical survey is based on the information available from the 
Datastream database in respect of a sample of companies of the EU 
countries. The results support the hypothesis that in case a country 
has established thin capitalisation rules, the utilisation of debt 
financing by the companies who do not exceed the thin capitalisation 
threshold is lower. However, contrary to the hypothesis tested, 
companies operating in the conditions of statutory maximum 
dividend restrictions tend to have a higher demand for debt. Require­
ments concerning minimum share capital and equity levels and 
minimum dividends do not seem to have a significant impact on 
capital structure.
1. Introduction
The formation o f companies’ capital structure has been an area of 
theoretical and empirical research for nearly half a century, starting 
from the early tax-exclusive model o f Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
to the numerous recent interpretations. However, no consent has been 
reached neither on the optimal capital structure nor on the effect of 
tax and legal factors on com panies’ financing decisions.
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In most countries, a significant volume o f legislation has been 
adopted to regulate financial affairs on a company level for the 
purpose o f promoting companies’ sustainability and protecting 
creditor rights. These statutory regulations include minimum share 
capital and equity requirements, dividend restrictions and thin 
capitalisation rules. The common feature o f these rules is that they 
imply on companies’ capital structure and may in various ways 
constrain voluntary choices between debt and equity financing, as 
discussed in Hazak (2006a). However, there are significant diffe­
rences in the corporate law environment o f countries, including 
within the European Union (“EU”).
This paper seeks to provide an empirical analysis o f the impact o f 
the above regulations on companies’ capital structure. The results o f 
this and related studies may bring out a suggestion for changes in 
some countries’ micro level economic policy and legislation.
The remainder o f this article is structured as follows. Summary 
overview o f key related literature is provided in section 2. Section 3 
deals with cross-country differences in minimum share capital and 
equity requirements, dividend restrictions and thin capitalisation rules 
in the EU countries. Section 4 describes the data and methodology 
used for the survey and presents the key results o f the analysis. 
Section 6 concludes.
2. Key related literature
Several extensive literature analyses have been prepared on the 
formation o f companies’ capital structure, including Prasad, Green 
and Murinde (2001), Myers (2001) and Masulis (1988). These papers 
cover, besides the impact o f taxation and statutory regulations, also 
research results on other aspects o f companies’ financing decisions.
In general, modem literature on the structure o f capital starts from 
the non-tax model o f Modigliani and Miller (1958). One o f the key 
outcomes of this model is that the capital structure does not have any 
impact on the company’s value and the cost o f capital. The model 
assumes a perfect capital market and non-existence o f corporate 
taxes. In addition, other idealisations are made.
In a later paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduce corporate 
taxes to the previous model. Their updated model shows that as a
120 Aar о Hazak, Mari Mäe
result o f taxes, debt becomes a more favourable source o f financing 
than equity. The advantage o f debt derives from a “tax shield”. The 
interest costs related to debt decrease profits and hence corporate tax. 
Companies are therefore motivated to use debt to the extent possible 
and practicable.
Many subsequent papers take the work o f Modigliani and Miller 
as a basis, by removing constraining assumptions or taking into 
account additional parameters. One group o f such literature deals 
with the impact o f various adjustments to taxable profit on 
companies’ capital structure. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), for 
example, incorporate tax depreciation and investment tax credits to 
the analysis. They conclude that the bigger the tax reducing adjust­
ments to profit (or non-debt “tax shields”), the lower the company’s 
motivation to use debt for tax deduction purposes is. Companies with 
relatively high non-debt “tax shields” are believed to have relatively 
less debt in total capital. However, some papers (e.g. Scott, 1977; and 
Moore, 1986) support the opposite argument. Higher investments 
(higher non-debt “tax shields”) are believed to result in a company’s 
improved ability and motivation to acquire secured debt (higher debt 
“tax shields”).
Hazak (2006a) has addressed the specific impact o f thin capi­
talisation rules. Thin capitalisation rules refer to statutory regulations, 
which limit the deduction o f interest cost from companies’ income 
tax base in the situations where the debts o f the company are regarded 
as too high compared to equity. Thin capitalisation rules usually 
define a maximum debt to equity ratio, whereas companies using 
external finance beyond this level are not allowed to reduce the 
income tax base by the interest cost relating to the excessive portion 
o f debt. An important role o f thin capitalisation rules is to tackle 
potential tax avoidance issues.
Thin capitalisation rules are hypothesised by Hazak (2006a) to 
result in increased demand for debt in order to finance the additional 
income tax expense, for a company, which (a) prefers debt (inclusive 
o f the adverse impacts o f thin capitalisation rules on the cost o f debt) 
to equity, and (b) has utilised debt finance beyond the statutory thin 
capitalisation threshold. For a contrary effect, thin capitalisation rules 
result in decreased demand for debt for a company, which (a) 
normally prefers debt to equity, but due to the adverse effects o f thin 
capitalisation rules on the cost o f debt is forced to start preferring
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equity, and (b) has utilised debt finance in a larger volume than the 
statutory thin capitalisation limit. In case equity becomes more 
favourable than debt as a result o f thin capitalisation rules, the 
company’s equity is higher than that o f a similar company in an 
economy with no thin capitalisation rules.
The determinants o f dividend policy have been explored in a large 
number o f papers from Miller and Modigliani (1961), Gordon (1959) 
and Lintner (1962) to many recent interpretations. However, dividend 
restrictions have received little attention. Wald (1999) finds that 
dividend restrictions result in more profitable firms having lower debt 
to equity ratios. W ald’s paper is however focused on contractual (and 
not statutory) dividend restrictions. Wald and Long (2005) address 
the effect o f the US state laws on capital structure, finding, that laws 
on payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have 
not reincorporated outside their home states.
The specific impact o f statutory dividend restrictions is addressed 
by Hazak (2006a). In general, there are two main types o f statutory 
dividend restrictions: (i) limitations on the maximum amount o f 
accumulated net profit, which can be distributed as dividends, and (ii) 
requirements on the minimum amount o f dividends that the company 
has to distribute out o f its annual profit (i.e. mandatory dividends). It 
is hypothesised that limitations on the distribution o f a company’s 
accumulated net profit as dividends result in higher equity capital in 
comparison to the situation where no such restrictions exist and, thus, 
decreased demand for debt. This statement is hypothesised to be valid 
if debt finance is less costly for a company than equity capital. 
Mandatory dividends, however, are considered not to have a 
significant impact on companies’ capital structure.
Hazak (2006a) has also discussed the impact o f minimum share 
capital and minimum equity requirements on companies’ capital 
structure. The minimum amount o f share capital needed to start and 
operate a company tends to be established by law. Requirements 
concerning the minimum size o f equity represent a statutory obli­
gation for a company to maintain its total equity above a certain level, 
defined as a percentage o f share capital, as a fixed amount or 
otherwise. The theoretical analysis in this paper reveals that these two 
types o f statutory regulations have no impact on companies’ choices 
between debt and equity financing. However in case o f very small 
companies in certain jurisdictions with a high minimum share capital
16
122 Aar о Hazak, Mari Mäe
requirement, equity capital is potentially higher than the voluntary 
level.
Numerous empirical studies have been carried out to substantiate 
the existence and importance o f the factors that influence companies’ 
capital structure. These studies include Titman and Wessels (1988), 
MacKie-Mason (1990) and Welch (2004), among others. Examples 
o f empirical studies based on (some of) the EU countries’ data 
include Comelli, Portes and Schaffer (1998), Nivorozhkin (2005), 
Haas and Peeters (2006) and Jõeveer (2006). A comprehensive 
comparison o f empirical research can be found in Prasad, Green and 
Murinde (2001). Similarly to the theoretical literature, there is no 
consent on the impact o f legislation and other factors on companies’ 
financing decisions.
3. Statutory regulations in the EU countries
3.1. Minimum share capital requirements
Figure 1 summarises minimum share capital requirements in the EU 
countries as in 2005. Minimum share capital amount needed to 
operate a limited liability company has been indicated. In case it is 
possible to operate different types o f limited liability companies in 
one country, the smallest o f the respective minimum share capital 
amounts has been presented in the table. It should be noted that 
exceptions may apply to the amounts shown in the table, e.g. for 
companies o f specific industries.
There exist significant differences in the statutory minimum share 
capital amounts. Out o f the EU countries the minimum share capital 
required to operate a limited liability company is highest in Austria, 
being equal to 35 thousand Euros. On the other hand the United 
Kingdom, France, Ireland and Cyprus have not established any 
minimum share capital requirements for (certain types of) limited 
liability companies.
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Belgium I "" ' . - " H Q
Netherlands 
Greece
Denmark I I 17
Poland d
Luxembourg I 1 12
Hungary I I 12
Sweden I ' '"""I 11
Italy I ...................................1 10
Slovenia 1 1 9
Finland С
Czech Republic I I 7
Slovakta I ~1 5
Portugal I 1 5
Spam I "1 -5
Lithuania I 1 3 
Latvia I 1 3 
Estonia I I 3
Malta □  1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Figure 1. Minimum share capital requirements (EU, 2005; EUR in th.)
Source: Legislation o f respective countries; see References
3.2. Minimum equity requirements
Minimum equity regulations in the EU countries usually establish a 
requirement to improve the equity position (e.g. by investors injecting 
additional share capital or by decreasing the share capital to net off 
the accumulated losses) in case (a) the accumulated net loss o f the 
company exceeds a certain percentage o f share capital, or (b) total 
equity falls below a certain percentage o f share capital. Figure 2 
summarises minimum equity requirements in the EU countries as in 
2005, presented as percentage o f share capital and recalculated to
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minimum equity requirement if  the regulation is a maximum net loss 
restriction in case such regulations exist.
Italy 167%
Spam 1 ■ . ::v 167%
Denmark 160%
Slovenia 150%
Luxembourg 150%
Lithuania 150%
Hungary 150%
Greece ; i 50%
France i 50%
Finland 150%
Estonia 150%
Czech Republic 1 50%
Belgium 150%
Austria I j 8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Figure 2. Minimum equity requirements (EU, 2005)
Source: Legislation o f respective countries; see References
There have been no minimum equity requirements established in 
Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In these 
countries, where such requirements exist, the minimum equity 
amount ranged from equal to 8% o f share capital in Austria to 67% of 
share capital in Italy and Spain.
3.3. Dividend restrictions
In the EU countries limitations on the distribution o f net accumulated 
profit as dividends tend to be defined as a percentage o f annual net 
profit, which has to be retained as a reserve for potential future losses 
until such a reserve becomes at least equal to a certain percentage of
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share capital. Figures 3 and 4 summarise these regulations in the EU 
countries as in 2005.
Greece I I 33%
Sweden I 120%
Spain I ~ 1 20%
Portugal I............................................................. J 20%
Slovenia |.......................Z D  10%
Luxembourg I 1 10%
Lithuania 1 I 10%
France I I 10%
Estonia 1 ................... 110%
Czech Republic I 110%
Belgium I 110%
Austria 1 110%
Slovakia [ 110%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Figure 3. Minimum percentage of share capital in the extent of which 
retained earnings are to be retained as an undistributable reserve (EU,
2005)
Source: Legislation of respective countries; see References
Some EU countries, like Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and the 
United Kingdom do not require this kind o f a reserve to be created 
(for certain types o f companies). The opposite extreme is Greece, 
where the amount of accumulated net profit, which has to be retained 
as a reserve for potential future losses, is set at 33% of share capital.
In these EU countries, which require a minimum undistributable 
reserve to be created, the minimum percentage o f annual profit to be 
transferred to the reserve is either 10% (Spain and Sweden) or 5% 
(other countries).
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In addition to the limitations due to an obligatory reserve, the 
regulations adopted in the EU countries exclude some revenues 
and/or deduct the net book value o f certain assets from distributable 
profits. These limitations are company and industry specific and 
difficult to quantify.
Luxembourg i I 5%
Lithuania I I 5%
Italy I 1 5%
Greece I 1 5%
France I I 5%
Estonia I I 5%
Czech Republic 1 5%
Belgium [ 1 5%
1
Austria I I 5%
Slovakia I I 5%
Portugal I 1 5%
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
Figure 4. Minimum percentage o f annual net profit to be retained as an 
undistributable reserve (EU, 2005)
Source: Legislation o f respective countries; see References
Greece has established a minimum dividend requirement. A mini­
mum annual dividend o f the higher o f 6% of share capital and 35% of 
profits is payable (unless 80% o f shareholders waive their 
entitlement).
3.4. Thin capitalisation rules
Figure 5 summarises thin capitalisation rules in the EU countries in
2005.
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Thin capitalisation rules are expressed as maximum debt to equity 
ratio defined by law to determine whether a company is thinly capita­
lised or not. There have been no thin capitalisation rules established 
in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 
these countries, where thin capitalisation rules have been put into 
effect, the maximum statutory debt to equity ratio ranged from 1.5 in 
Germany and France to 8 in Slovenia.
Germany 1 i 1.5
France t 11.5
Portugal I I 2
Spam I 1 3
Poland 1 1 3
Netherlands I 1 3
Hungary I ' ' ■ Л 1 3
Lithuania I 1 4
Latvia I 14
Italy 1 1 4
Denmark I 14
Czech Republic I И
Luxembourg I . ■ : . . " : 15.67
Slovenia 1 1  8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 5. Maximum debt to equity ratio for statutory thin capitalisation 
purposes (EU, 2005)
Source: Legislation o f respective countries; see References
4. Data, methodology and results
The empirical information has been gathered from the Datastream 
database available from Tallinn University o f Technology. The 
version o f the database available for this analysis included 2005 
financial information o f the listed companies o f the EU countries. We
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have extracted from these companies the ones which (a) information 
regarding debt and equity components as well as annual revenues and 
profits was not available for 2005; and (b) do not belong to the 
financial sector. Due to the above criteria, the sample used for the 
empirical analysis covers 4,023 companies. It should be noted that the 
database did not include information meeting the above criteria for 
any Cypriot, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Slovakian, 
Slovenian companies. Therefore we used information available from 
the stock exchanges o f these countries as an additional source of 
information in order to cover all the EU companies with the sample.
In order to distinguish companies which prefer debt to equity from 
companies that are equity preferring, positive value o f leverage has 
been used as the breakpoint. 3,365 companies or 84% of the total 
sample had used debt and have therefore been considered as 
companies preferring debt to equity. We note that in addition to the 
countries mentioned in the previous section, the sample from 
Slovakia and Cyprus deems to be relatively unrepresentative as 
respectively only 25% and 33% of companies qualify as debt 
preferring, compared to the sample average o f 84%.
4.1. Minimum share capital requirements
In respect o f  minimum share capital requirements the average 
percentage o f the statutory minimum share capital amount in total 
capital employed has been calculated by countries in respect of the 
sample. Descriptive statistics has been used here and in the following 
paragraphs as an easy but adequate approach to analyse the relations 
under consideration.
The analysis reveals that minimum share capital amount consti­
tutes on average only 0.00005% o f total capital employed by the 
companies included in the sample. These average percentages vary by 
country, maximum being 3% o f total capital employed. Overall, such 
results support the hypothesis by Hazak (2006a) that minimum share 
capital requirements are not a significant factor in companies’ capital 
structure formation.
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4.2. Minimum equity requirements
First, the number o f companies in the sample, which do not meet the 
minimum equity requirements, has been identified by countries. The 
EU average number o f companies, which did not meet the minimum 
share capital requirements, was only 0.8% o f total companies.
Second, in order to identify the impact, if any, o f the minimum 
equity requirements on the capital structure o f the companies in the 
sample, the country average leverages o f  companies operating within 
the conditions o f different minimum equity requirements have been 
compared to these o f the other companies. The overall average 
leverage o f companies operating within the conditions o f minimum 
equity requirements is 32% compared to 37% in the other countries. 
However, the analysis by countries shows that there are no clear 
differences in the capital structure o f companies operating within the 
conditions o f minimum equity requirements compared to companies 
that do not have to follow any minimum equity rules. Furthermore, 
there seem to be no significant differences in the capital structure o f 
companies, depending on whether the company is operating in a 
country with high or low minimum equity requirements.
In general, no significant evidence contradicting the theoretical 
analysis by Hazak (2006a), hypothesising that minimum equity 
requirements do not have a significant impact on com panies’ capital 
structure, was found.
4.3. Dividend restrictions
Leverage o f debt preferring companies has been compared on country 
average basis for different minimum equity requirements. It appears 
that in these countries where no dividend restrictions exist, companies 
use on average less debt financing (average leverage o f 32%) than in 
these countries where such regulations exist (overall average leverage 
o f 34%). Therefore, the hypothesis by Hazak (2006a) that the 
existence o f minimum equity requirements result in lower use o f debt 
capital, has not found support by the above analysis. However, the 
results may be impacted by other legal or country specific factors’, 
limited representativity or outlying companies in the sample.
In respect o f minimum dividend requirements, the leverage o f 
debt preferring companies operating within the conditions o f  a
17
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minimum dividend requirement has been compared to other 
companies. Based on this analysis, the average leverage o f companies 
that operate in countries with no obligation to pay a minimum amount 
o f dividends does not seem to be significantly different from that o f a 
country where minimum dividend requirement exists. No significant 
evidence has been identified which would contradict the hypothesis 
by Hazak (2006a) that minimum dividends do not have an impact on 
com panies’ capital structure.
4.4. Thin capitalisation rules
In respect o f thin capitalisation rules, debt preferring companies’ have 
been grouped by country and by the applicability and the level of thin 
capitalisation rules. When comparing the average leverage o f compa­
nies in such groups, it appears that companies that do not have to 
meet any thin capitalisation rules tend to use on average less debt 
financing than companies in respect o f which thin capitalisation rules 
apply. It can also be noted that the stricter the rules, the lower 
com panies’ utilisation o f debt financing is, though the relation is not 
so clear in these cases. The discrepancies may partially be explained 
by the fact that companies still prefer debt financing in the conditions 
o f thin capitalisation rules and prefer to pay the income tax on the 
interest related to the portion o f debt exceeding the thin capitalisation 
threshold.
Overall, it may be concluded that the results o f the empirical 
analysis give support the hypothesis by Hazak (2006a) that thin 
capitalisation result in decreased demand for debt for a company, 
which (a) normally prefers debt to equity, but due to the adverse 
effects o f  thin capitalisation rules on the cost o f debt is forced to start 
preferring equity, and (b) has utilised debt finance in a larger volume 
than the statutory thin capitalisation limit. For a contrary effect, thin 
capitalisation rules result in increased demand for debt in order to 
finance the additional income tax expense, for a company, which (a) 
prefers debt (inclusive o f the adverse impacts o f thin capitalisation 
rules on the cost o f debt) to equity, and (b) has utilised debt finance 
beyond the statutory thin capitalisation threshold.
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Conclusion
Comparative analysis o f statutory minimum share capital and equity 
requirements, dividend restrictions and thin capitalisation rules in the 
EU countries as in 2005 shows significant cross-country differences 
in respective legislations.
Out o f the EU countries the minimum share capital required to 
operate a limited liability company is highest in Austria, being equal 
to 35 thousand Euros. On the other hand France (starting from 2003), 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus have not established any 
minimum share capital requirements for (certain types of) limited 
liability companies. There have been no minimum equity require­
ments established in Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. In these countries, where such requirements exist, the 
minimum equity amount ranges from equal to 8% o f share capital in 
Austria to 67% o f share capital in Italy and Spain. Some EU count­
ries, like Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom do 
not require this kind o f a reserve to be created (for certain types o f 
companies). The opposite extreme is Greece, where the amount o f 
accumulated net profit, which has to be retained as a reserve for 
potential future losses, is set at 33% o f share capital. Out o f the EU 
countries, Greece is the only jurisdiction that has established a 
minimum dividend requirement. A minimum annual dividend o f the 
higher o f 6% o f share capital and 35% o f profits is payable (unless 
80% of shareholders waive their entitlement). There have been no 
thin capitalisation rules established in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. In these countries, where thin capitalisation 
rules have been put into effect, the maximum statutory debt to equity 
ratio ranged from 1.5 in France and Germany to 5.7 in Luxembourg.
The empirical analysis presented in the paper, that is based on a 
sample o f companies and their financial information from the 
Datastream database, gives support to the hypothesis that in case a 
country has established thin capitalisation rules, the utilisation o f debt 
financing by the companies who do not exceed the thin capitalisation 
threshold is lower. However, contrary to the tested hypothesis, 
statutory maximum dividend restrictions (i.e. limitations on the
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amount o f accumulated net profit which can be paid out as dividends) 
appear to result in higher demand for debt. The opposite type of 
dividend regulations, minimum dividend requirement, as hypothesi­
sed, tends not to have a large impact on the formation o f companies’ 
capital structure. Based on the empirical analysis presented in this 
paper, requirements concerning the minimum levels o f share capital 
and equity, as hypothesised, do not have a significant impact on 
com panies’ choices between equity and debt financing.
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WHAT IMPACT HAS VENTURE CAPITAL 
ON EARLY STAGE VENTURES 
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Abstract
Estonian policy-makers have set a goal to move towards the higher 
value added knowledge-based economy. Access to venture capital 
(VC) and its quality plays an important role in that process. New 
technology-based and early stage firms usually require both sub­
stantial financial and non-fmancial contribution to support their 
growth. It is important to know how venture capital hands-on 
investors contribute to the growth of individual firms and what the 
impact o f VC investor on a venture is. Hands-on VC investors usually 
promise the entrepreneurs seeking additional capital to contribute 
non-financial value added along with the monetary VC investment 
needed to support growth of early stage companies. In the current 
study the authors group non-financial contributions into three cate­
gories: resources (access to distribution channels, manufacturing 
tools, technology and networks, human resources), knowledge 
(business expertise, experience, information, contacts), and endor­
sement (transference of investor’s reputation and credibility, provi­
ding moral support and legitimacy). The aim of the study is to assess
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the impact of VC’s non-fmancial contributions aside from financial 
impact on ventures in seed, start-up and early growth phase in 
Estonia. In other words are the available non-fmancial contributions 
of VC in compliance with the expectations of early-stage ventures 
and which strategies and operating areas of a venture are most 
influenced by VC? The nature and characteristics of an impact help to 
estimate the quality o f VC investors. The study was carried out in 
2005 among Estonian companies who have used VC financing. 
Estonian venture capital industry is very young and small, and not 
specialized to specific economic sectors, which certainly has an 
influence on VC’s non-fmancial contributions and VC’s impact. The 
authors found that access to VC is vital for ventures in early stage in 
Estonia. Reputation and reliability were considered by ventures as the 
most important non-fmancial contributions in Estonia. Access to 
other useful contacts (business partners, scientists, experts, suppliers, 
and competitors), management competence/experience and additional 
financing resources were also rated highly. The authors found that 
VC investors really contributed their investees, but the impact mostly 
fell under expectations. VC had strongest impact on the creation of 
financial strategy and drawing up financial budget. That led authors 
to the conclusion that VC sector operating in Estonia still lacks 
professionalism and experience.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Non-fmancial Contributions
1. Non-financial contributions of VC
Venture capital is equity or semi-equity-based investment to unqu­
oted high risk early-stage companies through fund raising. Impor­
tance o f VC is to provide not only financing for early stage high 
growth companies but also actively contribute non-financial support 
like expertise, networks, contacts, access to distribution channels, etc. 
VC investors make a contribution to young high growth companies 
by being an active partner for them. The impact o f all these 
contributions is not always directly measurable. The purpose o f non- 
fmancial contributions is to mitigate investment risk and help to build 
a valuable company, which would enable to earn high capital gains 
through VC’s exit (Initial Public Offering, trade sale, secondary 
purchase, etc.). Besides financing early stage (seed, start-up and early
18
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growth) companies usually lack management skills, business expe­
rience and contacts. These are gaps that an experienced venture 
capitalist can fill. VC involvement in early stage ventures can be 
either positive (increase in shareholder value through higher effi­
ciency, competitive advantages, growth and profitability) or negative 
(destroying shareholder value through negative non-financial contri­
bution). For example problems and conflicts between VC investor 
and management may arise from different understanding over ope­
rating, financing and growth strategy and from lower motivation of 
the management.
1.1. Classification of VC contributions
In the current study the authors divide non-financial contributions 
into three categories (Maula 2001: 79):
• Resources -  access to distribution channels, manufacturing, 
technology and intellectual property (IP), networks, human 
resources;
• Knowledge -  business expertise, experience, information, con­
tacts;
• Endorsement benefits -  transference o f the investor’s repu­
tation and credibility, providing moral support and legitimacy.
Nathusis (2002: 17) defined three main roles o f VC investors’ to help 
ventures: strategic role (business consultant and financing), social 
role (mentor, friend and fiduciary) and a role related to networks 
(contacts for management recruitment, industry contacts, and contacts 
with other investors). The authors have systemized the possible 
contributions o f a VC investor in Figure 1. Maula et al. (2002) have 
found that most important non-financial contributions are finding 
additional capital for next financing rounds, strategic role (business 
consultancy, sharing experience and business knowledge) and team 
recruitment.
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Figure 1. VC contributions and their impact (composed by authors)
Before we interpret and analyse the results o f the study we give a 
short overview o f possible contributions and effects o f VC on early 
stage companies.
The main resources a VC investor can contribute to a venture are 
access to distribution channels, technology, personnel (including 
management), research and development, and contacts. Knowledge 
helps to use resources effectively. If a company has no competence 
and experience o f how to use/commercialize technology then it is 
useless for this company. Young ventures often lack both resources 
and knowledge. Usually corporate investors can contribute more 
resources and knowledge than VC investor, for example access to 
company’s distribution channels, intellectual properties (including
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patents), research and development activity, manufacturing tools, etc. 
(Barry et al 1990:3). Gompers and Lem er called that synergy 
strategic relatedness (Maula 2001: 33). As human capital plays an 
important role for ventures, the network o f VC investor is vital for 
finding suitable experienced personnel (Fried, Hisrich 1995: 104). 
VC backed ventures replace management (founders o f company) 
more often against new outside management in later stage than non- 
VC companies, which lowers the investment risk for the VC investor 
(Hellmann, Puri 2002: 170). This may cause conflicts between VC 
investor(s) and founders. Independent VCs were found to be seen as 
better at helping portfolio companies obtain new financing, recruiting 
key employees, and helping to develop the organization. In contrast, 
corporate venture capitalists appear to be stronger helping startups 
attract new partners, helping them attract new domestic and foreign 
customers, and helping start-ups develop their technology. (Maula et 
al 2002). It creates higher positive synergy for the investment.
Knowledge is considered to be the main growth factor that has an 
effect on technology based companies (Yli-Renko et al 2000: 5). 
Knowledge here includes business experience, competence, skills, 
strategic advice, information on the market, competition, and also 
contacts/networks. Ability to learn and skills to use competence 
effectively is nowadays considered to be most important competitive 
advantage for technology based companies. Most important areas 
where ventures lack knowledge are markets, clients’ needs, compe­
tition, and marketing. New ventures are usually competent in their 
technology but they do not have information on markets, competition, 
and marketing skills. VC investors and business angels contribute on 
drawing up a business strategy and giving different business advice. 
This is very valuable for young ventures, which lack such expertise 
and experience. This lets us assume that VC investor should have a 
successful and long track record (entrepreneurial experience). Past 
entrepreneurs have become later VC investors. They usually act as 
partners o f the management company which raises VC funds, or as 
business angels. In a young market economy there is always lack of 
experienced entrepreneurs who could run a successful VC fund and 
be a good partner for portfolio companies. Survey conducted by 
EVCA found that most important non-financial contribution for 
ventures was strategic advise, followed by networks and moral 
support (Survey o f . . . .  2002: 15).
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Endorsement benefits include reputation, reliability, legitimacy 
and moral support. As small and young companies are at higher risk, 
it is difficult to get acceptance and reliability in the eyes o f business 
partners and clients. They do not have a track record, which is 
important in business. A reputable VC investor can help to create 
legitimacy for the venture (Maula 2001: 13; Bottazzi, Da Rin 2002: 
236). It certainly improves venture’s reliability as VC investors trust 
him and are willing to take even bigger shareholder risk. Professional 
VC investor has an impact on others’ opinion o f the venture, which 
helps to recruit management and to find business partners (Stuart et al 
1999, Engel 2002: 21). VC investor can offer moral support by 
acting as a fiduciary and a friend for the founders. This is the reason 
why ventures prefer experienced VC investors with strong reputation. 
Fried and Hisrich (1995: 104) also considered this argument a 
valuable factor for small ventures. It is also considered to be veiy 
important in case o f corporate investors (Maula et al 2002).
1.2. Early studies on VC impact on ventures
The main aim o f VC fund raising is always to add shareholder value 
for existing shareholders. In order to achieve that, an early stage high 
growth company needs more than just financing. Younger and riskier 
companies usually get more attention by VC investors. The closer and 
more open the relationship between VC investor and venture’s 
management the higher the benefit from VC (Maula 2001: 42; Fried 
and Hisrich 1995: 102). Sapienza (1992) has found that the impact o f 
VC is the bigger the higher is the innovativeness o f the company.
It is very complicated to measure isolated impact o f different VC 
contributions on shareholder value or on current financial perfor­
mance o f a venture. It is easier to estimate the direction o f the impact 
(positive or negative), whether the contributions o f VC are in 
compliance with management’s expectations (relative strength o f 
impact), and which operating areas o f venture are most influenced by 
VC (in other words, how the contribution acts). The authors also used 
that approach in the current study.
Many researchers have studied VC impact on ventures’ growth, 
because it is a ground for future growth in shareholder value and 
successful financial performance. Without growth you can not expect 
success and profitable exit. Results are still controversial. Engel
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(2002, 14), Davila et al (2002: 17) and Kjaergaard and Borup (2005) 
found that companies which have used VC have grown feister in terms 
o f employment. M anigart and Hyfte (1999) on the contrary did not 
found the abovementioned impact in their study among Belgium 
companies. They found that VC has a positive impact on assets 
growth but not on value added and employment. Buergel et al. (2000) 
also did not found VC impact resulting in higher employment growth 
compared to other companies. Gompers and Lerner (1999a) have 
pointed out three reasons why VC-backed companies should be more 
successful than non VC-backed companies:
1) VC investors are screening out companies which have higher 
growth potential and chances to success.
2) VC investors offer different non-financial contributions that 
conventional financial intermediaries do not supply.
3) VC investors monitor companies’ performance constantly and 
collect information for decision-making (lower information 
asymmetry).
The development stage o f VC industry in a particular economic 
environment plays an important role in VC’s quality. VC impact is 
lower in countries where VC industry is young, inexperienced or less 
developed than in the USA (Maula 2001: 18). VC industry and 
market in the USA is the most active, competent and biggest. Euro­
pean VC industry has less competence and experience in hands-on 
investment management. That helps to explain different results of the 
abovementioned studies on VC contributions.
2. Results of the study and conclusions
2.1. Research problems, data and methodology
The authors set up five research problems:
1) Which VC contributions do Estonian entrepreneurs value as 
the most important?
2) Which VC contributions become available with VC investment 
for Estonian entrepreneurs?
3) Are the available contributions o f VC in compliance with the 
expectations o f early-stage ventures?
4) Which operating areas o f the venture are most influenced by VC?
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5) Which is the overall estimated impact o f  VC investment on a 
company?
The research was carried out in 2005 among the CEO’s o f Estonian 
VC-backed companies. The survey was conducted using a question­
naire with sections covering background information on venture 
capitalist and the firm, contributions provided by the most important 
(by investment amount) VC investor, the estimation o f the impor­
tance o f different VC contributions, the expectations towards venture 
capitalist and the extent o f its fulfilment, the perceived impact o f  VC 
investor on various corporate activities and strategies, and the overall 
impact to the development o f the firm. The initial sample consisted o f 
all (15) VC-backed early-stage companies in Estonia known to the 
authors. The questionnaire was sent to 11 o f them3. O f those 11 
companies, 6 returned the filled questionnaire (response rate o f 55%). 
A VC investor was still a shareholder in 4 ventures at the time o f the 
study. The low absolute number o f respondents makes it less reliable 
to draw profound conclusions on the subject but the authors believe 
that the results should still be representative for the small and early- 
stage Estonian VC market. 5 respondents were IT and/or internet 
companies, and one was a biotechnology company. Estonian VC 
investors have so far avoided making an investment into early stage 
biotechnology ventures because o f lack o f experience and compe­
tence about running this kind o f investments. Usually investment 
horizon o f an early stage biotechnology company is also too long 
(10-15 years) for investors. It all makes risk unbearable for VC 
investors. Early stage biotechnology companies have therefore been 
mostly sponsored and financed by Enterprise Estonia4.
3 4 companies were either already liquidated, in bankrupcy or refused to 
answer when they were asked for permission to send the questionnairy to 
them.
4 Enterprise Estonia is a public institution which provides financing, 
advice, partnership opportunities, and training for entrepreneurs, research 
and development institutions in Estonia. Enterprise Estonia is one of the 
institutions responsible for the implementation o f EU structural funds in 
Estonia. It operates under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Entreprise 
Estonia, www.eas.ee).
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2.2. Results o f the study
2.2.1. Description o f companies and investments
All the entrepreneurs questioned, had involved VC investor into their 
company in the year 1999 or 2000, at the time o f great VC market 
boom. It was easier to get VC financing to internet-related businesses 
at the time o f dot.com boom, which also explains the prevalence o f IT 
companies in the study. There was even oversupply o f VC. All the 
firms in our sample had involved capital from VC funds or business 
angels. The transactions were structured using common shares, which 
was characteristic to the time o f the boom market3. Only one 
company (only business angel) had used as well convertible loans. 
Investors were willing to take the highest risk. According to world 
practice, VC investors usually take minority interest in the company. 
Our results indicated though that in two thirds o f the respondents 
majority stake o f the company was acquired by VC investor. VC 
investors preferred to take control over ventures.
5 ventures were financed by a VC fund. One venture was financed 
by foreign VC fund and other four by local funds. One venture 
involved financing from a business angel6. VC investors usually 
prefer not to invest farther than 200 km-s from home, which localizes 
the VC market. At the time o f investment all ventures were in an 
early stage o f development (four ventures in seed and two in start-up 
stage). In five cases VC investor acquired a seat at the board of 
directors and in two seed stage companies the representative o f VC 
investor was involved in the management. In the company which was 
financed by business angel investor took actively a part both in the 
board and in executive management.
After the boom market VC investors became more risk aversive 
due to big losses and lower exit valuations. Early state ventures’
5 Investors were willing to take higer risks. After the market boom it has 
been much more difficult to get VC financing, deals are usually 
structured using convertible preferred shares or convertible loans, which 
lowers the downside risk and increases the yield potential for venture 
capitalists.
6 An investor is a person who invests in a business venture, providing 
capital for start-up or expansion. These individuals are looking for a 
higher rate of return (typically 25 percent or more).
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access to VC financing in Estonia was sharply restricted. At the 
moment o f study in summer 2005 there was only one early stage VC 
fund which actively built a portfolio in Estonia but it clearly avoids 
seed and start-up stage investments.
We studied frequency o f involvement by VC investor in venture’s 
activity and its sufficiency for management. We found that investors 
with bigger ownership were more active (hands-on) and management 
considered it sufficient (see table 1). In two companies where investor 
had acquired minority stake involvement was rare and management 
did not regard it sufficient. We can conclude that if  VC investor 
trusted management and did not want to be involved much then they 
did not need to acquire majority stake. They were rather more hands- 
off financial investors.
Table 1. Frequency of VC investor’s involvement in venture’s activity, 
management’s estimation on sufficiency of this involvement, and their 
correlation with VC’s share of ownership (number of companies).
VC
investor’s
ownership
Number
o f
compa­
nies
Frequency o f  
involvem ent
M anagem ent’s estimation on 
involvem ent
At least 
once a 
month
At least 
once a 
quarter
Is not 
enough
Suffi­
cient
More often 
than 
needed
ЗОЛ- 
49, 9%
2 0 2 2 0 0
50% and 
more
4 3 1 0 4 0
We concluded from responses also that investors are more active in 
case o f seed stage ventures because seed stage companies need a 
closer attention o f VC investors than later stage companies. This 
corresponds also to the findings o f Maula (2001: 42) and Fried, 
Hisrichi (1995: 102).
2.2.2. Analysis o f non-fuiancial contribution and its impact
Our study was based on research problems set up in chapter 2.1. We 
differentiated importance o f individual contribution (value added) and 
management expectations towards it. We studied both non-financial 
contributions which are considered important by management and 
expectations towards VC investor, which are certainly influenced by
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agreements between VC investor and outstanding shareholders, and 
investor’s promises.
We asked companies to estimate the importance o f different non- 
financial contributions for their venture by VC investor directly or 
using his contacts in the scale 0-5  (0 -  unimportant, 5 -  very 
important). Results are presented in table 2.
Table 2. Importance of non-financial contributions to entrepreneurs.
Contribution Number 
of respon­
dents
Mini­
mum
estimate
Maxi­
mum
estimate
Average
estimate
Mode
Access to distribution 
channels 6 0 3
1 0
Access to (additional) 
financing resources 4 1
4 3 4
Access to technology 5 0 5 1,4 0
Access to personnel 5 1 5 2,4 1
Access to intellectual 
property
5 0 5 1 0
Access to research and 
development activity
5 0 5 1 0
Access to
manufacturing tools 5
0 4 1 0
Access to brands and 
trademarks
6 0 5 1 0
Access to management 
competence and 
experience
6 1 5 3,17 3 and 5
Access to new clients 6 0 5 2,17 0
Access to market 
information 6 0
5 2,17 0
Access to other useful 
contacts 5 1 5 3,4
3 and 5
Reputation and 
reliability 6 2 5 3,5 4
Moral support and 
acknowledgement 5 0 5 1,8 0
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On the assumption o f table 2 and using average and mode estimate 
we can conclude that ventures considered reputation and reliability as 
the most important non-financial contribution. Also access to other 
useful contacts (business partners, scientists, experts, suppliers, 
competitors), management competence and experience and additional 
financing resources were rated highly. An access to different 
resources was least important: distribution channels, manufacturing 
tools, IP, brands and trademarks, and R&D activity. The results are as 
expected because VC is provided by financial investors who usually 
do not supply such non-financial contributions. Resources are usually 
provided by corporate investors. A big variance in answers is 
explained by different VC resources. For example a company which 
supplied IT solutions for other companies regarded access to re­
sources (technology, personnel, IP, research and development 
activity) very important because part o f the VC originated from 
IT/telecom company (partly corporate VC). We also found that 
management competence and experience, market information, repu­
tation and reliability are higher estimated by seed stage ventures (no 
sales yet, mainly developing o f product and business strategy). Seed 
stage company needs this contribution in order to work out a business 
plan and create vital business strategy. Help from VC investor is 
highly appreciated.
Next the results o f the actual VC contributions are described.
None o f the companies mentioned that they got access to 
technology, intellectual properties, and R&D. Only one company got 
access to distribution channels. This result is quite expected as 
investors were VC funds and a business angel. These contributions 
are more characteristic to corporate VC. As we can see in table 3 
most frequently reputation and reliability, management competence 
and experience, and finally additional financing resources supple­
mented with VC investment. On average ventures got 4 -6  non- 
financial contributions, except for one company which mentioned that 
the only contribution was access to new financing. Probably in that 
last case the VC investor was not competent and experienced enough 
in that business field and did not meet venture’s needs and 
expectations. Not surprisingly the VC fund was just established 
before that investment. In order to find real reasons, this case would 
need a detailed case study.
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Table 3. Non-fmancial contribution to ventures (number of ventures).
Non-fmancial contribution Number of 
cases
Missing
answers
Access to distribution channels 1 0
Access to additional financial resources 3 1
Access to technology 0 1
Access to personnel 2 1
Access to intellectual properties 0 1
Access to research and development activity 0 1
Access to manufacturing tools 2 1
Access to brand or trademark 2 0
Access to management competence and 
experience 4 1
Access to new clients 3 0
Access to market information 2 0
Access to other useful contacts 2 1
Reputation and reliability 5 0
Moral support and acknowledgement 2 2
Next we studied the impact o f non-financial contributions to investee 
firms, and whether VC contributions met ventures’ expectations. We 
assumed that before the fund raising parties agreed on how the VC 
investor can contribute to the firm in the future. This created justified 
expectations towards non-financial contributions. We take it as an 
estimate o f VC’s (relative) impact (or VC’s quality) if the 
expectations are satisfied. The results o f the study are presented in 
table 4.
Next, access to resources is compared to investee’s expectations. 
We consider it as VC investor’s relative impact. If expectations are 
not met then the impact o f contribution was insufficient. It indicates 
the quality (professionalism) o f VC investor to meet the manage­
m ent’s expectations (promises). As we saw in table 3, different 
resources supplemented with provided VC only in a few cases. Most 
respondents mentioned only 0 -2  contributions concerning resources. 
As we can see from table 4 that actual resources corresponded mostly 
to expectations. It means that entrepreneurs’ expectations toward 
resources were rather low and VC investors did not promise to
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Table 4. Compliance of non-financial contributions to the companies’ 
expectations (number of cases).
Contribution Lower than 
expected
In accordance 
with or over the 
expectations
Missing
answers
Access to distribution channels 4 2 0
Access to additional financial 
resources
3 2 1
Access to technology 0 5 1
Access to personnel 3 2 1
Access to intellectual 
properties
1 4 1
Access to research and 
development activity
1 4 1
Access to manufacturing tools 0 5 1
Access to brand or trademark 1 5 0
Access to management 
competence and experience
4 1 1
Access to new clients 2 4 0
Access to market information 2 4 0
Access to other useful contacts 3 2 1
Reputation and reliability 3 3 0
Moral support and 
acknowledgement
2 3 1
provide those either. Ventures expected and acquired different 
resources on a moderate scale. As an exception we would like to 
point out access to distribution channels, which was contributed only 
in one case (table 3), but at the same time was said to have failed to 
meet the expectations in 4 cases out o f 6 (table 4). It means that the 
companies had some expectations/hope concerning access to 
distribution channels. It is interesting to note that in three companies 
VC investor also did not justify expectations concerning access to 
additional financial resources and new personnel. In other words it 
means that relative impact o f these contributions was lower than 
expected. These two types o f resources were also most important for 
ventures (see table 2). So we can conclude that Estonian VC investors 
should accumulate this kind o f capital in order to meet ventures’ 
expectations towards VC’s contribution o f resources.
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Next we analyse access to knowledge (market information, 
management competence and experience, client contacts, and other 
useful contacts) compared to expectations. Four companies (table 3) 
acquired management competence and experience from VC investor, 
but on a large scale the impact was lower than expected (table 4). 
This could be explained by the fact that VC investors in Estonia are 
mostly young men who have 5-10 years financial sector background 
but who clearly lack management and business experience. In that 
sense VC sector is not professional enough in Estonia. What concerns 
access to new clients and market information, two companies (out of
6) considered it lower than expected/hoped and four ventures were 
satisfied. Access to other useful contacts was important for 
companies, but only two ventures acquired it and three (out of 6) 
investors could not meet the management’s expectations. We can 
conclude that investors promised management advice and other 
useful contacts that is the most important knowledge for an early 
stage company but unfortunately the contribution still did not fully 
meet the expectations.
At last we analysed endorsement benefits. Reputation and 
reliability were considered as most important contribution o f VC 
investors (table 2). 5 ventures really acquired it, but three ventures 
noted that it was lower than expected (other three said that it met 
expectations). We can again explain it with young and inexperienced 
VC sector whose reputation and reliability is still not high enough.
Supported by the previous analysis we can conclude that 
companies most often acquired contributions which were most 
important for early stage ventures, but the impact was still under the 
expectations. This leads the authors to the conclusion that VC sector 
is still not professional and experienced enough in Estonia, and the 
investors fail to live up to their promises. It means that the impact 
was lower than expected, and ventures were often left disappointed. 
Despite o f that, all companies said that without VC they would not 
have existed at all (3 seed stage ventures) or their growth would have 
been lower (3 companies), which means that the overall impact o f VC 
on companies’ performance was still positive (probably due to 
financial contribution7).
It is difficult to differenciate impact of financial and non-finanial 
contributions to venture’s performance.
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Table 5. VC’s impact on different strategies and operating areas (number 
of ventures).
Area of impact Valid answers Missing
answersNo
impact
Small
impact
Remar­
kable
impact
Big
impact
Very
strong
impact
Business strategy 
(what product 
and to whom to 
supply)
0 3 1 2 0 0
Marketing stra­
tegy (how to 
supply product 
and at what 
price)
1 3 0 1 1 0
Financial strategy 
(investments and 
financing)
0 0 3 0 2 1
Research and 
development 
strategy
1 4 0 0 0 1
Organisation of
manufacturing
(operations)
3 1 0 0 0 2
Drawing up 
budget
0 1 2 2 0 1
Improvement of 
financial mana­
gement system
0 3 1 1 0 1
Improvement of 
financial accoun­
ting and reporting 
system
0 3 2 0 0 1
Recruitment 0 3 1 1 0 1
Motivation
system
1 1 3 0 0 1
Risk manage­
ment
0 5 0 0 0 1
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Differentiating results for only company which involved business 
angel we can point out non-financial contributions like access to 
manufacturing tools, management competence, other useful contacts 
and reputation/reliability. Last three mentioned contributions fell 
under the expectations. As all these contributions where important to 
the venture then we have to admit that business angel did not meet 
management’s expectations.
We also asked ventures to specify VC investor’s direct impact to 
strategies and operating areas on the scale from 1 (no impact) to 5 
(very strong impact). Results are presented in table 5.
As can be seen in table 5 VC had strongest impact on creation of 
financial strategy and drawing up financial budget, but VC investor 
also had quite remarkable impact on business strategy and 
improvement o f motivation system. The lowest impact was on 
organisation o f operations (manufacturing), risk management and 
research and development activity. The results were expected because 
VC investors do not usually have that kind o f competence. EVCA 
survey (Survey o f ... 2002: 14-15) also came to the same conclusions 
when as they found VC investors’ impact on financial strategy and 
budgeting the strongest.
2.3. Conclusions
We have to admit that access to VC is vital for ventures. Impact is 
stronger if  VC investor can also contribute non-financially. Investors 
with larger shareholding in the venture were more active (hands-on) 
and management considered it sufficient. In the companies where 
investors had minority stake, their involvement was rare and 
management did not regard it as sufficient. If VC investor trusted 
management and did not want to be involved much, they did not 
acquire the majority stake. But this level o f involvement was still 
insufficient for early stage ventures.
Ventures considered reputation and reliability as the most 
important non-financial contributions. Also access to other useful 
contacts (business partners, scientists, experts, suppliers, and compe­
titors), management competence and experience, and additional 
financing resources ware rated highly. It was found that companies 
did acquire contributions which were considered most important for 
early stage ventures, but the impact was still under their expectations.
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That led the authors to the conclusion that VC sector operating in 
Estonia lacks professionalism and experience and investors promise 
more than they can actually contribute. It means that the non-financial 
impact was lower than expected and ventures were often left 
disappointed.
The authors also found that VC had the strongest impact on the 
creation o f financial strategy and drawing up financial budget. 
Finally, the authors want to add that Estonian VC sector still has a 
long way to go in order to meet market’s needs for non-fmancial 
contributions, and early stage ventures seeking financing have to 
become more competent in selecting investors to create partnership 
with.
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SME POLICY IN LATVIA: 
MAIN TRENDS AND PROBLEMS
Kirill Kondratov
Latvian University
Abstract
During transitional economy period Latvia has managed to shift 
from centrally planned socialist economy to liberal market economy 
achieving a stable macroeconomic situation characterized by rapid 
growth rates. At the same time it features high inflation (especially 
after joining EU), low labour productivity as well as marked regional 
disparities. The national innovation strengths o f Latvia are based on 
its strong tradition and R&D potential in a range of research fields, 
well-educated people, its recent move towards wider awareness and 
promotion of innovation as a crucial source o f economic development 
and dedication to implementation of the Lisbon strategy.
We can’t but say that Latvian government has accepted a number 
of documents to ensure continued growth and transition from a 
labour-intensive economy to a knowledge-based economy. Aside 
from the adoption of two key documents aimed at the promotion of 
innovative activities -  National Programme for Innovation (2003-
2006) and Development Plan o f Latvia. (2004-2006) -  by the Cabinet 
of Ministers in 2003, the new policy documents of 2004/2005 include 
the Single Economic Strategy for Latvia, annual action plan of the 
National Programme for Innovation as well as the Law on Research 
Activity.
As one can notice all these measures do not give proper result.
Here is the brief list of problems that will be covered in the wor­
king paper:
• Regional development disparities (employment uneven distri­
bution, energy policy , infrastructure and other issues)
• Incompatibility of educational skills with labour market 
requirements
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• Lack of a favorable legal environment and simplified 
administrative procedures
• Tax policy for start-up’s
• Support of R&D programs
• Financial market development
The working paper consists of three sections. In the first section 
following topics will be covered: Latvian economy rational/ 
perspective, SME promotion/development. In the second section 
Latvian institutional framework for entrepreneurship and it’s role in 
SME policy implementation will be discussed. Revealing inefficien­
cies and current problems possible solutions will be proposed in the 
last section.
All numerical information and data, except in cases specifically 
indicated, were received from the Central Statistical Bureau of the 
Republic of Latvia or from Eurostat.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, SME-s and Institutional Environment
I. Latvian Economy Perspective; SME Development
In the first section we will try to get overall impression o f macro­
economics situation in Latvia, trying to underline main trends and 
potential problems. That will give us material for more proper 
research o f SME policy implementation in the second section.
Reforms accomplished in Latvia and integration in the European 
Union has left an impact on the economic development o f this 
country. One the one hand Latvia has achieved one o f the highest 
economic growth rates in the EU. Since 2000 the average annual 
GDP growth rate has been 7.4% (see table 1.1.), and in 2005 GDP 
increased even faster -  by 10.2%. High growth rates are also expected 
in 2006 ~ 10.7%. On the other hand Latvia is experiencing negative 
external labour mobility effect.
Accession to the EU provides Latvia with new opportunities for 
economic development. Support o f the EU funds fosters structural 
changes in the national economy and helps to reduce social and 
economic disproportions.
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1.1. Table. Latvian Economy Main Indicators % Dynamics in 2000-
2006.
Indicator 2000 2001 20021 2003 2004 2005 20062
GDP 8.4 8.0 6.5 7.2 8.6 10.2 10.5
Unemployment 7.8 7.7 8.5 8.6 8.5 7.4 7.0
Inflation 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 6.2 6.9 7.1
The developed National Lisbon Programme o f Latvia for 2005-2008 
(hereinafter the “Programme”) is a policy planning document, which 
shows how Latvia will promote growth and employment in the 
medium-term and how it will implement Integrated Guidelines 
approved by the Saeima (parliament) in July 2005. In order to achieve 
the goal during 2005-2008 the annual GDP growth rate should be 
6-8%  and employment rate should be increased to 65% (o f which 
61% is for women and 48% for older people). In order to ensure 
balanced development Latvia plans to continue gradual decrease o f 
the budget deficit, which will also contribute to a decrease in the 
current account deficit. Gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development (R&D) have to grow from the present 0.38% o f GDP to
1.1% of GDP by 2008. The Programme points out five main 
economic policy directions to reach the Lisbon goals in Latvia, 
namely:
-  Securing macroeconomic stability
-  Stimulating knowledge and innovation
-  Developing a favorable and attractive environment for invest­
ment and work
-  Improving education and skills
As one can notice the aims have been stated correctly, however their 
implementation is deterred by a number o f significant “hidden” 
factors that influence indirectly. And therefore there is need for 
thorough research.
1 Central Statistics Bureau has changed methodology for calculating 
main indicators.
2 Projected values.
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Securing macroeconomic stability
Latvia has a goal o f  maintaining a stable macroeconomic environ­
ment, which is a necessary precondition to ensure growth and 
employment. At present, the comparatively high inflation and 
imbalance o f the foreign sector must be carefully assessed. The 
comparatively high inflation negatively affects the business environ­
ment, reducing competitiveness o f the national economy. Besides, it 
can be an obstacle to the introduction o f the Euro even in 2010. The 
high current account deficit o f  the balance o f payments is a risk 
factor, which may negatively affect the volume of domestic 
consumption in the future due to sudden changes o f financial flows 
caused by various reasons. In the medium-term it is forecasted that 
the current account deficit level may decrease slightly, mostly due to 
faster export growth, stimulated by structural reforms. However, a 
comparatively high demand for imports will also remain, which will 
be determined by further modernization o f the national economy and 
an increasing openness o f the economy.
Monetary policy possibilities to restrict domestic demand under a 
fixed exchange rate regime are rather limited, because the inter-target 
and operational target o f monetary policy is maintenance of the 
national currency rate at a fixed level. Latvia is an open economy 
country, where an increase in domestic demand encourages increase 
in imports. The comparatively high share o f loans granted in foreign 
currencies in the overall credit structure, as well as the relatively easy 
access o f banks to foreign resources limit the effectiveness of 
instruments available for the Bank o f Latvia.
In implementation o f fiscal policy, a prudent permissible amount 
o f the total budget deficit and rational budget spending directed to 
growth will be observed.
From the Central Statistical Bureau o f Latvia publications we can 
derive that current rapid GDP growth is mainly due to construction, 
transport and communication sector growth. Financial sector growth 
is derived from credits for physical persons (currently total volume 
more than 4 billions). Lack o f high technology products won’t let to 
keep up stable (6-8% ) GDP growth in the mid-term period.
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Stimulating knowledge and innovation
Essential drawbacks, hindering structural changes, are low public and 
private sector investments in research and development, a poorly 
developed innovation system, incompatibility o f the education 
structure with long-term labour market requirements, a low level o f 
Internet availability, non-introduced electronic signature, which is 
one o f the main obstacles to e-commerce development.
The market economy, setting down new requirements for 
professional skills, develops faster than the adequate professional and 
higher education programmes. Thereby a discrepancy between the 
labour market’s demand and the current education supply exists in 
several professions. Distribution o f students by thematic fields o f 
studies does not correspond to the needs o f the national economy and 
labour market changes. Co-operation between the education establi­
shments and employers is insufficient.
A lifelong learning system has not been established in Latvia, 
which would increase the opportunity o f the population to adapt to 
the conditions o f a changing labour market. There is a shortage o f 
professional orientation services in the basic stage o f education.
Adaptation o f the first-year students in the professional education 
establishments is incomplete and awareness o f the opportunities for 
education as well as further education is insufficient. The number o f 
students who do not graduate or do not achieve a professional 
qualification is relatively large.
Professional skills and further education opportunities o f teachers 
are insufficient. Teachers and academic staff become old. The 
number o f new teachers and academic staff with a scientific degree 
decreases. The low wages o f teachers do not encourage involvement 
of young teachers into education. Preparedness o f medium-generation 
teachers in bilingual education is insufficient.
Formulating macroeconomics policy
In order to maintain macroeconomic stability in such hefty situation a 
number o f measures are proposed:
-  Comply consistently with the fulfillment o f the Maastricht 
fiscal criteria in Latvia and ensure gradual reduction o f the 
government budget deficit;
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-  Introduce medium-term (3-5 years) budget planning and 
strategic planning in the ministries and, in accordance with it, 
to base budget formation on financing the action o f policy 
goals and results;
-  Promote concerted increase o f wages and labour productivity 
in order to prevent additional economic instability, at the same 
time taking into account the consequences o f  inflation;
-  Do not hasten Latvia’s accession to the Euro zone.
It. Latvian institutional framework 
for entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurs -  people who start businesses and make them grow -  
are essential agents o f change in the process o f transition from a 
centrally planned to a market economy. They are the catalysts of 
growth, marrying capital, innovation and skilled people.
“There is no standard definition o f SMEs that is followed by all 
countries. However, common criteria are: micro-enterprises, up to 10 
people; small enterprises 10-50 people, annual turnover up to EUR 7 
million, fixed assets not exceeding EUR 5 million; medium 
enterprises 50-250 people, annual turnover up to EUR 40 million, 
fixed assets not exceeding EUR 27 million.”3
The policy framework for SME development should be based on a 
detailed knowledge o f the problems and constraints that entrepreneurs 
are facing. For example, a survey undertaken in Latvia in 2002 
identified key constraints for start-up entrepreneurs as:
-  Lack o f finance (33 %)
-  Taxes and institutional environment (29 %)
-  Marketing problems (17 %)
-  Lack o f adequate premises (9 %)
-  Labour (6 %)
-  Machinery and technology (4 %)
-  Racketeering and organized crime (2 %).
3
Journal of the European Commission’, Commission Recommendation 
of 3 April 1996 concerning the definition o f SMEs.
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We will use this survey result as a benchmark for our further investi­
gation.
Developing a favourable and attractive environment for 
investment and work
Conditions to ensure a conductive environment for investment and 
work are improving every year: obstacles to EU internal market 
freedoms are basically eliminated. Competition is strengthened and 
liberalization o f monopoly sectors has commenced. The main 
problems hindering business development in Latvia, especially SME, 
are encumbered with the funding receipt, various administrative 
obstacles, lack o f adequate information, and shortage o f a skilled 
labour force. Guarantee and investment instruments have not been 
sufficiently developed yet. Latvian enterprises working with EU 
directives on quality, lack information on product standards and new 
production methods. Product quality assessment instruments are not 
available in Latvia.
Only minor progress is observed in the improvement o f the state 
road network. However, road deterioration is high and the carrying 
capacity o f transport network is insufficient in several segments.
Economic activities in the regions outside Riga increase at a much 
slower pace than in Riga and its neighborhood. One o f the reasons is 
due to slow administrative territorial reform; there is a large number 
of economically and administratively weak local governments, unable 
to ensure the provision o f all municipal functions, which continue to 
exist in Latvia.
In the Programme, the following main tasks have been set as 
priority directions for the creation o f a favourable and attractive 
environment for investment and work in 2005-2008:
-  Promote entrepreneurial culture, lessen administrative obstac­
les and burden, create a supportive environment for SME;
-  Strengthen the supervision o f competition and ensure effective 
competition in public services;
-  Improve and develop transport infrastructure, increase the 
number o f connections with other European infrastructure 
networks;
-  Speed up administrative territorial reform.
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Problems of SME
Enterprise policy is not just a set o f programmes. It is a central part of 
overall economic and national development policy. It needs a body 
with clear responsibilities to have the proper impact. It needs 
commitment o f people and budget and strategies to maintain and 
ensure the continuity o f the support institutions and programmes.
These are fundamental issues if  the vision for growth o f SME is to 
be translated into reality...The attitude o f government is more 
commanding than supporting, this needs to change.
Institutional Framework for Entrepreneurship
According to the Programme we can define the main directions 
On institutionalisation o f SME policy:
I. Institutionalisation o f SME Policy and SME Representation
II. Regulatory Framework and the Informal Economy
III. Tax Policy for SMEs
Support Services and Financial Instruments for Entrepreneur­
ship
IV. Financial Instruments for Start-ups and SMEs
V. Advisory Services for SMEs
VI. Regional and Local Enterprise Promotion
Judging from the defined above we can introduce policy guidelines 
and recommendations on instituonalisation o f SME policy and SME 
representation. We should also take into account that the rapidly 
changing global and regional environment has profound impact on 
SME policy. Entrepreneurship and small business development 
policies need to react to changing reality by a constant adaptation of 
strategies and tools. It is policy-making with shifting business 
circumstances and moving targets. A critical task for the future work 
will be to monitor the implementation o f these guidelines and to 
formulate amendments where necessary.
Policy guidelines
Ministry o f Economics on behalf o f  government should state and 
publicly present the policies and implementation strategies, which 
encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise development, and ensure
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that they are seen as a central aim of national development policies. 
Undertake a practical development strategy for SMEs that coincides 
complements macro policies. Key actions are:
1. Affirm the importance o f the SME sector to economic and 
social development by making specific reference in national 
development plans and policy reform programs to the crucial 
contribution o f SME to the goals for entrepreneurship and 
enterprise development.
2. Create a positive attitude to entrepreneurship across the whole 
o f society, a central theme o f SME policy
3. Disseminate the policy widely and publicize the aims and 
actions planned.
4. Assign clear institutional responsibility for supporting SME 
development, and for developing SME policies and strategies.
5. Ensure that implementation o f policies is monitored and 
measured.
6. Specify policy priorities for the SME sector and ensure that 
performance in achieving these is monitored in an open and 
transparent manner.
7. Ensure that the institutional responsibilities for supporting the 
achievement o f these progress indicators are stated.
8. Make the identification and removal o f obstacles to SMEs the 
priority area for action when formulating policies and support 
programmes.
9. Ensure that SME representative organizations and SMEs are 
seen to be supported by relevant state organizations by 
undertaking joint activities.
Examples o f joint activities are:
-  Award schemes for entrepreneurs
-  Shared sponsorship o f exhibitions/seminars, etc.
-  Joint studies or programmes to announce study results and 
propose new initiatives
-  Participation at industry/state policy discussions by SMEs.
10. Designate institutional responsibility for SME policy at natio­
nal, regional and local levels, and ensure clarity in roles in 
order to avoid duplication or overlapping activities.
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11. Assign the proper legal responsibility and adequate resources 
to regional and local government in order to promote and 
develop SMEs.
12. Adapt policies and programmes to the constantly changing 
conditions and requirements o f the dynamic SME sector.
Review the benefits o f establishing an agency or agencies o f govern­
ment, which can operate independently from the more conservative 
and bureaucratic procedures o f Ministries, and that can:
-  Implement support programmes in an effective manner
-  Analyze and formulate policy for approval, co-ordinate action, 
and focus efforts
-  Facilitate the learning process and interaction between govern­
ment and the private sector.
Figure 2.1. SME Policy Lifecycle Model.
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The figure 2.1 shows us possible model o f SME policy 
implementation in the rapidly changing environment due to transition 
economy processes.
I. SME Policy Inefficiencies and Problems
In the last section we would to aggregate information joining together 
all gained results.
Worldwide, small business is now seen as a crucial component o f 
national development and as a keyprovider o f new jobs, contributor to 
economic growth and regional development. For countries in 
transition to market economies, the growth o f small business is vital. 
Restructuring existing industry is important, but equally important is 
the need to maximise the growth o f new business.
SME policy main problems in Latvia 
□  Tax policy
for start-ups 
Bureaucracy 
and 
institutional 
environment □  Financial 
market 
inertness
□  Education
Labour 
market 
□  Regional 
disparity
□  Education Ш Labour market
□  R egional disparity □  Financial market inertness  
■  Bureaucracy and institu tional environm ent □  T a x p o lic y  for start-ups
Figure 3.1. SME Policy Main Problems In Latvia.
These are main problems where government should concentrate 
efforts and regularly monitor to ensure sustainable SMEs foundation 
grows and development. Let sum up main steps to be taken in order 
to diminish each o f these problems in the mid-term period.
1. For improvement o f education and skills the following main tasks 
should be implemented:
-  Strengthen co-operation between public administration insti­
tutions, education establishments and employers in order to
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adjust the supply o f the education system with the needs o f the 
labour market
-  Raise cost efficiency in all levels and forms o f education
-  Improve availability o f education at all levels and reduce the 
number o f students who do not graduate or do not achieve a 
professional qualification
-  Increase the availability o f lifelong learning and motivation of 
the population in this area
-  Raise the overall level o f  technological skills and natural 
science knowledge, improve the professional orientation 
system and ensure the availability o f professional orientation 
services for all the population in the context o f lifelong 
learning.
To stimulate knowledge and innovation, the main will be as follows:
-  Increase public investment and foster private investment in 
R&D.
-  Ensure renewal o f intellectual potential in science, improving 
the system of doctoral grants and modernising scientific infra­
structure.
-  Promote transfer o f knowledge and technologies in production 
(including business incubators and technology parks).
-  Increase Internet availability and introduce electronic signa­
ture, as well as ensuring wider public services in the 
e-environment.
2. One could define the following main tasks for fostering employ­
ment:
-  Create additional working places to encourage young people 
not to leave Latvia soon after graduating
-  Encourage economic activities in the least developed regions
-  Reduce undeclared employment.
3. In order to ensure even regional growth distribution -  SMEs 
development, apart from state policy inevitable changes should be 
made in:
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Transport
-  Ensure improvement o f the state road network’s condition and 
to increase the load carrying capacity o f the road surfaces and 
bridges in accordance with EU requirements (develop Via 
Baltica, update the East-W est railway corridor).
-  Improve and develop the quality o f international transport 
corridors.
-  Create integrated passenger transportation system (unified and 
rational network o f public transport routes).
Energy
-  Continue development o f the electricity market (to establish 
the independent distribution system’s operator by July 1, 2007; 
develop the secondary legal acts required for the Electricity 
Market Law by 2007).
-  Sign long-term agreement with Gazprom to ensure stable gas 
prices in future.
4. The lack o f finance is one o f the core difficulties entrepreneurs are 
facing when starting and developing their businesses. Due to the 
specific situation o f transition, this difficulty appears to be even more 
severe. This is the result o f a number o f factors, among them, the 
banking system not being competitive or banks often being more 
attracted by investments in high-yielding state bonds. The transaction 
costs o f lending small amounts are proportionally higher than those o f 
large amounts, which makes small business lending in Latvia 
commercially unattractive for most banks. The common problem of 
high transaction costs is exacerbated as well through a lack o f 
banking staff experienced in risk assessment for small businesses.
In order to help those enterprises that have viable business pro­
jects but which do not fulfill the requirements o f banks, non- 
traditional (alternative or hedge) funding institutions should be 
involved.
N on-traditional financial institutions include a wide range o f 
institutions with different objectives and funding resources. What 
they all have in common is that the project risk profile which they 
accept is higher than that o f traditional banks and the rate o f return 
may not be remunerated at the same market rate as that o f
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commercial banks or investment banks. Examples o f non-traditional 
financial institutions are:
-  Public schemes extending credit directly to SMEs
-  Hedge funds
-  Business associations
-  Credit guarantee agencies
-  Credit co-operatives
-  Small business equity funds
-  Micro-credit schemes.
Most o f the external finance -  whether through traditional or non- 
traditional tools -  is undertaken in the form of credit financing (or 
credit guarantees). We must admit that equity type o f financing is still 
rather an exception, as the sources here are facing a number of 
obstacles. These are related to:
-  A lack o f equity culture in Latvia
-  The unwillingness o f the entrepreneurs to share ownership
-  The lack o f exit mechanisms
-  Inappropriate legal environment for equity finance
-  An overall lack o f fund managers able to run commercially 
viable funds in the present local conditions
-  The lack o f innovative new policies to encourage private 
equity provision.
5. To deteriorate bureaucracy and simultaneously advance “manage­
ment” o f economics, following e-technologies needs to be imple­
mented:
-  E-government. Set o f electronics resources that will simplify 
and speed-up procedure o f new enterprises registration, “paper 
gathering”, information exchange, reduce possibility of corrup­
tion etc.
-  E-declaration will allow State Revenue Service to process 
information quicker and more precisely. This will allow in 
future to introduce obligatory income declaration for physical 
persons without major increase o f employees.
6. To improve motivation and promote financial attractiveness of 
jobs:
SME Policy in Latvia: Main Trends and Problems 169
-  State Revenue Service o f Latvia should switch emphasize from 
squeezing hefty fines to clarifying peculiar tax policies’ 
characteristics.
-  By gradually raising the untaxed monthly minimum and 
allowances for dependent persons.
Implementation o f the planned measure has already started. The 
untaxed monthly minimum not subjected to personal income tax was 
increased by LVL 5 in 2005 (from LVL 21 to LVL 26) while the tax 
allowance for dependent persons was raised by LVL 7.50 (from LVL 
10.50 to LVL 18). For 2006, the untaxed monthly minimum is fixed 
at the amount o f LVL 32, while the amount o f allowance for 
dependent persons is LVL 22.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the capital budgeting practices and especially the 
use of the internal rate of return in Estonian private equity and 
venture capital firms. Structured interviews with main providers of 
venture capital and private equity were conducted to collect 
information about the current practice in Estonia and to highlight 
topical problems in this field. Evidence shows that internal rate of 
return is widely used as a capital budgeting technique by Estonian 
private equity and venture capital firms. They also use positioned IRR 
as an estimate of the cost of capital figure in project valuations. 
However, the IRR has many critical deficiencies, which may result in 
distorted calculations and inadequate decisions.
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Introduction
It has been shown (see Dittman et al., 2004) that valuation methodo­
logies have a statistically and economically meaningful impact on the 
investment performance o f venture capitalists. Therefore, proper 
choice o f valuation method and correct application o f methodology 
are rather important.
The aim o f the article is to discuss main methodological problems 
associated with the calculation o f internal rate o f  return (IRR) and 
investigate the use o f IRR by Estonian private equity and venture 
capital funds in capital budgeting and performance measurement 
settings. A case study method is used and interviews are conducted to 
collect the information about current practices.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section gives the 
theoretical background and discusses main methodological problems 
with IRR. The second section describes the research methodology 
and gives some background information about the cases. The last 
section presents the views o f Estonian private equity and venture 
capitalists about the use o f IRR and discusses the problems with 
application o f IRR in venture capital context.
Theoretical background
The modern corporate finance literature describes an array o f
different capital budgeting methods including the internal rate o f
return (IRR), which can also be used in performance measurement
settings. Internal rate o f return (IRR) is a discount rate, which makes
the present value o f future cash flows equal to initial investments. We
cannot explicitly state a formula to calculate IRR. It can be calculated
iteratively from the following polynomial equation:
CF{ C f2 CF
(1) ------ -----I--------— 7 + ... +--------------/0  = 0,
(1 + IRR) (1 + JRK)2 (1 + /RR) "
where CFt -  cash flows in period t,
« -n u m b er of periods,
IO -  initial outflow.
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This equation can be solved with the Newton-Raphon’s method. In 
practice, we can find IRR by interpolation or using a spreadsheet 
program (MS Excel, etc).
Many business practitioners prefer IRR over NPV, although the 
latter has clear advantages (Graham and Harvey 2001). The reasons 
are as follows. IRR can be easier to understand because it can be 
calculated without having to estimate the cost o f capital. IRR can be 
expressed as a percentage o f rates o f return and therefore is easily 
comparable to other projects.
IRR is a concept very widely used in the venture capital setting 
because it is an input to the so-called venture capital method. 
According to this method, a venture capitalist determines the amount 
that must be returned on a proposed investment at some future date to 
achieve the desired IRR. The VC then calculates a projected terminal 
value o f the company based on “success scenario”, i.e. scenario in 
which the venture meets its performance target. Dividing the required 
amount by the projected terminal value, the venture capitalist 
calculates the required percentage o f exit proceeds. Dividing the 
investment by this percentage gives the post-money value o f the 
project. To compensate for the inflated forecast, the required IRR is 
very high and well above the true cost o f  capital (see Smith and 
Smith, 2000).
The managers o f venture capital funds must compete with each 
other to obtain funds from investors. Therefore, they are mostly 
interested in the relative performance o f the fund -  that is, the fund is 
successful if  its performance is better than the performance of 
competitors. The Association o f Investment Management Research 
(AIMR) has deemed the IRR as the most appropriate measure of 
returns presentation for venture and other private equity investor 
investments. The European Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (EVCA) and the British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA) have also adopted the IRR as the best measure of perfor­
mance.
It is quite usual that an investor is typically required to fund only a 
small percentage o f its total capital commitment at the outset of the 
fund. Additional draw downs may happen during the lifecycle o f the 
fund. This enables to minimize uninvested cash the fund holds and 
maximize the IRR o f the fund. In the early years o f most funds, the 
returns are low or even negative due to the small amount o f capital
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actually invested at the outset combined with the establishment costs, 
management fees and running expenses (Why and h o w ...2006). The 
first exits may take place before the fund is closed, and some 
proceeds may be distributed back to investors even before the whole 
commitment has been drawn. This results in a J  curve depicted in 
Figure 1. Under such scheme, it is unusual for an investor ever to 
have a full amount o f its commitment actually managed by the 
manager (Ibid).
A high IRR cannot be the only criterion for financing venture 
capital projects. If the IRR is high due to the wrong interpretation o f 
the model, shareholder value may be destroyed because the venture 
capitalist will choose wrong projects and make wrong decisions. The 
problem is especially acute when the cost o f capital is close to 
inadequately calculated IRR.
—  • Commitment------Calls - *  Returns-------IRR
Figure 1. Private equity fund lifecycle (Why and how ...2006)
In order to calculate and interpret IRR correctly, one must be aware 
of its limitations. Some o f them are purely mathematical while others 
are more substantial.
Reinvestment rate. The first assumption o f IRR is that interim 
cash flows must be reinvested at the same rates o f return. If  the 
assumption does not hold, the measure will overestimate quite 
significantly the actual rates o f return (see Appendix 1 ,1). Financially
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it is more normal to assume the reinvestment with the cost o f capital 
and in practice sometimes the cash flows are not reinvested at all. The 
bias depends on the timing o f cash flows. The more biased are interim 
cash flows towards the start o f the projects, the more biased is the 
IRR. World famous management consulting firm McKinsey con­
siders this to be the most dangerous problem with IRR (Kelleher, 
MacCormack 2004).
What can be the solution to the problem? A good alternative to 
IRR as far as reinvestment problem is concerned is modified rate of 
return (MIRR). It allows choosing appropriate and more realistic 
interim reinvestment rates (zero incl.). Usually it is assumed that the 
reinvestment rate can be equated to cost o f  capital. MIRR can be 
derived from the following formula:
\ / 9
,=o (1 + WACC)1 (1 + MIRR)" 
where CFIt -  investments,
CFt -  cash flows,
WACC -  weighted average cost o f capital, 
к -  reinvestment rate o f return.
In order to make decisions based on comparison o f WACC and 
MIRR, interim cash flows must be reinvested into a project with 
similar risk characteristics as the project under consideration (i.e. in 
most cases к = WACC). However, if  interim cash flows are reinvested 
into a project with a considerably lower risk level, one should use 
NPV instead o f IRR. This may happen when venture capital fund exit 
from some o f his portfolio companies before the end o f the fund does 
not distribute the received cash right back to the investors (limited 
partners).
The use o f MIRR also enables to avoid the following problem 
characteristic o f IRR.
Multiple rates o f return. IRR is calculated from a polynomial 
equation, which according to mathematical rules may have as many 
solutions as there are changes in signs in the equation. In cases in 
which investments have a mix o f positive and negative cash flows 
over time, there can be multiple discount rates that make the net
П
П CFI.
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present value o f these cash flows equal to zero. The use o f staged 
financing which is quite common in venture capital setting (Sahlman 
1990) can produce such a pattern in cash flows.
The problem o f multiple IRR has been covered in almost every 
corporate finance textbook but according to Longbottom and Wiper 
(1978) it will occur only under very limited and -  what is even more 
important -  uncommon conditions. Multiple rates can only occur 
when later cash outflows are veiy large relative to initial cash inflows 
(Longbottom, Wiper 1978). An illustrative example is given in 
Appendix 1 (II).
What can be the solution to the problem? In capital budgeting 
context one should use NPV or MIRR instead o f IRR to solve the 
problem.
Continuous cash flows and interest calculation methods.
Assumption o f discrete cash flows may be appropriate for financial 
investments but it does not appear suitable for corporate investments 
in new technology or new products which presumably are expected to 
yield a continuous stream o f cash flows (Pogue 2004). European 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA 2005) suggests using the 
extended IRR model, in which monthly required rate o f return is used 
instead o f annual rate o f return (Formula 3).
OUTQ OUTx OUTN
[ 0  + IRRm)° + (1 + I R R J  + " '+ (l + IRRm) N f
M V n Г Wq , Щ  , , {Nn
0 + |_(1 + ш г „ ) °  0 + / « й „ , ) '  “ ■ ( i + / « « „ ) w j
where IRRm -  monthly IRR,
NA VN -  net assets value o f the unrealized portfolio 
in month N.
In order to compare projects with different frequencies in cash flows, 
one should use effective annual rate o f return. The monthly IRR 
should be recalculated into annual equivalent rate o f return (EAIRR) 
with the following formula:
(4) EAIRR = (\ +IRRm)n -
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Monthly IRR is quite a good solution to use instead o f annual IRR but 
it is not the best solution in the private equity setting. The more 
realistic assumption would be that the cash flows should occur on a 
continuous basis (Pogue 2004). In order to estimate cash flows on a 
continuous basis, a continuous discount factor should be used instead 
o f discrete discount ones.
and effective annual IRR can be found by the following formula:
Appropriate discounting methods should be chosen according to the 
type o f cash flows (i.e. continuous cash flows should be discounted 
with the continuous discount factor and discrete cash flows should be 
discounted with the discrete discount factor) (Pogue 2004).
If the cash flows come earlier (as in the case o f continuous cash 
flows), the effective annual continuous IRR as well as the value of the 
project will be higher (see appendix l.IV):
In case o f discrete cash flows, the relationship between different rates 
o f return is as follows:
MIRR with no reinvestment results with the lowest score. The simple 
interest method assumes the reinvestment o f principal amounts but 
the proceeds will be not reinvested.
=  10.
(6) EAIRR =
n
(7) EAIRR,count > EAIRR,comp •
(8) MIRR < EAIRR,count = EAIRR,comp = IRRsimp •
Re invest=0
Project selection under investment constraints. As the commit­
ment o f the investors has been limited to a specific amount, the 
venture capital or private equity fund cannot accept all projects in
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which IRR is higher than the required rate o f return. In order to select 
the best mix o f projects, one cannot rely solely on the individual 
characteristics (IRR, NPV) o f projects but instead on NPV (or IRR) 
of the portfolio as a whole. This, however, raises an additional issue -  
nonadditivity o f yields. Nonadditivity o f yields means that one 
cannot calculate the fund level IRR based on the weighted average o f 
IRR of individual projects (see Appendix 1, III). Similar concept 
applies in calculating the pooled IRR for the funds.
The comparison of IRR with WACC. Although IRR equation 
does not require the cost o f capital (WACC) for calculation, the latter 
is needed in order to decide whether to accept a project or not. In case 
of a typical investment project, the following conditions hold:
IRR > WACC, accept the project;
IRR -  WACC, further analysis is needed;
IRR < WACC, reject the project.
These criteria are opposite for financing-type projects (i.e. for 
projects where cash inflows precede cash outflows). Therefore it is 
necessary to find out which type o f project is under consideration 
before deciding whether to accept or reject the project. This may not 
be very clear if cash flows are mixed. The use o f NPV or MIRR will 
enable to avoid this problem.
The choice o f cash flows. It is questionable whether a minority 
investor should calculate IRR based on FCFE. The distribution and 
reinvestment o f FCFE is under the control o f the majority investor. If 
a minority investor calculates the expected IRR based on FCFE, but 
the majority investor decides to reinvest FCFE into project/ 
instruments with a lower risk and return, the expected IRR cannot be 
achieved. Therefore, we suggest using expected cash dividends 
instead o f FCFE in IRR calculation for a minority shareholder.
Kelleher and MacCormack (2004) state that “the most straight­
forward way to avoid problems with IRR is to avoid it altogether.” 
Another way is to make adjustments for the m easure’s most dange­
rous assumptions and act in accordance with the recommendations 
above.
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Methodology
The analysis is carried out by using the case study methodology. 
According to the best tradition o f case study methodology, “how and 
why” questions are posed. The most important research questions 
regarding the topic are:
1. Which capital budgeting techniques are used by venture capitalists 
to evaluate projects?
2. How do venture capitalists find the internal rate o f return o f the 
project?
3. Do venture capitalists modify IRR to deal with theoretical 
limitation o f the model? Why and how?
4. How do venture capitalists find the cost o f venture capital? Why?
In order to answer the research questions, structured interviews were 
carried out among Estonian venture capitalists in 2004-2005 and an 
additional e-mail survey was carried out in 2006. Each interview 
lasted about one hour with a representative o f a venture capital fund. 
All funds were managed by professional and experienced manage­
ment teams. The names o f the venture capitalists are not provided 
because they wished to remain anonymous.
The following part presents the five cases analyzed in the article: 
Case A is an experienced venture capital and private equity 
provider in Estonia. It manages two different funds. The first fund is 
meant for start-up investments and the second is for growth-staged 
investments. It was one o f the first venture capitalists in Estonia. It 
invests in different sectors in Estonia and abroad.
Case В is a small venture capital provider in Estonia, which does 
not actively invest in business ventures any more. It has a small 
portfolio o f Estonian and foreign ventures.
Case С is a venture capital provider in the Baltic States who has 
made investments in Estonia over the last decade. It has made quite 
large investments and has quite a large investment portfolio 
consisting o f companies operating in different sectors.
Case D is both a venture capital and private equity provider in the 
Baltic States. It has made quite small investments in different sectors 
for less than 10 years in Estonia.
Case E is a mezzanine capital provider in the Baltic States. Its 
portfolio consists o f quite a few enterprises operating in different
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sectors but the investments have been quite large. This case differs 
considerably from others because it does not provide equity capital.
The reliability o f the study can be assured because a case study 
protocol was used and written notes were taken.
Results and discussion
According to the conducted interviews, Estonian private equity and 
venture capitalists use internal rate o f return for two purposes: in 
capital budgeting and performance measurement.
In the case o f capital budgeting, large U.S. companies prefer NPV 
or IRR analysis (Graham and Harvey 2001). In venture capital and 
private equity settings, IRR is much more often used than NPV.
Estonian private equity and venture capitalists use the valuation 
model in which the required IRR is compared with expected IRR. 
According to Figure 2, the valuation process begins with the 
determination o f the internal rate o f return o f the project and the 
required rate o f return. The internal rate o f return from the project 
must be greater than the required one, in order to continue. Then the 
value o f the project is estimated by using the required IRR as the 
discount rate. The next step is holding negotiations between parties 
and distribution o f ownership after which the expected internal rate o f 
return and the investment made by venture capitalists can be 
calculated. Venture capitalists accept a project if  the required rate o f 
return is lower than the expected internal rate o f return. This approach 
is quite similar to the traditional venture capital method.
In capital budgeting context, venture capitalists face several 
problems listed in the theoretical part o f the article. In our view, two 
main problems are reinvestment o f interim cash flows and choice o f 
the required IRR. The reinvestment problem can be viewed on two 
different levels: the project level and the fund level. If  a venture 
capitalist is a minority holder, his/her ability to control the 
reinvestment decision on the project level is limited. The expected 
IRR is only achieved when the majority holder (usually entrepreneur) 
reinvests interim cash flows or distributes these cash flows back to 
the investors to be invested into other projects/instruments, and the 
reinvestment takes place with the same IRR as the project under
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Figure 2. Quantitative decision-making process among venture capi­
talists in Estonia
consideration. Distribution o f interim cash flows essentially carries 
the reinvestment problem to the next level. The reinvestment decision 
on the fund level is the responsibility o f the venture capitalist. If 
he/she does not distribute the proceeds back to the funders or reinvest 
them with IRR, the potential net assets value (NAV) will be lower in 
the future, as well as IRR o f the fund. This is not a methodological 
problem, but should be taken into account when evaluating projects 
because the potential IRR will be lower.
It is highly questionable whether a fund level IRR can be used as 
the required rate o f return on the project level. First, there is an issue 
o f management fees and other costs associated with the management 
o f the fund. Second, if  the fund invests its money in projects 
gradually, it may have quite large cash balances in the first years, 
which reduces the fund level IRR. And last but not least -  such an 
approach implicitly assumes that all accepted projects are within the 
same risk class. According to the performance data o f US private 
equity and venture capital funds from the last 20 years, the realized 
IRR for seed/early stage funds was 20.5%, later stage funds 13.8%, 
buyouts 13.3%, mezzanine 9.1% (P rivate...2006). At the same time,
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the required rates o f return have been between 36% and 45% for 
early-stage investments and between 26% and 30% for expansion 
investments, acquisitions, buyouts, and other later-stage categories 
(Manigart et al., 2002). Estonian private equity and venture capitalists 
used positioned IRR as a required rate o f return. Commercial banks 
require 4-8% , mezzanine financiers 15-20%, equity providing 
venture capitalists 25-35%  (Table 1).
Table 1. Venture capital pricing issues and return
Case A В С D E
Measure of 
the cost of 
capital
IRR IRR IRR IRR IRR
Investment
stage
Start-up
Expansion
Growth Rapid growth 
Exit
Growth Growth
Required rate 
of return (%)
30-35 Min 20 Min 30 Min 25 Min 16
Source: Kõomägi, Sander 2006a
The remaining problems are not so important in capital budgeting 
decisions. Staged financing, especially when used in later stages, 
could potentially cause the problem o f multiple IRR. As stated in the 
theoretical part, multiple rates can only occur when the latter cash 
outflows are very large relative to initial cash inflows. Estonian 
private equity and venture capitalists use staged financing rather 
seldom (Kõomägi, Sander 2006b), and therefore the problem o f 
multiple IRR does not emerge in most cases. Although Estonian 
venture capitalists use compound interest calculation methods, they 
do not apply continuous cash flows in capital budgeting. Therefore 
the projects are a little bit undervalued. Estonian private equity and 
venture capitalists do not attach much importance to the technical 
details of IRR calculation as project selection depends not only on the 
financial criterion but also on non-financial criteria. According to one 
interviewee “there is not much difference between the returns o f 28% 
or 32%.”
Some of the problems in capital budgeting also appear during the 
measurement o f fund performance. Performance measurement 
depends on the structure and the type o f fund. The predominant
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private equity and venture capital investment vehicle is the inde­
pendent private fixed-life fund. Since this type o f fund has a fixed 
life, the return on investment is fairly easy to calculate, but problems 
will occur if  there is only one capital call and the money is not 
invested in the portfolio companies at once (i.e. high cash balances 
remain). Another problem concerns the distribution o f proceeds 
(Figure 1). This is actually a reinvestment problem. If the venture 
capitalist does not distribute the proceeds back to funders at once, 
these should be reinvested. However, even if this does not happen, 
there is no methodological problem in the calculation o f fund level 
IRR as the NAV will be lower. I f  the venture capitalist distributes the 
proceeds back to the funders, they should reinvest the proceeds to 
earn the IRR presented.
One o f the reasons IRR is preferred is that this type of partnership 
generally has a fixed number o f investors and a fixed commitment 
basis and proceeds cannot be several times reinvested so the cost 
basis o f investment does not increase and decrease as it would with 
an evergreen or Open-End Fund (Interpretive... 2006).
In most Estonian private equity and venture capital funds there has 
been only one capital call (i.e. the capital was paid in once at the 
beginning o f the fund). Still, there were also some funds with several 
capital calls during the fund life (like in Figure 1) and this approach 
gains more and more popularity among the practitioners. Although 
neither approach creates any methodological problems in IRR calcu­
lation, the latter approach enables to maximize the IRR for the 
funders.
Results concerning the distribution o f the proceeds are mixed. In 
some funds, cash is distributed back to the funders straight after the 
disinvestment o f portfolio company even if  this happens several years 
before the liquidation date o f the fund. Another approach is to make 
only one cash payment at the moment o f  fund liquidation. The latter 
approach does not raise the reinvestment problem for IRR, because 
the NAV captures the effect. As fund performance is a rate o f return 
to a limited partner (funder), they should reinvest the proceeds with 
IRR during the investment process. If they do not do that, the actual 
IRR will be lower than calculated.
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Conclusion
Managers o f private equity and venture capital funds face several 
problems when using IRR as a tool for making capital budgeting 
decisions or measuring the performance o f the fund. While some o f 
these problems can be solved by correct application o f methodology 
(choice o f appropriate cash flows and interest calculation methods, 
comparison o f IRR with WACC), others are more fundamental 
(reinvestment problem).
Despite numerous problems with IRR, it is widely used in practice 
both for capital budgeting and performance measurement purposes. 
According to our study, Estonian private equity and venture capi­
talists use IRR as the main investment criterion for selecting projects. 
Instead o f using the comparison o f IRR with WACC, practitioners 
rely on positioned IRR (i.e. the required IRR depends on the 
financing stage and instrument).
If an entrepreneur distributes cash back to the venture capital fund 
and the venture capitalist does not reinvest or distribute the proceeds 
to the funders, there are no methodological problems with IRR as far 
as performance measurement is concerned, but in case o f distri­
butions the correct IRR can be only achieved if the proceeds are 
reinvested in the same IRR by the funders.
Fund managers should be very aware o f the assumptions and 
threats concerning the IRR measure before making investment 
decisions and presenting the rates o f returns for the investors.
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APPENDIX 1.
An Illustrative Example of Problems in IRR Calculation
Let us assume that a fund invested in two projects: A and B. In case of 
Project A, the initial investment was EEK 1.9 million. At the end of Year 
1, the cash flow is EEK 1 million and EEK 1.2 million for the second 
year. Total cash inflow is EEK 2.2 million. In case o f Project B, the 
initial investment was EEK 0.824 million. In Year 1, the project 
generates a positive cash flow in an amount of EEK 4.8 million, in Year
2 the project needs additional financing in an amount of EEK 10 million. 
In Year 3, the project was sold for EEK 6.6 million.
I. Reinvestment problem
By using the formula 1, we can calculate the IRR for project A. It is 
10%. However, this return can only be achieved if the cash flows are 
reinvested. This can be proved by the following calculations: 
100-(1.1)+ 120 = 230 , and 190 1.1 1.1 = 230.. If the cash flows are not
reinvested, the return is only 7.61% ( IRR actual < IRR accounting )•
II. Multiple rate of return
The IRR of Project В was 24.5%. However if the second year cash 
inflow would have been 5 millions instead of 4.8 millions, the project 
would have three mathematically correct IRR-s: 71.3%, 92.2%, and 
143.3%, neither of which could be the economically correct rate of 
return.
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Figure 3. Multiple rates of return
III. Nonadditivity of yields
In order to calculate the IRR for the whole fund, one cannot just use the 
weighted average of IRR-s due to the nonadditivity of yields. Therefore 
it is necessary to calculate the fund level IRR based on fund level total 
cash flows. In our case the weighted average of individual IRR-s would 
be
---- — ------24.5% + — — ------10% = 14.41%.
824 + 1900 824 + 1900
But the fund level IRR is actually 15.12%, assuming that all the interim 
cash flows were reinvested with IRR itself.
IV. Continuous cash flows
If in case of Project A, cash flows are generated continuously instead of 
once at the end of year, the effective annual continuous IRR (Formula 6) 
would be 15.43% instead of 10%. If the cash flows are generated 
monthly, the discrete IRR would be 14.8% instead of 10%.
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to identify the developments on Tallinn 
Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1996 to 2005 with respect to listing 
status (listings, delistings and cross-listings) and to determine their 
possible causes. This paper shows that the listings on TSE were 
strongly influenced by the TSE crises in autumn 1997 and by the 
effects of Russian crises on share prices in 1998. Changes in listing 
status were mostly contributable to changes in capitalization require­
ments set in Rules or were part of ordinary listing procedure (move­
ment from Free Market to 1-list or Main List). Many companies that 
considered listing their shares on TSE dropped this idea after the 
crises, but the companies that were already listed became delisted due 
to mergers, ownership changes, bankruptcy or other reasons. The 
history reflects that the future o f TSE depends on the overall develop­
ment of Estonian companies, the changes in their ownership struc­
tures, financing conditions and on the future developments of TSE.
Keywords: Tallinn Stock Exchange, listings, delistings, cross­
listings
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1. Introduction
Tallinn Stock Exchange (TSE) has gone through considerable 
changes from its establishment in mid 1990s till today. It is a 
developing market and many companies that listed their shares on 
TSE when the exchange was established are no longer publicly traded 
or in some cases the companies have ceased to exist. At the same 
time some new companies have listed their shares and contributed to 
the development o f the exchange. It poses a question: how and why 
have the listings on TSE occurred and changed? No previous study 
has concentrated on these issues, but in order to envision the future 
developments o f TSE, it is important to know and understand them. 
Therefore the purpose o f this paper is to identify listing status 
changes on Tallinn Stock Exchange during 1996-2005 and to 
determine their possible causes.
M ost o f the data presented in this paper has been gathered from 
TSE web pages, therefore no special references to this source have 
been made hereon. In order to find clues for changes in listing status 
many newspaper articles from the Estonian economics newspaper 
Äripäev were used as a starting point. These articles have not been 
specifically referred to as conclusions drawn are based on several 
articles. The references to bankruptcies are based on Äriregister 
(Estonian Registry o f Companies).
All the companies listed on TSE have been Estonian companies 
and in this paper their names have been used in the same form as they 
are written in Estonian (in some instances the references to the 
activities o f the firms were added into the brackets). An interested 
reader may find the GICS classifications for sector and industry for 
each listed firm from Annex 1.
This paper has been divided into 7 sections. The second section 
introduces TSE listing requirements and their changes in time. The 
third section deals with listings, listing status changes and cross­
listings. In order to illustrate the listings data with market information 
the fourth section investigates the listing status changes in 
comparison to market capitalization and market index changes. The 
fifth section concentrates on delisting issues and the sixth section 
presents some prospects for the future development o f the TSE. Main 
conclusions drawn are presented in section seven.
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2. Listing requirements on Tallinn Stock Exchange
Tallinn Stock Exchange (TSE) was set up in Estonia in April 1995 
and the first trading day was on 31 May 1996. The trading started 
with 11 securities from which 5 where the shares o f local banks and 6 
where obligations issued by the Hüvitusfond1. Before that date the 
necessary legislative acts in the form o f Securities M arket Act and 
Investment Funds Act had been approved in 1993 and 1994 
respectively and in November 1994 the Central Registry o f Securities 
had started its operation. In Estonia the stock exchange was involved 
in the privatisations only as an intermediaiy o f bonds that could be 
bought only for EVPs and a more important role was the creation o f a 
market place where securities o f the newly privatised companies 
could be transacted.
The securities listed on the TSE are divided into the following 
exchange lists: Main List; I-list; list o f bonds; list o f shares o f  funds 
and Free Market. This paper concentrates only on Main List, I-list2 
and Free Market securities. From 16 Dec 2002 the main requirements 
set for listing are:
1. An issuer applying for listing in the Main List o f shares shall have 
been engaging in its main field o f activity for at least 3 years.
2. Market value (if the market value cannot be assessed, the equity 
capital o f the public limited company) is at least 4 million EUR in 
case o f Main List and at least 1 million EUR in case o f I-list 
listing.
3. At least 25% o f the share capital represented by the shares to be 
listed is held by investors who belong to the public. The
1 In Estonia privatisation vouchers (EVPs) where given to people and 
these could be used in the privatisation process (to purchase land or 
property including shares of companies under privatisation). Hüvitusfond 
was set up in 1993 to give monetary coverage to the EVPs. It received 
portion of the money from privatisations and issued bonds that could be 
purchased only for EVPs. Hüvitusfond finished its activities in 2003. For 
details see the homepage of Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Estonia, http://www.fin.ee/index.php?lang=en
2 Before 25 February 2002 the I-list was called Secondary list, but in this 
paper only the term I-list is used to describe the previously used 
Secondary list term as well.
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aforementioned degree o f distribution may be expected to be 
achieved over a short period after the start o f the listing o f the 
shares on the exchange.
From its establishment the listing requirements on TSE have changed. 
The major changes have been in the required market value o f the 
issuer (point 2 above). Before 01 October 1997 the Main List listing 
required market value o f 100 million EEK (6.39 million EUR) and 
I-list listing 10 million EEK (0.64 million EUR). From 01 October
1997 till 16 December 2002 the minimum requirement o f market 
value for Main List listing was increased to 300 million EEK (19.1 
million EUR)
In addition some changes have been made regarding the 
distribution o f shares (point 3 above). Before 16 December 2002 the 
Rules required listed shares to be distributed between at least 300 
investors in case o f Main list and 100 investors in case of I-list 
listings. From 16 December 2002 till 27 September 2004 at least 15% 
o f the share capital represented by the shares to be listed had to be 
held by public.
The changes in listing requirements have also lead to amendments 
o f list transfer regulations. Till 16 December 2002 the Listing 
Committee had the right to transfer the shares o f the issuer from the 
Main List to the I-List in case over the last 6 months:
1. The average market capitalization o f the shares was below 200 
million EEK (12.78 million EUR); or
2. The number o f shareholders was below 1000; or
3. The average number o f shareholders, each o f them having in their 
possession shares with the market capitalization below 10 000 
EEK, was below 300.
From 16 December 2002 the requirements were simplified and the 
Listing Committee gained right to transfer the shares o f the issuer 
from Main List to I-list if  during the previous 6 months the average 
market value o f the issuer’s shares had been below 4 million EUR.
In both periods the Listing Committee had the right to transfer the 
shares o f the issuer from the I-List to the Main List o f the exchange in 
case the opposite was true.
In addition to Main and I-list listing it is also possible to list the 
shares on the Free Market. TSE enables Free Market listing only if:
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1. The company is in compliance with general listing cntena.
2. The issuer has prepared a plan and schedule for bringing the 
securities into conformity with the listing requirements.
3. Sufficient number o f the shares o f the company shall be held by 
investors belonging to the public.
4. Sufficient interest o f investors may be expected in trading in the 
security.
Before 16 December 2002 it was also clearly stated that the approval 
for trading on the Free Market would be given for a year, except to 
the foreign issuers. Since that date such a strict requirement has been 
dropped, but replaced with the listing change schedule requirement
i.e. the company must presents its own view o f the schedule and steps 
for listing on Main or I-list.
3. Listings on TSE
From 1996 (the establishment o f TSE) till end o f December 2005 in 
total o f 33 different companies have listed their shares on TSE during 
different time periods (see Annex 1 and Table 1 for details). The 
greatest number o f newcomers was in 1996, when in total o f 16 
companies listed their shares. From these only 5 were initially listed 
in the Main List (the 5 commercial banks: Eesti Forekspank, Eesti 
Hoiupank, Eesti Ühispank, Hansapank, Tallinna Pank), 2 were 
initially listed in I-list (commercial bank EVEA and IT company 
XXL.EE) and the remaining 9 (Norma, Kalev, Saku Õlletehas, 
Tallinna Farmaatsiatehas, Estiko, Tallinna Kaubamaja, Rakvere 
Lihakombinaat, Eesti Näitused, EMV) were initially listed on the 
Free Market. From these Free Market companies only 1 (Tallinna 
Farmaatsiatehas -  a pharmaceutical company) moved from Free 
Market to Main List during 1996 (see Table 2).
No liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings initiated in the two years 
preceding the submission of the application or no permanent insolvency 
encountered; the management (supervisory board or management board) 
members of the issuer applying for listing may not have undergone 
significant changes during the 12 calendar months preceding the date of 
submission of the listing application.
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Table 1. New Companies Listed on TSE 1996-20054
Year Main List 1-list Free Market
Total new 
listings
1996 5 2 9 16
1997 2 7 2 11
1998 0 2 0 2
1999 1 0 0 1
2005 3 0 0 3
Total 11 11 11 33
Source: TSE, http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
Table 2. Transfers between lists on TSE 1996-20055
Year
From Free 
Market to 
I-list
From Free 
Market to 
Main List
From I- 
list to 
Main List
From 
Main List 
to I-list
Total 
movements 
between lists
1996 0 1 0 0 1
1997 1 4 0 0 5
1998 4 0 0 4 8
2000 0 0 1 0 1
2003 0 0 2 0 2
Total 5 5 3 4 17
Source: TSE, http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
In 1997 11 new companies listed their shares: 7 o f them listed 
initially in I-list (Klementi, Viisnurk, Fakto, Leks Kindlustus, ESS, 
Harju Elekter, ASA Kindlustus), 2 in Main List (Baltika, Merko 
Ehitus) and 2 on Free Market (Tallinna Külmhoone, Viru Rand). At 
the same time 5 companies listed initially in 1996 changed their 
listing: 4 o f  them (Eesti Näitused, EMV, Norma, Tallinna Kauba­
maja) moved from Free Market to Main List and 1 (Estiko) from Free 
Market to I-list.
In 1998 only 2 companies (Reval Hotelligrupp and Pro Kapital) 
listed their shares in I-list. Although the number o f newcomers was 
small, 8 o f  the previously listed companies changed their listing. 
Namely 4 (Saku Õlletehas, Kalev, Rakvere Lihakombinaat, Tallinna
4 Years with no new listings excluded from the table.
5 Years with no transfers between lists excluded from the table.
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Külmhoone) moved from Free Market to I-list and 4 (Eesti Näitused, 
Baltika, Tallinna Farmaatsiatehas, EMV) moved from M ain List to 
I-list. The movement from Main List to I-list o f these 4 companies 
was due to TSE regulations that increased Main List companies’ 
market capitalization requirement 3 times (from 100 to 300 million 
EEK). This change clearly influenced the preference o f Free Market 
companies to become listed on I-list (capitalization requirement 10 
million EEK) not in the Main List.
In 1999 only 1 new company listed its shares in I-list. It was Eesti 
Telekom a previously 100% state-owned company that listed 49% of 
its shares after IPO on TSE. In 1999 the movements between lists 
ceased.
In 2000 only 1 company (Pro Kapital) moved from I-list to Main 
List after additional shares were issued on TSE. No movements bet­
ween lists occurred till 2003. In 2003 2 companies (Baltika and Harju 
Elekter) moved from I-list to Main List. This change was influenced 
by lowered market capitalization requirement o f TSE for listing in 
Main List (decreased from December 2002 from 19.1 million EUR to
4 million EUR).
Six years after the previous IPO in 1999 3 new companies 
(Tallinna Vesi, Starman and Tallink Grupp) listed their shares on the 
Main List o f TSE in 2005. These were also the first IPOs conducted 
according to the changed legislative acts that also follow the EU 
regulations. Tallinna Vesi (water utility) led the way with its IPO in 
June. As the price o f the share after IPO began to increase consi­
derably (by October increase 62.7% compared to IPO price) the 
public interest increased. As the Starman’s IPO was also in June the 
public had little time to react. Although Starman’s share price did not 
increase as much after the IPO (increase by December 14%) the 
expectations before Tallink’s IPO in December ran high. Over 9 
thousand people opened special securities’ accounts and participated 
in the IPO. However the price o f shares had not increased by the end 
of August 2006, but decreased (it was below the IPO price). After 
additional share issue in August 2006 the share price began to 
increase. The future developments on the exchange depend on how 
the share prices o f newly listed companies will change in the future.
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If no significant setbacks occur and the prices begin to increase, the 
high level o f interest for new IPOs would be guaranteed6.
Tables 1 and 2 show that in time the Free M arket has lost its 
significance as a means for companies for entering the M ain List or 1- 
list. After 1998 it has not been used at all. The numbers also indicate 
that in 1996, when the TSE was established, many companies needed 
time to adjust to the requirements and did not want to move to the 
I-list or Main List too quickly. Although the Free Market was 
intended to be used around 1 year, the 3 companies (Saku Õlletehas, 
Kalev, Rakvere Lihakombinaat) that moved from Free Market to 
I-list in 1998 remained on the Free Market over 1.5 years, which also 
indicates that these companies were not ready for other listings before 
that or the condition o f the market was not suitable. It may also mean 
that these companies just happened to “go with the flow” in 1996 and 
might not have been listed, if  that decision were made on the 
following years.
Listing changes are partly contributable to events that occurred on 
TSE at the time. The biggest changes in investor behaviour took place 
after TSE crisis. In 1997 the prices o f shares on TSE grew rapidly, the 
number o f  investors increased, as everyone wanted to profit from the 
recent share price increases. Some investors began to borrow money 
to by more and more shares. By 29 August 1997 the TALSE7 index 
(OMXT) reached a peak o f 492.27 points (in 3 June 1996 the index 
started at 100 points). Thereafter the prices fluctuated and in 23 
October 1997 came the first significant drop in prices by 15.3%. This 
was influenced mainly by two factors:
1. Liquidity crisis in big banks -  banks could not satisfy their needs
in other ways than selling shares.
6 On 18th May 2006 the shares o f Eesti Ehitus (construction and engi­
neering company) were listed in the Main list o f TSE and since the IPO, 
its share prices have mostly been above the IPO price. On 23rd October 
2006 the shares of Olympic Entertainment Group AS (gambling services 
provider) were listed in the Main List of TSE and during the first week of 
trading the price remained above IPO price.
7 TALSE was a TSE index (based on Paasche index) calculated from 3 
June 1996. Since 3 Oct 2005 the index was renamed OMXT. Hereon 
reference to TALSE has been substituted with OMXT.
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2. Articles on foreign press on the weak macroeconomic condition o f 
Estonia that could lead to devaluation o f EEK forced some foreign 
investors to sell their Estonian securities. It also activated currency 
speculators.
On the following weeks the decline continued: on 23 October 1997 
OMXT dropped by 12.5%, on 28 October 1997 by 12.5%, on 06 
November 1997 by 14.4%, on 10 November 1997 by 19.4%. The 
latter decreases were influenced by the factors that initiated the 
decrease on the 23rd but were also magnified by “Asian flu” (financial 
crisis in Asia) that had negative impact to share prices globally8. The 
drop on the 6th November was very closely related to the activities of 
Estonian banks. They eliminated their repo portfolios (they sold the 
shares that had been pledged for the loans). As banks gave no new 
loans to investors for buying shares the prices continued to drop. This 
boosted panic amongst small investors.
This event had a significant impact on the TSE development on 
the following years. The drop o f public’s interest in share dealing 
decreased the companies’ interests o f becoming listed on TSE. In 
spring 1997 more than 25 companies had expressed their interest in 
becoming listed on TSE9. By November 1997 only 7 o f them actually 
had become listed. The rest postponed their listing into the next year, 
but only a few actually became listed at all. In order to group these 
potential newcomers the GICS10 classification o f companies was used 
for determining the sectors. Consumer staples group included 9 
potential newcomers like Võru Juust, Lacto, Tallinna Piimatööstus, 
Tallegg, Tartu Õlletehas, Remedia, Ösel Foods, Orto and Pro Med. 
None of these companies became listed. Lacto went bankrupt, some 
got new owners who were not interested in listing (Pro Med
x On 27 October 1997 the Dow Jones even plunged by 7.2%.
9 This number is based on estimations that appeared in Äripäev at the 
time. The following companies include the ones for which authors found 
listing intentions mentioned in articles o f Äripäev.
10 GICS -  Global Industry Classification Standard. It was developed by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) to enhance the investment research and asset management process 
for financial professionals worldwide. See http://www.msci.com/ for 
details.
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purchased by M agnum Medical) and some admitted that they 
considered becoming listed due to public pressures during the TSE 
boom (Ösel Foods). Consumer discretionary group included 5 
potential newcomers like Soots Turism, Sangar, Standard, Tallinna 
M ööblimaja and Hotell Olümpia. Only the last company became 
listed in 1998 after it had merged with Inn Grupp and was renamed 
Reval Hotelligrupp. Most o f industrials sector potential newcomers 
like Balti Laevaremonditehas, Eesti M etallieskport (EMEX), Koger
& Sumberg Grupp and FCM did not become listed. The latter two 
merged in 1998 and are currently operating under the name of YIT. 
The only industrials sector company that became listed in 2005 is the 
former Hansatee (now known as Tallink). From financials sector 
potential newcomers Eesti Kindlustuse and АБ Elukindlustuse were 
caught into mergers on Estonian insurance market and energy sector 
company Alexela Oil and utilities sector company Eesti Gaas did not 
become listed either.
The negative developments o f 1997 were amplified by Russian 
crisis in 1998. Estonian companies that exported products to Russia 
were caught into difficulties, because their Russian partners could not 
pay for the delivered products. This meant significant losses for those 
Estonian firms and many o f them had to rethink their whole export 
strategy (turn to the West). Crisis affected every 6th Estonian exporter 
and many listed companies suffered losses: Hansapank 60 million 
EEK, Forekspank 50 million EEK. These events influenced TSE as 
well. The OMXT decreased from April till October 1998, whereas the 
lowest level was reached on 14 December 1998 when the OMXT was
87.1 points i.e. below the starting value in 1996.
Considering these developments it seems odd that 2 companies 
became listed in 1998. The listing o f Reval Hotelligrupp is more 
rational as they became listed in the beginning o f year when the 
market seemed to be stabilizing, but the case o f Pro Kapital can be 
explained only by their attempt to gain reputation (see delistings in 
section 5 for details on this com pany’s future on TSE).
From 1998 the companies who entered the TSE knew what they 
were up against and were prepared to be listed directly on 1-list or 
Main List. They also had the advantage o f having seen the downside 
o f listing -  the TSE crisis and the effects o f  Russian crisis on share 
prices.
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Based on the data above, the main reasons for listings, like in 
other countries, were the added visibility and prestige (similar 
findings Baker and Johnson, 1990), improved liquidity (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1981; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), benefits o f listing 
signals (Booth and Smith, 1988) and information asymmetries (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Better access to additional capital has been also 
claimed by analysts for pre-1998 period. For an overview o f the 
reasons to go public see Röell (1996).
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Figure 1: Listings on TSE Lists 1996-2005 
Source: TSE, http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
During 1996-2005 the number o f companies listed in different lists 
has fluctuated as shown on Figure 1. The biggest number o f listed 
companies was at the end o f 1997, when 27 companies were listed. 
During 1998 and 1999 the number remained quite stable it means that 
the TSE crisis did not lead to the departure o f firms from TSE. Still 
after 1999 the number o f companies began to decrease. The figure 
also shows, that the number o f Main List companies has been more 
stable than the number o f 1-list companies. As both the change in total 
listings and I-list listings is connected to delistings this issue is 
analysed in more detail in section 5.
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Figure 2: N um ber o f  com panies listed on TSE 1996-2005 by sector 11 
Source: TSE, http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/& authors
One interesting question is, how the number o f listed companies has 
varied by their field o f activity. To answer this question the existing 
GICS classification o f companies was used. For companies that were 
listed on TSE in January 2005 a full classification was available, but 
for companies that have already left the stock exchange the authors of 
this paper used GICS sector and industry classifications’ (effective 
from 28 April 2006) descriptions. The division o f companies is 
presented in Annex 1. Figure 2 presents an overview of the number of 
companies listed on TSE by most presented GICS sectors. Figure 2 
shows that the number o f companies in different sectors has changed 
quite similarly to the overall number o f listed companies (the only 
exception is financials sector). In the beginning the TSE was 
dominated by financials sector companies (initially by banks and in
1998 additionally 2 insurance companies and 1 real estate developer 
were listed). The peak was in 1997 when 8 financial companies (6 
banks) were listed. After that year their number began to decrease and 
by end o f 2005 no financial sector companies were listed on TSE. As 
the decrease is closely connected to delisting this issue will be 
covered in more detail in section 5.
11 This figure includes only these 4 sectors, in which more than 1 
company operated. The total number o f represented sectors was 9 i.e. the 
figure does not show Health care, IT, Materials, Telecommunication and 
Utilities.
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With respect to cross-listings, there is little to comment, as most 
o f TSE companies are listed only on TSE. The exceptions are Merko 
(construction company) that has been listed on München Stock 
Exchange and Frankfurt Stock Exchange since October 1997; Norma 
that is listed on Frankfurt, Berlin and M ünchen Stock Exchanges; 
Eesti Telekom that is listed in GDR Main List o f London Stock 
Exchange since February 1999; Tallinna Vesi that is listed on Berlin 
Freiverkehr from June 2005. Hansapank used to be listed on Riga 
Stock Exchange, but after the Baltic list was created in 2000, the 
company remained listed only on TSE from which it was delisted in 
2005. Based on cross-listing hypotheses tested by Bancel and Mittoo 
(2000), the main reasons for cross-listings in case o f TSE listed 
companies is the increased stock liquidity (widen the shareholder 
base and improve trading possibilities).
4. OMXT Index, market capitalization and listings
So far the discussion has centred on the number o f companies listed 
in different lists, but an important questions is how important have 
these companies been with respect to market capitalization. One way 
to look at the development o f the share prices and the market 
capitalization is to compare the development o f the OMXT index and 
the Herfindahl (HF) index o f market capitalization (Martin, 1993).
The comparison (given on Figure 3) illustrates the difference in 
the size o f the listed firms on TSE and the degree o f concentration in 
it. As can be seen from Figure 3, in the first years after the market 
was opened for trading, the HF index and OMXT index moved into 
opposite directions, which clearly indicate the active listing activities 
specific to that period. Also the two crises on TSE (the end o f 1997 
and summer 1998) are clearly reflected in the development on OMXT 
index. However, the HF index continued to decline till the end on 
1998, which clearly indicates that the crises had instant effect on the 
share prices, but due to long process o f delisting, the effect on market 
capitalization and concentration was lagged approximately by one 
year. The developments o f the two indexes after the period o f crises 
indicate the impact o f rising share prices and declining number o f 
listed firms at the same time.
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Figure 3: Herfindahl index of market concentration and the number of 
equally sized firms on TSE in 1996-2005
Source: TSE. http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
5. Delistings on TSE
The changes in the number o f listed companies in section 3 already 
indicated that many companies have been delisted from TSE. Table 3 
presents an overview delistings from 1996 till 2005.
Table 3. Delistings from TSE 1996-200512
Year
Delistings from 
Main List
Delistings 
from I-list
Delistings from 
Free Market
Total
delistings
1998 2 1 1 4
1999 0 3 0 3
2000 0 3 0 3
2001 2 1 0 3
2002 1 2 0 3
2004 0 1 0 1
2005 1 0 0 1
Total 6 11 1 18
Source: TSE. http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
12 Years with no delistings were excluded from the table.
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During 1996-2005 18 companies have left the TSE, whereas on
13average 3 companies were delisted from 1998 to 2002 each year . 
Only one company was delisted from Free Market in 1998. It was 
Viru Rand (producer o f different fish products), who officially stated 
that it was not ready to be listed in Main List or I-list (could not fulfil 
the necessary listing requirements after the expiration o f first year 
trading rights). The economic situation o f that company at the time o f 
delisting was otherwise good (it was generating sales and profits 
greater than on previous year) and they even stated that they might 
become listed in official lists o f TSE in the future. This prospect did 
not however realize -  Russian crisis and the overall financial 
deterioration o f the company made it impossible as in 1999 the 
company went bankrupt.
All Main List companies that have been delisted were from 
financials sector: 5 o f them were banks (Eesti Hoiupank, Tallinna 
Pank, Eesti Ühispank, Eesti Forekspank, Hansapank) and one was a 
real estate developer (Pro Kapital). The changes in banks’ listing have 
been influenced by the overall banking sector development in 
Estonia14. Tallinna Pank merged with Ühispank and due to that was 
delisted in 1998. Eesti Hoiupank merged with Hansapank and due to 
that was delisted in 1998. Forekspank changed its name initially in
1999 for Optiva Pank and in 2000 for Sampo Pank. As the Sampo Pic 
became the majority shareholder o f the bank, it bought back the listed 
shares and the company was delisted from TSE in 2002. Similar 
development happened with Ühispank and Hansapank. Ühispank was 
taken over by Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB, which bought 
back the listed shares and the company was delisted in 2001. Hansa­
pank was taken over by Swedbank, who also bought back the shares 
and the company was delisted in 2005.
The biggest delisting scandal o f TSE was the case o f real estate 
developer Pro Kapital. It is also the only time, when the TSE has
1 From the 1st of October 2006 the shares o f Rakvere Lihakombinaat 
became delisted from the TSE I-List.
14 In the beginning of 1990s over 40 banks were established, whereas by
2000 most of them had ceased to exist: some due to bankruptcy, while 
others had merged with other banks (due to increased requirements set by 
the Bank of Estonia). For details see the homepage of the Bank of 
Estonia http://www.eestipank.info/frontpage/en/
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punished a company for non-compliance with TSE regulations with 
delisting. Delisting was initiated by TSE due to repeated delays in 
information disclosures, disclosure o f false, misleading information 
or partial disclosure o f information. The connected persons of the 
emitent were also found to have made share transactions with the 
com pany’s shares during prohibited trading periods. Pro Kapital sued 
the TSE and wanted its position in the Main List o f TSE to be 
restated, but the TSE decision was supported by TSE arbitration 
board and in September 2001 the company was officially delisted. 
The scandal lead to the investigation o f tax authorities and a court 
case was initiated against Pro Kapital (accused o f tax regulation 
violation). This court case is still ongoing, but the company itself is 
still functioning.
3 o f the 11 1-list delisted companies were from financials sector 
whereas two o f them went bankrupt (EVEA Pank -  bank, ASA 
Kindlustus -  insurance company) and were delisted in 1999. The 
third company, Leks Kindlustus (insurance company) merged with 
Balti Kindlustus and left TSE due to that in 2000.
Bankruptcy was also a cause o f delisting for one IT company 
(XXL.EE) in 2002. The companies from consumer discretionary 
(ESS delisted 1998, Eesti Näitused delisted in 1999, Reval Hotelli­
grupp delisted in 2000, Fakto delisted in 2001), industrials (EMV 
delisted in 2000), consumer staples (Tallinna Külmhoone delisted in 
2002) and materials sector (Estiko delisted in 2004) left the TSE doe 
to changes in ownership. In some cases the listed shares of the 
companies were bought by foreign companies: ESS majority share­
holding bought by Falck A/S, EMV bought by Skanska OY, Reval 
Hotelligrupp by Linstow International, Tallinna Külmhoone by AB 
Kauno Pieno Centras. In other cases Estonian companies who already 
were majority shareholders bought the listed shares.
It is clear that the main reasons for delistings have been the 
mergers and changes in ownership (generally from local to foreign 
ownership). Many o f  the mergers have later on turned into ownership 
changes. This development poses a threat to the future o f TSE (see 
section 6) as the number o f local capital based companies is low and 
decreasing.
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6. Future of TSE
Most o f Estonian companies are very small (the minimum share 
capital requirement is 400 thousand EEK or -2 6  thousand EUR). 
When one considers the capitalization requirements o f TSE (4 million 
EUR for Main List and 1 million EUR for I-list listing) and the size 
of Estonian companies the potential number o f TSE newcomers is 
low. When looking at the equity capital o f Estonian unlisted firms, 
there are less than 300 potential firms operating in Estonia that could 
be listed on TSE. These numbers are based on the data published by 
Äripäev, who analyzes TOP firms in different sectors and publishes 
the results once a year.15 Figure 4 presents a summary o f the number 
of potential firms to be listed on TSE Main and I-List based on their 
equity capital in 2004, whereas the sectors have been reclassified to 
fit GICS classification by the authors o f this paper. The results show 
that the greatest potential can be seen in the consumer discretionary 
and industrials sectors.
While compared to actual number o f listed firms the potential may 
seem to be high one has to consider that in case there are bigger 
companies that fulfil the capitalization requirement the problem can 
be their ownership structure. Many big and successful companies are 
already owned by international corporations that are already listed on 
other stock exchanges, which decrease their willingness to list their 
Estonian operation on TSE.
15 These firms are selected on the basis of their turnover as the TOP firms 
from a specific business activity group. The TOP companies are classi­
fied by Äripäev into pharmaceuticals retailers, printing-offices, con­
signing companies, textile & apparel, furniture manufacturers, auto­
motive retailers, retailers, food producers, construction companies, real 
estate companies, telecommunication companies, hotels & restaurants, 
road transportation companies, training services providers, IT firms, 
building materials producers, timber manufacturers.
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The listing willingness o f Estonian companies is also influenced by 
the possibilities to raise capital from other sources. Currently the 
firms have preferred banks to listing (smaller companies prefer the 
financing o f the owners o f the company) and many companies that 
are subsidiaries o f  international firms can get additional capital from 
their parent companies. It means that the financing needs are not 
usually the ones that drive Estonian companies onto TSE. Listing is 
therefore more strongly influenced by other factors like the possibility 
to increase the visibility o f the company’s operations, potential of 
improving its reputation or the owners wish to sell part of their 
shareholding.
Compared to previous years after successful IPOs in 2005 the 
interest o f  Estonian companies to be listed has increased. It means 
that if  the share prices o f these newly listed companies’ move upward 
and no significant setbacks occur, many new IPOs could be expected 
in the coming years. However the previous experience o f Estonian 
companies being taken over by foreign investors may be a warning 
for both listed and unlisted companies against involving too much 
foreign capital in their operations, unless it is a necessity for the 
survival o f  the company.
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7. Conclusions
33 different companies have been listed on TSE from its establi­
shment in 1996 till end o f 2005. Most o f these companies became 
listed during 1996-1997. This is closely related to the overall 
development o f TSE. The TSE started its operations on 31 May 1996. 
By 1997 the exchange was operating successfully -  the prices 
increased and in summer 1997 the TSE experienced a boom (on 29 
August 1997 OMXT index reached a peak o f 492.27 points). It also 
meant that the companies’ interest in becoming listed was big (over 
25 companies publicly expressed their intentions o f becoming a listed 
company). The first major drawback came in autumn 1997 when TSE 
experienced a first crisis. Due to liquidity crisis o f  banks, speculative 
deals, influences o f Asian crisis, sale o f banks’ repo portfolios and the 
following panic amongst investors the OMXT index decreased by 21 
November 1996 to 190.3 points. The crisis was followed by increase 
that ended in April 1998. The following Russian crisis had an adverse 
impact on OMXT index and the lowest level was reached on 14 
December 1998 when the OMXT was 87.1 points i.e. below the 
starting value in 1996. These two events decreased the Estonian 
companies’ interest in becoming listed and only 3 companies became 
listed 1998-1999. After 1999 the first three IPOs were carried out in 
2005 i.e. 6 years later.
During 1996-2005 in total o f 17 times the companies have 
changed their listing i.e. moved from one list to another. 10 o f these 
transfers were movements from free market to I-list or Main List and 
only 7 times the companies moved from 1-list to Main List or from 
Main List to I-list. The latter movements were mostly influenced by 
changes in TSE Rules (changes in capitalization requirements).
During 1998-2005 18 companies left the TSE. The crises had low 
impact on delistings. This was also supported by HF index, which 
showed that the crises had instant effect on the share prices, but due 
to long process o f delisting, the effect on market capitalization and 
concentration was lagged approximately by one year. Most o f the 
delisting were due to mergers or changes in company ownership i.e. 
the minority shareholding o f small investors was bought by majority 
owners and the company left TSE. However some companies left 
TSE due to bankruptcy (XXL.EE, Evea Pank, ASA Kindlustus), one 
went bankrupt after delisting (Viru Rand) and one company was
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delisted on TSE initiative (Pro Kapital delisted due to violation of 
TSE Rules).
According to the authors conclusions the future o f TSE depends 
on the:
1. Overall development o f Estonian companies -  the authors identi­
fied around 300 companies that could fulfil the Main List listing 
capitalization requirement o f 4 million EUR or I-list listing 
requirement o f 1 million EUR. The greatest potential can be found 
in the consumer discretionary and industrials sectors.
2. Ownership structures o f Estonian companies -  bigger companies 
that are owned by foreign companies have low interest of listing 
their Estonian operation. Many delistings on TSE have happened 
after the majority shareholding went into the hands of a foreign 
company.
3. Possibilities to use other financing sources -  if banks and owners 
are able to provide sufficient financing at approporiate prices, the 
interest for listing will remain low.
4. Developments on TSE after IPOs that took place in 2005 -  if the 
share prices o f these listed companies continue to increase and no 
setback on the TSE as a whole will occur, the interest for listing 
could increase. Especially among companies which want to gain 
respect and improve their reputation.
This paper did not cover other Baltic Exchanges: Vilnius and Riga 
Stock Exchanges. As these exchanges have been cooperating for 
years, an interesting topic for future research could be the listings, 
delistings and cross-listings in these contexts. This would enable the 
comparison with TSE. The future research o f TSE could also 
concentrate on the market-effects o f listings, listing changes and 
delistings on the post 2000 period.
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ANNEX 1
Listing changes on Tallinn Stock Exchange 1996—2005
Company
Name Changes in listing from SectoiVIndustry
Reason for 
delisting
Eesti
Forekspank*
03 Jun 1996 -  Main List 
19 Aug 2002 -D elistin g
Financials/ 
Commercial banks
Full foreign 
ownership
Eesti Hoiupank
03 Jun 1996 -  Main List 
15 July 1998 -D elistin g
Financials/ 
Commercial banks
Merger with 
Hansapank
Eesti Ühispank
03 Jun 1996 -  Main List 
01 Jan 2001 -  Delisting
Financials/ 
Commercial banks
Full foreign 
ownership
Hansapank
03 Jun 1996 -  Main List 
30 June 2005 -  Delisting
Financials/ 
Commercial banks
Full foreign 
ownership
Tallinna Pank
03 Jun 1996 -  Main List 
30 Jul 1998 -D elistin g
Financials/ 
Commercial banks
Merger with 
Ühispank
Norma
12 Aug 1996 -  Free Market 
05 Aug 1997 -  Main List
Consumer 
Discretionary/ Auto 
components
Kalev AS
12 Aug 1996 -  Free Market 
28 July 1998 — I-List
Consumer Staples/ 
Food products
Saku Õlletehas 
AS
12 Aug 1996 -  Free Market 
27 Jan 1998 -  I-List
Consumer Staples/ 
Beverages
Tallinna 
Farmaatsia­
tehas AS
15 Aug 1996 -  Free Market 
07 N ov 1996 -  Main List 
27 Oct 1998 -  I-List
Health Care/ 
Pharmaceuticals
Estiko
03 Sept 1996 -  Free market
04 N ov 1997-I - lis t
01 July 2004 -  Delisting
Materials/ 
Containers & 
Packaging
Change in 
ownership
Tallinna Kau­
bamaja AS
06 Sept 1996 -  Free Market 
19 Aug 1997 -  Main List
Retailing/ 
Department Stores
Rakv ere Liha­
kombinaat AS
30 Sept 1996 -Free Market 
21 Jul 1998 -  I-List
Consumer Staples/ 
Food products
XXL.EE**
03 Oct 1996 -  Main List 
22 Feb 2002 — Delisting
Information 
Technology/ 
Computer & 
Peripherals Bankruptcy
Eesti Näitused
21 Oct 1996 — Free Market 
20 May 1997 -  Main list 
07 May 1998-I - lis t  
01 Dec 1999 — Delisting
Consumer
Discretionary/
Media
Change in 
ownership
EMV
04 Nov 1996 — Free Market 
25 Jun 1997 —Main list 
27 Oct 1998-I - lis t  
08 March 2000 -  Delisting
Industrials/ 
Construction & 
Engineering
Full foreign 
ownership
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Company
Name Changes in listing from Sector/Industry
Reason for 
delisting
EVEA Pank
30 Dec 1996-I - lis t  
30 March 1999 -  Delisting
Financials/ 
Commercial banks Bankruptcy
Klementi AS 20 May 1997 -  I-list
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Textiles, Apparel & 
Luxury Goods
Fakto
22 Jul 1997-I - lis t  
30 March 2001 -  Delisting
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Speciality Retail
Change in 
ownership
Baltika AS
05 Jun 1997-M a in  List 
07 May 1998 -I -L ist  
17 Feb 2003 -  Main List
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Textiles, Apparel & 
Luxury Goods
Viisnurk AS 05 Jun 1997-I - lis t
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Household durables
Tallinna
Külmhoone
27 Jun 1997 -  Free Market 
13 Nov 1998-I - lis t  
22 Feb 2002 -  Delisting
Consumer Staples/ 
Food products
Full foreign 
ownership
Merko Ehitus 22 Jul 1997-M ain  List
Industrials/ 
Construction & 
Engineering
Leks
Kindlustus
22 Jul 1997-I - lis t  
01 Jul 2000 -  Delisting
Financials/
Insurance Merger
Viru Rand
22 Jul 1997 -  Free Market 
07 Sept 1998 -  Delisting
Consumer Staples/ 
Food products
ESS
05 Aug 1997-I - lis t  
17 Dec 1998-D elistin g
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Diversified 
Consumer Services
Foreign
ownership
Harju Elekter
30 Sept 1997 —I-List 
17 Feb 2003 -  Main List
Industrials/
Electrical Equipment
ASA
Kindlustus
25 Nov 1997-I - lis t  
01 Dec 1999 -  Delisting
Financials/
Insurance Bankruptcy
Reval Hotelli­
grupp
27 Jan 1998-I - lis t  
01 Nov 2000 -  Delisting
Consumer 
Discretionary/ 
Hotels, Restaurant & 
Leisure
Full foreign 
ownership
Pro Kapital
01 Sept 1998 —I-List 
06 Sept 2000 -  Main List 
28 Sept 2001 -  Delisting
Financials/ Real 
Estate Management 
& Development
Non-
compliance 
with TSE 
Rules
27
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Company
Name Changes in listing from Sector/Industry
Reason for 
delisting
Eesti Telekom 11 Feb 1999 -  Main List
T elecommunication 
Services/ Diversified 
T elecommunication 
Services
Tallinna 
Vesi AS 01 June 2005 -  Main List
Utilities/ Water 
utilities
Starman AS 28 June 2005 -  Main List
Consumer
Discretionary/
Media
Tallink Grupp 09 Dec 2005 -  Main List
Industrials/ Marine 
transportation
* Renamed from 21 Jan 1999 Optiva Pank and from 28 Dec 2000 Sampo Pank
** Before 1999 named Pennu CT
Source: TSE, http://www.ee.omxgroup.com/ & authors
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Abstract
SME-s account for the substantial share of Latvian economy being its 
main driving force. It is essential for government to ensure 
institutional environment that could support creation and rapid 
development of SME-s. During the transition period to market 
economy overall institutional environment was created to assist 
development of entrepreneurship. In the last years new steps were 
made to use more sophisticated tools in the area o f SME support, e.g. 
Latvian Guarantee agency (LGA), a state-owned entity implementing 
the national program of venture capital development was established. 
LGA activity is aimed at supporting of economic activity o f SME-s 
registered in Latvian Republic, making credit resources more 
accessible, providing on its behalf security for medium-term and 
long-term loans for financial institutions registered in Latvian 
Republic and abroad, which finance these companies. Currently LGA 
assist also venture capital funds by pooling partial financing for them 
from the state budget and the European Regional Development Fund. 
These activities of LGA will clearly improve venture capital market 
conditions in Latvia and SME-s will benefit from it.
Another important step, which could be undertaken in the future, 
is adoption of new changes in legislation to allow 2nd pillar pension 
funds investments into venture capital funds. Currently new changes 
are in the process of adoption in the Parliament (Saeima). As regular 
contributions to 2nd pillar pension funds are mandatory for the 
majority of Latvian labour force and contribution rate will constantly 
increase till 2010, these pension funds will face skyrocketing asset 
growth in the nearest future. Seeking to diversify investment port-
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folios and to implement more dedicated investment strategies, 
pension funds will possibly grow their exposure to alternative 
investments such as venture capital funds.
The working paper will examine possible impact of Latvian 2nd 
pillar pension fund investments into venture capital funds and the 
marginal benefit of SME-s due to this. Pension funds will also meet 
new challenges during the investment process, that is why concept of 
choosing between different types o f venture capital funds in terms of 
investment attractiveness will also be covered.
Keywords: venture capital, 2nd pillar pension funds, SME-s
Introduction
SME-s account for the substantial share o f Latvian economy being its 
main driving force. It is essential for government to ensure insti­
tutional environment that could support creation and rapid develop­
ment o f SME-s. During the transition period to market economy 
overall institutional environment was created to assist development of 
entrepreneurship. In the last years new steps were made to use more 
sophisticated tools in the area o f SME support, e.g. Latvian Guarantee 
agency (LGA), a state-owned entity implementing the national 
program o f venture capital development was established. LGA 
activity is aimed at supporting o f economic activity o f SME-s 
registered in Latvian Republic, making credit resources more acces­
sible, providing on its behalf security for medium-term and long-term 
loans for financial institutions registered in Latvian Republic and 
abroad, which finance these companies. Currently LGA assist also 
venture capital funds by pooling partial financing for them from the 
state budget and the European Regional Development Fund. These 
activities o f LGA will clearly improve venture capital market 
conditions in Latvia and SME-s will benefit from it.
Another important step, which could be undertaken in the future, 
is adoption o f new changes in legislation to allow 2nd pillar pension 
funds investments into venture capital funds. Currently new changes 
are in the process o f adoption in the Parliament (Saeima). As regular 
contributions to 2nd pillar pension funds are mandatory for the 
majority o f Latvian labour force and contribution rate will constantly 
increase till 2010, these pension funds will face skyrocketing asset
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growth in the nearest future. Seeking to diversify investment 
portfolios and to implement more dedicated investment strategies, 
pension funds will possibly grow their exposure to alternative 
investments such as venture capital funds.
Research shows that pension funds can be an important source o f 
financing for venture capital funds. Pension funds account for a 
substantial part o f venture capital investments in UK (M ayer/Schoors/ 
Yafeh 2003), European venture capital funds during the last years 
experience huge money inflows from US state pensions funds, which 
have been looking increasingly to the European market (European 
Venture Capital Journal 2006). Latvian economy is only emerging 
from transition period and there is no experience o f pension funds 
placing money in venture capital, that is why it is very important to 
understand the possible impact o f such an action and adopt 
appropriate policies both by government bodies and pension fund 
managers.
The working paper will examine possible impact o f Latvian 2nd 
pillar pension fund investments into venture capital funds and the 
marginal benefit o f SME-s due to this. Pension funds will also meet 
new challenges during the investment process, that is why concept o f 
choosing between different types o f venture capital funds in terms o f 
investment attractiveness will also be covered.
1. Overview of Latvian pension system
Since July 2001 there is a three tier pension system in Latvia. All 
persons making social insurance contributions are involved in the 1st 
tier. Paid contributions are used for payment o f old age pensions to 
the existing generation o f pensioners (pay as you go).
Social insurance contributions o f those who participate in the 2nd 
pension tier through chosen fund managers are invested into the 
financial market and saved for the pension o f the specific contributor.
The 3rd pension tier ensures the possibility for every individual 
according to his free choice to create additional savings for his 
pension in the private pension funds.
Participants o f the 2nd tier do not have to pay additional social 
contributions. The total contribution for the pension capital remains 
unchanged and is redistributed between the 1st and the 2nd tiers o f the
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pension scheme. Contributions to the state pension amount to 20% of 
an employee’s gross salary, o f which 18 percentage points go to 1st 
tier and 2 percentage points to the funded 2nd tier. By 2010 each will 
receive 10 percentage points. The 2nd tier is mandatory for all new 
labour market entrants and those aged under 30 when the reform was 
implemented (July 2001) and optional for those aged between 30 and
49 at the launch while those aged 50 and over were not allowed to 
join.
Until January 2003 there was only one public fund manager for 
the funds o f the 2nd tier -  the State Treasuiy, which invested the funds 
exclusively into the Latvian state bonds and into the deposits of the 
largest and safest Latvian banks. As o f January 2003 private fund 
managers were involved and currently the participants o f the 2nd tier 
can choose their fund manager -  public or private -  themselves. The 
private fund managers offer to invest the pension capital also into 
corporate bonds, equity and foreign securities. Participants of the 
system are entitled to change their fund manager once a year and 
investment plans within one fund manager -  twice a year. Perfor­
mance o f the private fund managers is supervised by the Finance and 
Capital M arket Commission, but the State Treasury is supervised by 
the Ministry o f Finance.
There exist strict regulations in the field o f investing assets of 2nd 
tier. The maximal allowed amount of equity investments in the fund 
is limited to 30%. At the moment it is prohibited for pension funds to 
invest into private equity and venture capital.
At the end o f October 2006 there were 10 licensed fund managers 
(including State Treasury), number o f 2nd tier participants was almost 
880 thousands and assets under management were approaching LVL 
120 m illions' (EUR 171 million). Largest fund managers were Hansa 
fondi, SEB Unifondi and Parex Asset Management.
2. Perspectives of 2nd tier pension fund market
It is quite important to forecast the future size o f market for 2nd tier 
pension funds to understand how much funds they could dedicate to 
venture capital investments. As it was stated before, number o f 2nd
1 Latvian lat (LVL) is pegged to euro. 1 EUR = 0.702 LVL.
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tier participants is almost 880 thousands. Each person entitled for 
participation in 2nd pension tier contribute monthly to pension fund a 
certain ration o f his gross wage. Thus, pension funds are sensitive to 
gross wage changes in economy because gross wage fluctuations will 
respectively affect new money inflows to pension funds. Assumptions 
about future changes in average gross wage in Latvia are crucial for 
further analysis.
350
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2006
Figure 1. Average monthly gross wage in Latvia, 1995-2006, LVL2
Figure 1 gives information about gross wage at the end o f period (in 
this paper author will refer to gross wage being nominal gross wage) 
value in Latvia for the past 12 years. Until 2005 gross wage growth 
was rather balanced, 10% on average. The last two years reveal 
changes in this trend -  due to entering EU and convergence with 
European economy, as well as due to significant labour force outflow 
from the country (persons are moving to other EU countries seeking 
higher wages) one can see rapid growth in wages -  17% in 2005 and 
high 23% just for the first half o f 2006.
Author expects that trend for average wage growth will continue. 
Although there is a great room for debate, how much could wages 
increase during the next years, it is obvious that wages will increase, 
converging with EU and taking into account that average wage in 
Latvia is much lower than average wage in EU countries. It is not the 
focus o f this paper to analyse, whether semi-annual growth rate o f 
23% is sustainable in the medium and long term and favourable for 
the economy, so for the purposes o f our model will use a rather
2 Source: Latvian Central Statistical Bureau, www.csb.lv
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conservative (for current situation in Latvia) gross wage growth rate 
o f 10% yearly, which was observed over the 10-year long period.
Another important notice is that overall there will be only inflows 
to 2nd tier pension funds until year 2014. As only persons aged under
50 (on July 2001) were eligible for participation in the 2n pension 
tier and persons are normally granted old age pension in Latvia at the 
age o f 62 (when they are also eligible to receive 2nd tier pension), 
practically the first person will receive 2nd tier pension only in year 
2014. This means also, that in 2014 there will occur first serious 
payments from pension fund balances in favour o f retired persons. 
Till that time pension funds in Latvia due to selected transition 
mechanism for 2nd pension tier will be in rather favourable conditions 
compared to pension funds in other countries, because they will face 
only money inflows.
If  to speak about character o f money inflows, it should be 
answered whether money inflows will increase over time or decrease. 
Assumption was made, that gross wage in economy will increase. 
Inflows depend on gross wage and number o f 2nd tier participants, 
thus it is vital to understand changes in the pool o f participants. On 
the one hand, pool o f participants will increase till 2014 because new 
labour market entrants will be automatically eligible for participation, 
on the other hand, some people from the pool can loose their job or 
leave labour market or even move to another country and stop paying 
taxes and contribution to 2nd tier pension savings.
Figure 2. Number o f 2nd pension tier participants in Latvia, 2002-2006, 
end of period, thousands o f people3
3 Source: Latvian 2nd tier pensions web page, www.manapensija.lv
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Statistics show that the overall number o f participants increase all the 
time and should tend to reach number o f  employed, which is close to
1.1 million o f people4 (data on June 2006). At the same time number 
of inactive participants is about 10% o f all participants. Inactive 
participants do not pay current contributions, but their previous 
savings are still being invested till their retirement time. To simplify 
the model author will treat number o f participants as constant at the 
current level o f 880 thousands o f people, but will also incorporate 
10% o f inactive participants into the model.
When major assumptions are made, it is possible to calculate fund 
flows within 2nd pension tier till 2013 (this year was chosen because it 
will be the last year when 2nd tier pension funds will not pay pensions 
to retired persons). Table 1 show results o f  calculations. Contribution 
rate (percent o f gross wage) is set by State Funded Pension Law, 
which regulate 2nd tier pension scheme. Starting from 2007 it will 
increase gradually and reach its maximal value o f 10% of gross wage 
by 2010. Further it will be constant. Wage growth, as it was stated 
above, is expected to be 10% yearly. Simplifying the model, will 
assume that wage at the end o f 2006 will be 302 (the same as in June 
2006). Taking into account number o f 2nd tier participants and 
projected wage monthly wage pool can be calculated. From this pool 
yearly inflow to the 2nd pension tier can be calculated, taking into 
account monthly wages, contribution rate and correction for 10% o f 
inactive participants. End o f year 2006 is treated to be the reference 
point for calculations. 2nd tier pension assets under management 
(AUM) are expected to be LVL 128 millions at the end o f 2006. 
Although it is rather hard to assess future performance o f pension 
funds over the long run, it will be assumed that funds earn on average 
5% yearly. It means that every year starting from 2007 total assets 
under management will comprise o f previous year’s assets growing 
by 5% and current year inflow growing by 2.5%.
1 Source: Latvian Central Statistical Bureau, www.csb.lv
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Table 1. Projected inflows to 2nd pension tier in 2006-2013
Year Contri­
bution
rate
Wage
growth
Monthly 
wages, 
mln LVL
Yearly 
inflow, 
mln LVL
AUM, 
mln LVL
2006 2% 128
2007 4% 10% 279 120 258
2008 8% 10% 306 265 543
2009 9% 10% 337 328 906
2010 10% 10% 371 401 1 363
2011 10% 10% 408 441 1 883
2012 10% 10% 449 485 2 475
2013 10% 10% 494 533 3 146
Table 1 shows that 2nd tier assets under management will exceed LVL
1 billion by the end o f 2010. By the end o f 2012 assets will approach 
LVL 2.5 billion and by the end o f 2013 will exceed LVL 3 billion. 
Substantial monetary assets accumulated within a relatively short 
period o f time will make pension funds the largest institutional 
investors in Latvia.
3. Pension fund investments into venture capital
New changes to State Funded Pensions Law suggest that 2nd tier 
pension funds could invest up to 5% o f their assets into venture 
capital funds. Taking into account projected value of 2nd pension tier 
assets under management one can approximately find the possible 
amount o f  pension fund investments in venture capital.
It should be mentioned that investment policies o f pension funds 
differ in terms o f possible return and underlying risk. Some funds 
invest according to conservative investment policies only in fixed 
income securities and deposits (the total current market share of such 
funds in terms o f assets under management is about 22%). Funds with 
balanced investment policy normally invest up to 15% in equity and 
funds with active policy invest up to 30% in equity. Currently 74% of 
2 nd pension tier assets are invested according to active policy. New 
changes also increase maximal investment amount in equity up to 
50% o f pension fund’s assets. Thus, active plans and balanced plans 
could increase their exposure to equity. It is expected that balanced
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funds and active funds will use also exposure to venture capital, while 
conservative plans will not invest into venture capital because risks 
associated with this asset class are inconsistent with conservative 
investment strategy. If  current distribution among pension funds in 
terms o f investment policy in the market will hold in the future, funds 
with up to 78% o f all assets under management will have exposure to 
venture capital.
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Figure 3. Pension fund maximal projected exposure to venture capital 
funds, 2007-2013, mln LVL
Figure 3 show growth o f pension fund maximal exposure to venture 
capital funds. Monetary value o f such an exposure increase from LVL
5 million in 2007 to LVL 97 million in 2013. O f course, it should be 
stated, that figures show maximal exposure and, obviously, this 
maximal limit will not be reached from the very beginning. Probably 
funds will start to invest small amounts o f 1% -  2% o f assets to learn 
how to invest in this new (for Latvian pension funds) asset class. In 
the future when funds will gain more experience o f private equity 
investments exposure to venture capital could reach maximal amount.
It is o f great debate, whether pension funds should be allowed to 
invest solely in venture capital in Latvia or also in other countries and 
regions o f the world. Currently new changes in legislation do not 
impose any restrictions for geographical investments into venture 
capital. Both State Funded Pension Law and changes to it impose 
restrictions for geographical investments o f publicly traded securities, 
but venture capital investments are not public investments. Here 
question arise about the main idea o f giving pension funds a 
possibility to invest into venture capital. It could be either assisting
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pension funds investments enlarging possible investment range, or 
more broad idea o f both enlarging investment opportunities and 
supporting venture capital and also SME development in Latvia. In 
the current situation part o f possible exposure to venture capital could 
go to foreign venture capital funds, although there is also a number of 
venture capital funds in Latvia with substantial experience, part of 
them being subsidiaries o f well known foreign venture capitalists 
with vast experience, and possible return o f private equity invest­
ments at home could be rather competing with private equity invest­
ment returns abroad because o f developments in Latvian economy, its 
emerging from transition and convergence with EU economy. In 
order to keep pension money invested in Latvia and spur growth 
government bodies should think o f imposing partial restrictions on 
venture capital investments o f pension money abroad.
According to preliminary data there were 55 thousand o f EMU5 in 
Latvia (data for the first half o f 2006). Normally venture capital funds 
in Latvia invest in one company from LVL 50 thousand to LVL 1 
million. This means that up to 100 enterprises could be financed with 
the help o f only pension fund money. O f course, this figure could be 
achieved only if the funds will invest at maximum and venture 
capitalists will invest minimal amounts in one company. On the 
contrary, with the pension money could be funded 5 big investment 
projects. If  we assume that through time average investment amount 
in one venture capital project will be about LVL 400-500 thousand, 
even taking into account possible growth o f EMU number in the 
country, by 2013 about 0.3-1%  o f all EMU could be financed 
through pension investments into venture capital giving possibility to 
ensure innovation and development in this sector o f Latvian 
economy.
In the future 2nd tier pension funds will meet new challenge during 
the investment process. As it was stated above, till 2014 funds will 
experience only money inflows, but after will have also to pay money 
in favour o f retired persons. If  now funds are focused on constructing 
investment portfolios in terms o f risk and return tradeoff, in future 
they should think how to address also liquidity gap and, like banks, 
match assets with liabilities. As equity instruments have small 
duration because are available for sale fast, investments into venture
5 Source: Latvian Ministry o f Economics, www.em.gov.lv
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capital could become serious instrument o f addressing the liquidity 
gap different from traditional instruments like bonds and deposits. 
The only problem is that it is rather hard to determine the exact 
duration o f venture capital investment, because venture capitalist may 
decide to exit private equity investments faster or later than it was 
initially stated due to market conditions, but some prudent overall 
assumptions could help determine duration o f such an investment.
Overall, the number and monetary value o f pension fund 
investments into venture capital funds will be determined by the 
success o f the first investments in this field. It is crucial to work out 
methodology for selection o f venture capitalists in order to ensure 
efficient decision making process while investing in private equity.
4. Selection of venture capital funds
Selecting venture capital funds for investments, some traditional 
features like fund management profile, investment policy, manage­
ment company track record and management fees should be taken 
into account, but these features sometimes should be analyzed from 
point o f view which differ from traditional approach when selecting 
ordinary mutual funds for investments.
Venture capitalist could be divided into two main groups: 
“specialists”, who invest only in certain economy sectors, where they 
have expertise and experience, and “all-rounders”, who invest in 
companies with future prospects disregarding industry (Jungwirth/ 
Moog 2003). Specialist try to focus on the company selection process 
and at the later stages just monitor and passively manage their 
investments, while all-rounders select companies with investment 
projects being not to complex to understand them and focus more on 
nurturing -  they are deeply involved in the business process and try to 
support it with all the knowledge venture capitalist has. Thus, first o f 
all it should be identified, to which type belong venture capitalist or 
its fund and evaluate specific risks associated with each business 
strategy.
Obviously, specialists, which are less concentrated on the process 
of nurturing could miss some important developments in the portfolio 
company and this could affect their investment value negatively. 
From the point o f diversification specialist investments could be also
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more vulnerable to system shocks in specific industries or regions 
where they invest due to their special knowledge. It is important to 
notice that even having knowledge in some specific fields specialists 
could not have in depth understanding o f the project the portfolio 
company or its management have, so for specialists it could be 
relatively much harder to evaluate risks associated with certain 
projects than for all-rounders, because all-rounders by definition 
select not very complex investment or development projects. On the 
other hand, all-rounders being very focused on nurturing possibly 
could take wrong management decisions that would lead to bad 
portfolio company performance results.
Venture capitalists normally invest in companies that are in 
different development stages: initial start-up modes and various 
stages o f the business life cycle. Venture capitalist may provide 
needed financing to help a company grow beyond a critical mass to 
become more successful. Investment focus o f venture fund (which 
stage or stages o f business cycle are financed) could give guidelines 
to possible duration o f investments, which is rather important for 
pension fund assets and liability analysis.
In case o f  illiquid private equity investments it is very important 
to evaluate venture capitalist’s experience o f exiting investments. 
Depending on the investment focus and strategy o f the venture firm, 
it will normally seek to exit the investment in the portfolio company 
within two to seven years o f the initial investment. Initial public 
offering may be one o f the exit ways, exits o f venture investments 
also occur through a merger or acquisition o f the company by either 
the original founders or another company. The expertise of the 
venture capitalist in successfully exiting its investment could be one 
o f the main selection factors, although it could be rather hard to 
obtain such an information.
Another problem, which is associated with private equity illi­
quidity, is appropriate valuation o f investment. Venture capitalists try 
to conservatively value their investments using guidelines or standard 
industry practices and by terms outlined in the prospectus o f the fund. 
Venture capitalists are usually conservative in the valuation of 
companies, and pension funds should assess venture fund valuation 
policy to ensure that investments are valued conservatively indeed, as 
well as try to obtain periodically also valuation details.
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Conclusion
Latvian 2nd tier pension funds do not have experience o f investing 
into venture capital funds, thus they are facing new challenges, but 
also have new opportunities to diversify their portfolios and use more 
sophisticated investment strategies. Process o f  venture fund selection 
could be o f vital importance for successful investment, while process 
itself differs from traditional approach to selection o f mutual funds or 
publicly traded securities due to some specific features o f private 
equity investments. Government bodies should think about imposing 
partial restrictions for pension fund venture capital investments 
abroad in order to spur venture capital market growth in Latvia and 
assist SME development processes in the country. One can expect 
that pension funds will gain required experience in the field o f 
venture capital investments and through the time will increase their 
exposure to private equity investments up to maximal amounts 
allowed in the legislation.
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THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMING 
INTERBUDGET RELATION 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIJA
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Abstract
Keywords: budget system, local government budgets, spending 
authority, subsidiarity principle, subsidies, fiscal equalization 
(horizontal and vertical), budgetary management, fiscal capacity, 
administrative-territorial and regional reform.
The system of interbudget relations must be directed towards 
observing the principle o f social equality throughout the territory o f 
the state, the manoeuvrability and efficiency o f utilizing budget 
resources and, finally, the possibility o f regulating socioeconomic 
processes in separate administrative units.
Latvia being a unitary state, its budget system provides for, 
according to the adopted legislation packages: the implementation o f 
principles o f economic independence o f administrative-territorial 
units (local governments), separate creation o f their budgets and 
finally, the need for correspondence between the independence and 
autonomy o f local government budgets and the financing o f the most 
important events from the funds o f the state budget.
In this context the choice o f criteria for characterizing and 
classifying interbudget relations is an unsolved methodological 
problem in research on interbudget relations. Specifically for the 
interbudget relations in the Republic o f Latvia such a criterion can be 
the percentage o f spending by the subnational governments (the 
spending o f local government budget) in the consolidated state 
budget.
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Under the circumstances o f the occurring local government 
reforms the most justified way to solving the task o f increasing the 
role o f local budgets is granting the spending authority o f government 
institutions as close as possible to the place where the governed 
population actually resides, that is on the basis o f the principle of 
subsidiarity.
One o f the important directions o f interbudget relations reform is 
the expected results from the completion and the implementation of 
administrative-territorial and regional reforms. With more than 600 
local government units in existence it seems problematic to “follow 
up” on the effectiveness o f funds invested in regional development. 
The effectiveness o f using EU structural funds and the Cohesion 
Fund in the implementation o f investment projects, modernizing the 
infrastructure, improving the service sector becomes directly depen­
dent on the changes in the regional structural policy, thereby creating 
real prerequisites for the long-term and uniform development of the 
territories o f the Republic o f Latvia.
The interbudget problems o f local governments do not only 
consist o f  the general lack o f financial resources, which is partly 
determined by the vertical imbalances o f the budget system and partly 
by the weak activity o f local governments in adopting reforms. A no 
less serious problem, as shown by the results o f the research, is the 
structural discrepancy between municipal income and municipal 
spending. The main aspect o f this discrepancy is in the fact that there 
is a definite slant in the structure o f municipal incomes in favour of 
funds for the horizontal fiscal equalization.
The outlined problems allowed to research and rationalize 
separate directions o f reform o f interbudget relations.
It is difficult to find a country in the modem world, which would 
not experience problems in budget relationships between the “centre” 
and the territories. Regions always turn out to have grounds to believe 
that the centre has established with them unfair budget relations, and 
to insist on their special status, which assumes a more favourable 
economic regime.
In the most general sense the choice o f the model o f interbudget 
relations depends on the organisation o f the state (federation, unitary 
state) and socio-economic situation, which is particularly characte­
rized by the territorial differences in the living standards.
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The budget system o f Latvia as a unitary state provides for, 
according to the adopted legislation packages: the implementation o f 
principles o f economic independence o f budgets o f administrative- 
territorial units (local governments), separate creation o f those budgets 
and finally, the need for correspondence between the independence and 
the autonomy o f local government budgets and the financing o f the 
most important events from the funds o f the state budget.
In this context there appears a problem of choosing a criterion, 
which would allow to evaluate the peculiarities o f the used model o f 
interbudget relations in the overall budget system o f the state. 
Latvia’s budget system is represented by the state budget -  the main 
and the special budget and multiple local government budgets, which, 
in turn, consist o f the main and special budgets. However, if, for 
example in 2006, in the state budget the relative proportions o f the 
main and the special budgets in the income part o f the consolidated 
state budget is 74:26, then on the level o f local government budgets 
the same proportion is correspondingly 92:8. This is determined by 
the functional differences and the significance o f the mentioned parts 
of the budget system: special state budget is a budget o f social 
insurance and support for the whole state, whereas the special budget 
of the local government consists o f separate funds, which are pri­
marily targeted towards environmental measures on a regional level.
The form o f organisation o f the functioning o f the budget system 
must be directed towards observing the principle o f social equality 
throughout the territory o f the state, the manoeuvrability and 
efficiency o f utilizing budget resources and, finally, the possibility o f 
regulating socioeconomic processes in separate administrative units. 
With this in mind, European Charter o f Local Self-Government 
considers the political and economic independence o f local govern­
ment institutions as an important criterion o f society’s demo- 
cratisation and provides that national legislatures should allow the 
local government institutions to determine and manage a significant 
part o f the state affairs, within the borders o f  local government’s 
competency and in the interests o f the population o f a particular 
region. Therefore, European community does not consider budget 
services on a local level as something irrelevant to the state affairs. 
On the contrary, it is exactly the local community as a small, but an 
important part o f the civil society, that is the main subject o f local 
self-government.
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In this context the main methodological problem for the study of 
interbudget relationships is the choice o f criteria for their description 
and classification. Three basic criteria are traditionally used in 
economic literature: the power o f subnational governments to form 
their own income, and, firstly, on introducing own taxes; the power of 
subnational governments to manage expenditure; and the percentage 
proportion o f the spending by subnational governments in the 
consolidated budget o f  the state.1
In our opinion, the percentage o f the expenditure by the sub­
national governments in the consolidated budget o f the state should 
be such a criterion. It is this evaluation that can outline the real effect 
o f the management by the corresponding institutions o f local 
government in conducting an independent budget policy. The first 
and the second o f the criteria mentioned above -  the power of 
subnational governments to create their own income and spending 
powers -  are to an extent mutually interdependent and are formally 
declared in such acts o f  legislation o f the Republic o f Latvia, such as 
the law “On Budget and Financial Management” and “On Budgets of 
Local Governments”.2,3
It is clear that the legislative limitation o f the authority o f the local 
governments in the area o f taxation determines the provision of 
financial assistance to them from the main state budget. The lowering 
o f the amount o f taxes gathered by the local governments leads to the 
decrease in their expenditure. In order for that not to happen, when 
municipal governments lack income, the lacking funds are transferred 
from the main government budget and the interbudget equalization 
fund. Thus, on a local level, such an amount o f expenditure, which is 
necessary for achieving the purposes o f socioeconomic policy 
declared by the central government, is ensured. Meanwhile, it is 
worth mentioning that research shows that the working mechanism of 
interbudget relations in the Republic o f Latvia does not at all fully 
satisfy European requirements for the strengthening o f the role of
1 Шуба В. Модели межбюджетных отношений конкретных стран: 
общее и особенное -  Финансы №10, 2003 г.
2 LR 1994.gada 24.marta likums “Par budžetu un finansu vadlbu” 
(ar grozljumiem, kas izsludinäti lldz 20.10.2005.)
3 LR 1995.gada 29.marta likums “Par pašvaldlbu budžetiem” (ar 
grozljumiem, kas izsludinäti lldz 20.10.2005.)
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local budgets and their high levels o f independence. This finding is 
confirmed by the following negative tendencies. During the period o f 
2002-2006, while the spending part o f the consolidated state budget 
has increased by 104,1% the expenditure in the cumulated budget o f 
local governments has increased by 64,5% along with the steady 
decline o f their share in the expenditure in the consolidated state 
budget from 33,5% to 27,1% over the time period considered (Table, 
Diagram).4
Table. The Proportion of Spending by Local Governments in the 
Expenditure of the Consolidated Budget of Latvia (2002-2006, millions 
of lats) 1 EUR = 0,702804 LVL from 30.12.2004.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Expenses of Consolidated 
State Budget (mln.LVL)
1643.2 1826.4 2159.1 2851.0 3353.8
Expenses of Summarized 
Municipality Budget 
(mln.LVL)
551.9 604.6 687.5 809.8 908.8
Weight of Expenses of 
Consolidated State Budget 
relative to Expenses of 
Summarized Municipality 
Budget) (%)
33.5% 33.1% 31.8% 28.4% 27.1%
Under the circumstances o f the ongoing reform o f local governments, 
the most justified way to solve the task o f increasing the role o f local 
budgets is, in our opinion, to grant spending powers to government 
institutions as close as possible to the place, where the population 
actually resides, that is on the basis o f the principle o f subsidiarity, 
and delimiting income sources by levels o f the budget system in 
accordance with that principle. This principle is based on the idea that 
local government institutions are more aware o f the needs o f the 
population, which resides on their territory. This is an important 
condition for creating civil and democratic society.
When discussing the necessary conditions for that, it is first o f all 
necessary to assume delimitation o f spending powers, taking into 
account the principle o f subsidiarity, as well as the sources o f income.
1 Likumprojekta “Par Valsts budžetu 2006.gadam” paskaidrojumi
230 Galina Reshina
This has to be directed to ensuring to a maximum possible extent that 
spending is covered by income without separating the latter on the 
state or non-state income.
Diagram. The Proportion o f Spending by Local Governments in the 
Expenditure o f the Consolidated Budget o f Latvia (2002 — 2006, 
millions o f lats)
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Analyzing the structure o f the income part o f local government 
budgets for the years 2002-2006, one can see that the proportion of 
tax incomes, non-tax payments and subsidies from the state budget 
over the considered time period remains relatively unchanged -  
60:10:30. However, the main source o f tax income -  more than 86% 
o f the total is the income tax from the population that resides at a 
particular territory. The local government institutions get 75% of that 
type o f tax, which creates the income basis for the local government 
budget and the remaining part -  25% is directed towards the main 
state budget. One can note that the higher (all other things being 
equal) is the amount o f  tax load on wages; the less possibilities there 
are for the positive changes o f macro- and microeconomic 
relationships in the economy (investment in the development of 
manufacturing, decreasing labour costs in the cost o f the final 
product, motivating labour force and creating new workplaces). The 
level o f  taxation, which now totals to more than 60% o f the value 
added, is evidence that the peak o f the Laffer curve has long been 
passed and payments to budget will be constantly declining as a result 
o f  the fall in the tax base, cessation or decline in the volumes of
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manufacturing, continuing movement of the manufacturers towards 
the black economy and tax evasion. All of this means the fall in 
stimulating factors for regional development and the solutions 
towards socio-economic problems of the territories.
With this in mind, in our opinion, granting constant subsidies also 
deprives the territories of the stimulating factors for development and 
prudent spending of the granted funds. Subsidies, as a partial 
participation of the state in covering the spending powers of the local 
government institutions and their targeted expenditure in local 
government budgets, do not create objective conditions for en­
couraging the development of priority industries and are not 
appropriately controlled. This thesis is confirmed by the investigation 
of the causes of the steady decrease of the share of expenditure by 
local governments in the expenditures of consolidated state budget, as 
well as the unchanged base and size of subsidies over the period of 
2002-2006. Naturally, it would be worthwhile in the future to ensure 
stability for no less than 5 years in the set differentiated norms for 
transferring income tax from businesses (their profits), which operate 
on the territories of local governments, together with the decrease of 
subsidies for the equalization of fiscal capacity.
Granting financial aid has a purpose of strengthening financial 
independence of the territories and increasing their responsibility for 
the decisions taken on their level. The creation of a system of inter­
connected forms of vertical and horizontal budget regulation has to 
serve this purpose as well. The ways of transferring money must be 
such that ensure the highest effectiveness for the spending of budget 
resources and the highest social and economic effect.
One of the important directions of reform of interbudget relations 
in the Republic of Latvia is the completion and implementation of the 
administrative-territorial and regional reforms. Today, with more than 
600 local government units in existence (with the population size of
2,3 million people) it is problematic to “follow up” on the 
effectiveness of the use of the invested funds for regional 
development.5 The effectiveness of using the EU structural funds and 
the Cohesion fund in the implementation of the investment projects, 
modernisation of the infrastructure, and the improvement of the
s Latvijas Galvenajas statistikas raditaji 2006. -  Latvijas Republikas 
Centrälä statistikas pärvalde, 2006
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service industry, is made directly dependent on changes in the 
structural regional policy, creating in this way the preconditions for 
the long-term and equal development of Latvian territories.6
The possibility granted to Latvia, as a country of European Union, 
to use budget financing from the structural funds of European Union 
as part of the implementation of regional policy depends, to a 
significant extent, on the structuring and optimisation of the 
administrative-territorial division of the state.
The nomenclature of territorial units of statistics (NUTS) founded 
by Eurostat is meant to classify the union of uniform territorial units 
in the statistical representation of the European Union. The 
nomenclature of territorial units of statistics, which from 1988 is used 
by the EU legislation, determines the procedure for the accounting 
and analysis of the effectiveness of use of structural funds by the EU 
countries. (Council Regulation (EEC) N 2052/88 on the tasks of the 
Structural Funds: O.J.L 185 of 15 July 1988). In this case NUTS is 
comprised of the hierarchical classification of five levels -  three 
regional levels and two local levels in the territorial division of the 
EU countries. Such a classification divides every country of the 
European Union on the exact number of NUTS-1 regions, which in 
turn are divided into an integer number of NUTS-2 regions, 
furthermore NUTS-2 regions are divided into an integer number of 
NUTS-3 regions. The main objectives of such divisions and the 
application of NUTS are:
-  The introduction, development and harmonisation of regional 
statistics in the EU countries;
-  Socio-economic analysis of regions;
-  The structuring of the EU regional policy.
The concept of reform of Latvian local government, which was 
adopted already in 1993 (the “Administrative-Territorial Reform 
Law”), reflected in it many principles and assumptions of the Euro­
pean Charter of Local Self-Government, in particular:
-  New legislation, which granted local governments legal status 
was adopted;
LR 2005.gada 08.decembra likums “Eiropas Savienibas strukturfondu 
vadTba”
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-  Functions were divided between the types of local govern­
ments, as well as between local governments and central 
management;
-  The real estate property of local governments was defined and 
strengthened into law;
-  An independent budget of local governments has been created 
with the legislative foundation for financing of local 
government;
-  The system of interrelationship between the local governments 
and central government was defined;
-  Civil organisations working with local governments were 
strengthened;
-  The system of education for the personnel from local 
government was designed.
The conducted administrative-territorial reform envisions unifying 
district, territory, city and other local governments currently existing 
in Latvia, that is lowering the amount of local governments and 
optimising their operations. Transformation in Latvian local govern­
ments has been happening from the last decade of the previous 
century, because the territorial structure that existed in the sixties was 
directed towards regional territories to a large extent implementing 
economic management, whereas district territories were adapted to 
the functions of collective farms and state farms. It should be 
mentioned that at the end of 2006 envisioned reform is far from 
completion, although the original implementation terms have long 
since passed.
In the continuing discussions on the offered approaches to the 
models of unification very different opinions are proposed: from the 
“model 102” (9 cities and territories elsewhere) to the “model 82” 
(city or territory, where more than 25 thousand people reside is 
preserved, whereas the rest is unified) to the “model 33” (7 large 
cities and 26 localities). In addition to the mentioned transformations, 
whose results have not yet become the reality, regional reform, 
described in the 2002 by the “Regional Development Law”, assumes 
the creation of the new, second level of local governments. In this 
case Latvia will be divided in 5 regions (Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Latgale, 
Zemgale and Riga), new government structures will appear. 
Representatives from district, territory and other local governments
зп
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will be included in these regional institutions together with the 
representative administration. It is envisioned that then it will be 
possible to coordinate the authority of the central and local govern­
ments, which should be conducive to the process of implementation 
of the EU regional policy, specified by Latvian legislation.
The envisioned reorganization is financed from the state budget. 
In addition, local governments, which have united or cooperate with 
one another, get a single subsidy, which varies from 1% to 5% of 
their total annual budget.
Financial questions between many small local governments and 
large volumes of mutual transactions do not allow rational utilization 
of the already insufficient financial resources. Interbudget problems 
of local governments are not just about the general lack of financial 
resources, which is partly due to the vertical imbalances in the budget 
system and partly due to the weak activity of local governments in 
conducting reforms. The results of the research show that the 
structural imbalances between the municipal incomes and expendi­
tures are a no less serious problem. The main aspect of this imbalance 
is that there’s a definite slant in the structure of municipal incomes 
towards the funds from fiscal equalization.
Fiscal equalization is one of the central problems of the reform of 
interbudget relations in the Republic of Latvia. The system for the 
equalization of local government finances is determined by the law 
“On Equalizing Finances of Local Governments” and envisions 
proportional division of tax burden between local budgets to elimi­
nate or at least lower the inequality in the possibilities of taxation in 
different territories as well as to take into account differences in the 
population by the level of per capita budget income and finally to 
lower the differences in the subsistence level of the population.
Under the existing system of territorial division in the Republic of 
Latvia, the problem of horizontal equalization is as difficult as in no 
other Baltic state. The solution to the problem of providing services 
and welfare guaranteed by the state to every person is connected to 
the large differences in the economic situation of various local 
governments, with different level o f expenditures and large diffe­
rentiation of budget capabilities of local government institutions.7
Ganna Rešina. Latvijas Republikas budžets: vakar, šodien rTt -  Riga 
TurTba, 1pp.263.
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The inequality in the economic development of Latvia’s regions is 
clearly shown by the statistical data of bulletins from 2000 to 2006 -  
“Macroeconomic Characteristics of Latvia’s Regions” as well as by 
the analysis of fiscal sufficiency of funds for each of the local 
governments in the process of equalizing their budgets. Thurs, for 
example, in 2006 budget incomes or the so-called “valued incomes” 
per person were ranging from 408 lats in the richest local govern­
ments (Riga district) to 40 lats in Latgale, where unemployment in 
regions is on average 25%. Besides more than 75% of local 
governments receive subsidies from the equalization fund, 15% of 
local governments are financial donors and only 10% are self- 
sufficient.8
Therefore, under the idea of horizontal equalization one needs to 
imply the elimination of discrepancy between the spending functions 
of local budgets and incomes, which are delivered on that budget 
level. The growth of budget incomes and a decrease in the “web” of 
interrelationships in equalizing minimal fiscal capacity of local 
governments can be achieved by stimulating business and investment 
activity. Therefore the solution to the national problem of increasing 
the quality of life lies in increasing the size of administrative 
territories as a result of bringing regional reforms to conclusion and 
the basis for the reform of interbudget relationships. It would be fair 
to assume that the results of the reform of local self government will 
be conducive to the formation of budget system and intebudget 
relations, which would informally conform to all of the clauses of 
European Charter on Local Self-Government.
Conclusion
A precise and justified delineation of spending powers and obli­
gations together with the maximum possible correspondence of 
spending to income sources has to be one of the main directions for 
the reform of interbudget relations.
x Likumprojekta “Par Valsts budžetu 2006.gadam” paskaidrojumi
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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the topical problem connected with the 
necessity of the improvement of credit risk assessment technique in 
lending to small and medium enterprises, suitable for the Latvian 
commercial banks, as well as corresponding to the international 
banking practice and to the recommendations of Basel II. Under 
modem conditions of lending development to Latvian borrowers one 
of the directions of credit risk assessment and management 
improvement is connected with the development of credit risk 
adjusted loan pricing model. The determination and introduction of 
the risk adjusted pricing is positive both on the part of banks and 
borrowers as well as national economy.
Keywords: bank internal ratings, credit risk adjusted loan pricing, 
expert systems, financial analysis, SME, statistical analysis
The banks of Latvia invest more than a half of their resources (65.8% 
as to 1 July 2006) in loan operation1. The banks consider them the 
most profitable. In the middle of 2006 the interest income on the 
loans issued to non-banks accounted for 49.6% of the aggregate 
income of commercial banks. A big part of the bank income is 
represented by lending of the small and medium enterprises (SME). 
These enterprises play an important role in the development of
1 The Financial and Capital Market Commission data. 
http://www.fktk.lv/
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economy. Statistics show2 that SME account for 99% of all 
companies in Latvia and create 63.2% of the national GDP and all 
together employ approximately 70% of all workforce. Bank loans are 
of major significance for the functioning and growth of SME. Banks 
promote the flow of capital from the branches of economy with low 
efficiency to competitive branches and enterprises. Favourable 
economic conditions have influenced the successful development of 
Latvian commercial bank sector and yearly growth of profits. 
However, gaining profit in the area of lending is almost always 
connected with assuming a risk.
In the conditions of modem commercial bank lending develop­
ment the issue of the improvement of the credit risk assessment and 
management is topical as it is related to the quantification of credit 
risk and the development, improvement and application of the credit 
risk adjusted loan price.
According to the Recommendations on the Credit Risk Manage­
ment issued by the Finance and Capital Market Commission of Latvia 
on 2 November 2001 the loan price is to be set so that it covers all 
costs related to the loan and compensates the risk assumed by the 
bank. Therefore the purpose of loan pricing adjusted to the credit risk 
is to find the loan price at which the borrower would himself assume 
the potential costs associated with losing the loan.
The new recommendations of the Basel Commission “Inter­
national Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stan­
dards” (Basel II) are aimed at the improvement of the credit risk 
assessment. These recommendations allow commercial banks to 
determine the amount of the necessary equity based on the borrower 
credit risk that is determined according to the evaluation results of the 
external or internal rating.
For the big commercial banks of Latvia that are owned by foreign 
banks it is possible to introduce the internal rating systems of their 
parent companies and use their experience. Other banks, however, are 
forced to develop internal rating systems by themselves. It is, of 
course, possible to acquire a ready system, like S&P or Moody’s 
rating system, for example. These systems, unfortunately, are very
2 Report on the Economic Development of Latvia. -  Riga: Republic of 
Latvia Ministry of Economics, July 2006, p. 135.
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expensive and it is necessary to conduct their adaptation to the local 
conditions.
At the moment for the SME credit risk assessment local banks 
mainly use the fundamental analysis of the borrower’s financial 
conditions or the so called traditional analysis. The analysis is based 
on the calculation of several financial ratios and partial evaluation of 
the branch where the specific business operates. The financial 
situation of borrowers and their creditability are described by words. 
Moreover, the results of the analysis very much depend on the 
interpretation of the credit manager. It is connected with the fact that 
the borders of the ratio “norms” are not clearly defined.
The traditional borrower analysis approach has several drawbacks:
•  It does not allow for precise quantification of credit risk and 
determination of the default probability;
• The credit applications are rejected that would have been 
approved under the differentiating approach -  consequently banks 
lose their profit potential;
• It is very requiring in terms of work and qualification of bank 
employees;
• The probability of losing the bank customer loyalty is increasing 
as the awarded loan price is inappropriate to the borrower’s credit 
risk (see flg. 1). If the credit terms are too strict, i.e., the unified 
(slightly differentiated) loan interest rate offered to the customer is 
higher than the interest rate adjusted to the risk of the specific 
borrower (in fig. 1 the triangle below the dotted line) the bank 
risks losing borrowers with the best creditability and smallest risk. 
Automatically the aggregate quality of the bank loan portfolio will 
fall as in the loan portfolio the proportion of the bad loans will 
increase. And vice versa, if the loan interest rate is lower than the 
one adjusted to the risk (in fig. 1 the triangle above the dotted 
line), the bank may become appealing to the customers with a 
relatively bad creditability and as a result the structure of the bank 
loan portfolio will become worse. Besides, the bank will not 
receive an adequate pay for the assumed risk and consequently the 
profitability of the invested resources will suffer;
• The probability increases that borrowers with a good creditability 
“subsidy” the borrowers with a worse creditability.
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Figure 1. Credit Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing And Borrowers’ Potencial3
To sum up the potential of the traditional analysis of the assessment 
of the borrower’s financial situation it must be concluded that as a 
result of the analysis a rather subjective “yes/no” decision is made 
regarding the issuing or rejection of the loan that does not allow for a 
precise quantification of the credit risk and determination of the loan 
price adjusted to the credit risk. Due to these reasons majority of 
banks are starting to use other methods in their operation.
Quantitative assessment of the corporate borrower credit risk and 
thus also the determination of the loan price adjusted to the credit risk 
is possible by using the bank internal rating system. That allows for 
complex assessment of the financial conditions of the business with 
the systematized indicator that is expressed in points and refers the 
company to a specific class of creditability. Commercial banks have 
already accumulated big experience of traditional analysis that can be 
successfully used for designing the internal rating system of the bank.
When analyzing the approaches available for establishing ratings 
in banks three basic groups can be singled out:
• the expert system approach;
• statistical approach;
• combined approach.
Basel II -  Meilenstein der Bankenregulierung. Credit Suisse Economic 
Briefing Nr. 36, 2004, S. 15
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The expert system approach is based on the fundamental financial 
analysis of the borrower. It is based on the assessment of the 
quantitative and qualitative factors where the selection and weighting 
of the factors to be included in the rating system is conducted by 
experts. This approach is to be used if the bank disposes the infor­
mation only regarding some default cases or some external ratings,
i.e., the bank has an insufficient volume of data to create the statis­
tical model.
In the basis of the statistical model there is the application of the 
statistical methods for the creation of the internal rating system of the 
bank. In practice the following methods are used: the discriminate 
analysis, logit/probit models, neuronal networks. With the help of 
these methods the statistical comparison of defaulted and non­
defaulted borrowers is made with the aim to identify the factors that 
predict the default. As a result new standard models are created for 
determining the borrower ratings. This approach can be used if there 
is a sufficient volume of data regarding the defaulted and non­
defaulted companies. Just a small number of banks fully rely on 
statistical models. Such models are based on the calculation of credit 
ratings according to a certain formula that comprises both the 
quantitative factors -  financial ratios, as well as some qualitative 
factors which have been standardized and expressed in quantity terms 
that characterize the peculiarities of the borrower branch, its credit 
history as well as other aspects.
Scholars Treacy and Carey4, when carrying out the research of the 
50 biggest banks of the USA concluded that banks see four main 
disadvantages of using the statistical approach for assessing the 
borrower’s credit rating:
-  Some important risk factors are subjective, for example, the 
borrower’s management quality;
-  It is difficult to obtain the data that would confirm the accuracy 
of assessing the models;
-  7 he reliability of the models will become obvious only after a 
certain time, thus the bank may undergo a significant risk up to 
this time;
Ггеасу, W, Carey, M. Credit Risk Rating Systems at Large US Banks, 
in: Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.24, Nr. 1/2, 2000, p. 181
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-  The complex mutual influence determines that there must be 
different rating models for the assessment of the creditability 
regarding the borrowers of different branches and geographical 
regions.
However, the banks that use the statistical approach for the 
assessment of the borrower credit rating mention the following 
arguments for the application of the approach:
-  with the help of the models consequent ratings can be obtained;
-  in a long-term the operational costs will be lowered as less 
staff for the determination of the rating will be needed.
The combined approach for the determination of the ratings implies a 
combined application of the statistical approach and the expert 
system. Moreover, the inclusion of the expert opinion in the 
determining the borrower’s credit rating is limited. Based on the 
degree of applying the expert opinion two approached can be singled 
out:
1. for the determination of the borrower’s credit rating in the 
objective segment the statistical approach is used that is adjusted 
with the expert opinion in the subjective segment of assessment;
2. for the determination of the borrower’s rating the statistical 
approach is used and only the rejected cases or the cases that fall 
into the grey zone are assessed individually by experts.
Thus impartial assessment of creditability on the basis of the 
statistical methods is supplemented by the subjective opinion of the 
experienced experts, i.e., the adjustment of the rating is made based 
on the analysis of the qualitative factors as well as the branch. For 
example, the rating points obtained with the statistical method can be 
adjusted by some points depending on the credit expert opinions. The 
bank can also set the maximum number of points for the assessment 
of the qualitative parameters and thus limit the influence of partial 
factors on the final rating. According to the Basel Committee estimate 
around 25% of banks use the model when analyzing the creditability 
of the big businesses.
Theoretically for the creation of the rating model also the shadow- 
bond method can be used which represents the statistical method that 
resembles the external ratings for the assessment of the businesses
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that have no external rating. That is possible only if the external 
ratings are available for a statistically significant selection of 
customers. In practice in Latvia it is not possible to apply the method 
as the number of companies with the ratings awarded by international 
rating agencies is very small.
For choosing a specific approach for the determination of the 
borrower credit rating in a bank it is necessary to conduct the 
assessment of separate approaches based on their assessment 
accuracy, cost-efficiency and approval on the part of customers.
The accuracy of the approach used for the assessment of the 
borrower creditability depends on several factors: the rating preci­
sion; completeness, validity and quality of the data, and the expert 
qualification.
To make the decision about the possibilities of using a specific 
approach for creation rating systems their comparative analysis can 
be made regarding the model accuracy (the quality of the classi­
fication). That allows determining which of the approaches provides 
the possibility of making the least imprecise forecast regarding the 
classification of the loan into the good or bad loans. For the 
determination of the approach accuracy the error quota (the pro­
portion of the erroneous forecasts) is used3:
-  type a errors (errors of type 1) -  characterize the percentage of 
the customers that have later gone bankrupt although initially 
classified as the “good” ones;
-  type ß errors (errors of type 2) -  characterize (ex post) the later 
solvent number of customers that had initially been classified 
as the “bad” ones.
The application of the statistical methods for the creation of the 
internal rating system is possible only under the condition that the 
statistically assessable data regarding borrowers are complete, 
accurate, without contradictions, in a sufficient volume and what is 
essential -  available in an electronic form. Thus the creation of a data 
base (the internal data base of a bank or a joint interbank data base) is 
a pre-condition for the creation of the bank internal rating system by 
using the statistical approach.
Boemle, M., Gsell, M.: Geld-, Bank- und Finanzmarkt-Lexikon der 
Schweiz, Zürich 2002, Verlag SKV, S.276
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It can be concluded that the worse the situation is in the bank 
regarding the availability and quality of data, the more it is necessary 
to use the expert system approach. Even if the data are good it is 
recommended to use the combined approach and not to refuse fully 
from the expert knowledge as loan experts take into account the 
individual characteristics of specific loans and process the qualitative 
information aspects.
The use of the rating system creation approach based on expert 
knowledge consequently involves the corresponding qualification of 
the credit experts. The impartiality of the expert also depends on his 
professional and human qualification. Moreover, not only the 
knowledge about the branches analyzed is important, but also the 
knowledge about people (psychology) is necessary.
In their work experts rely on their previous experience and 
compare the borrowers to the ones examined before. The subjectivity 
of the expert opinion reduces the accuracy of the assessment therefore 
it is necessary to ensure the raising of the expert qualification that 
will reduce the number of errors in their forecasts and assessments.
The evaluation of the approaches for the determination of the 
borrower credit rating in banks can also be made based on their cost- 
efficiency. As a result of the most intensive and effective checking of 
the borrower’s creditability the likelihood of wrong decisions 
decreases. If in the exit point of the evaluation there is complete 
information about the borrower, a perfect classification is possible 
without additional checking of its creditability. When conducting the 
comparative analysis regarding the accuracy of the rating model two 
types of errors are found out. When reducing type 1 errors also the 
costs of loan loss decrease and the less there are type 2 errors the less 
is the unattained profit. The decreasing of wrong classification means 
increased checking/control costs. The costs of type 1 errors (loan 
losses due to the borrower insolvency) are usually higher than the 
costs that have arisen due to type 2 errors (alternative costs in the 
extent of the unattained income). As it follows from practice, experts 
often have comparatively few type 1 mistakes and comparatively 
many type 2 mistakes. It is explained by the fact that expert 
assessments are generally too pessimistic and cautious.
To decrease the asymmetry of information and assess the 
borrower more impartially the closeness to the customer is important 
as well as a private contact with him. If there is no closeness and the
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loan examination process is impersonal the statistical approach is 
more useful because expert knowledge will not provide any 
additional benefit in this case. If the customer service is individua­
lized for reaching a better result the bank may use expert knowledge 
and the closeness of experts to customers by introducing the division 
of labour. Thus the aggregate economic and branch analysis may be 
done centrally, however the credit experts may be entrusted to 
conduct the assessment of the borrower and regionally specific 
factors (for example, the borrower’s management quality) on the spot.
The pre-condition for the application of the bank internal rating 
system and determination of the credit risk adjusted loan price is not 
only the classification of the borrowers by their c red ib ility , but also 
whether the customer approves of the price (including the bank risk 
premium). The borrower may approve of the checking of his 
creditability and the related risk premium if he feels sufficiently 
individually and justly assessed and is generally satisfied with the 
process of receiving and examination of the loan application.
As it is shown by the foreign bank experience, for the transition to 
the new Basel II standards banks will need a long-term (not less than 
5 - 1 0  year) statistics of using the bank borrower rating assessment 
system. This statistics is of huge importance for testing the accuracy 
of the rating system. Consequently, the timely creation and introduc­
tion of the rating assessment system will provide commercial banks 
with the time needed for the adjustment and piloting of the methods 
applied as well as the creation of the necessary statistics.
The banks that do not dispose of a well-built risk management 
system in future have to count with the need to provide for bigger 
equity, which, in its turn, will negatively affect the prices of the 
issued loans. However, the use of the differentiated rating system 
allows banks to implement a flexible pricing policy as well as sound 
policy for setting limits and creating reserves.
A consequent credit risk adjusted loan price policy provides 
several advantages to the commercial banks:
to implement a joint quantitative assessment of the credit risk;
-  standardize the price determination process in SME lending; 
determine the loan price that covers the expected loss; 
exclude the situation where the borrowers with good credi­
tability subsidy the borrowers with bad creditability;
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-  offer the borrower the loan issuing conditions that are adjusted 
to the customer risk profile;
-  serve as a basis for designing an efficient, profit-oriented bank 
strategy in the area of lending;
-  provide basis for efficient use of resources that, in its turn, 
improves the indicators of the bank cost-effectiveness.
A long period without losses can lead to economically unsound 
understatement of risk. Too low credit risk premiums reduce the 
value of the bank as a business. However, if the premiums are too 
high and the expected losses are overestimated borrowers will be 
frightened by too high loan interest rates. Yet the client can actively 
influence his rating and consequently the loan price by ensuring the 
transparency of his financial and economic operation and acquiring 
the trust from a bank through a constructive dialogue. Besides also 
the existence of the loan collateral allows a business to receive better 
lending terms.
Lending that is based on the credit risk adjusted loan pricing 
provides for further existence of lending. Besides, from the point of 
view of the national economy important volume and term trans­
formation of funds is implemented. From the national economy point 
of view the risk adj usted interest rates are efficient as they reduce the 
exaggerated cyclic character of lending. The determination of the 
credit risk adjusted loan price helps prevent the subvention of worse 
borrowers by better borrowers and thus the maintenance of inefficient 
companies that interfere with the structural changes in the national 
economy. Thus the determination and introduction of the risk 
adjusted pricing is positive both on the part of banks as well as 
national economy.
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In 2005 it has been lead nearby 1300 IPO1 in the world. On their 
results companies have attracted about $140 billion in total. This sum 
has surpassed the means collected in 2004 ($124 billion). In 2005 the 
number of primary accommodations in size over $500 million was 
nearby 60, while in 2004^44. In Russia market of IPO has started to 
get real outlines only in 2004. Before that primary accommodations 
of shares of the Russian emitters were extremely an unusual 
occurrence. However in the autumn of 2004 three companies: 
“Mechel”, “the Seventh continent” and “Open investments” have lead 
IPO at the same time. Many Russian companies created during last 
years, have apprehended IPO as an effective way of attraction of the 
capital for development of the business.
2005 became the best year of the Russian share market. The day 
time volume of the tenders at the Russian stock exchanges exceeds $1 
billion, and in 2002 it hardly exceeded $300^100 million. Still the 
most traded papers in the Russian market are shares of the Russian 
Open Society “United Power Systems” -  ROS UPS (tab. 1). But their 
share in total volume was reduced from 56 % down to 34 %. During 
last years shares of the ROS UPS were bought up actively by 
strategic investors and the industrial holdings consuming huge 
quantity of the electric power.
It is not easy to win popularity to the new power companies which 
have appeared at the Russian stock exchanges during reform of 
electric power industry. With papers of largest of them -  OGK-5 on 
the Moscow Interbank Stock Exchange (MISE) passes 100-200 
transactions each day -  much less, than with papers of the ROS UPS.
1 Kommersant. 19.12.2005. P. 17.
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“Gazprom ”. On December 22nd and 23, 2005 president Putin has 
signed the law and the decree on liberalization of share market 
“Gazprom”. These documents assign to the state of 50 % plus one 
share of “Gazprom” and remove all restrictions on possession of the 
remained share of non-residents. The signed decree cancels the 
decree 529 from May, 28th, 1997 on which these actions can circulate 
only at few stock exchanges which list is approved by the govern­
ment. It was Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Siberian stock exchanges and 
Stock exchange “St.-Petersburg”.
Table 1. Change of structure of the share market2
Volume of the tenders 2005 
jan -  oct.)
Volume of the tenders 2002 
(jan.-okt.)
The emitter $ million Share,
%
The emitter $ million Share,
%
ROS UPS 45.094,22 34,31 ROS UPS 19.935,7 56,37
Lukoil 25.910,13 19,71 Lukoil 4.007.,8 11,33
Gazprom 14.828,93 11,28 The Savings 
Bank
1.841,97 5,21
Norilsk nickel 12.511,02 9,52 Surgutneftegaz 1.994,48 5,64
Surgutneftegaz 7.771,84 5,91 Rostelecom 1.357,29 3,84
Rostelecom 7.429,64 5,65 UKOS 1.262,85 3,57
The Savings 
Bank
3.509,83 2,67 Mosenergo 878,03 2,48
Sibneft 1.697,39 1,89 Gazprom 874,73 2,47
Sberbank, pr. 1.503,26 1,64 Norilsk nickel 771,11 2,18
Surgutnefte-
gaz,pr
1.407,94 1,63 Tatneft 590,26 1,59
Transneft, pr. 1.398,95 1,55 ROS UPS, pr. 419,72 1,59
Uralsvyaz-
inform
1.309,67 1,00 Sberbank, pr. 351,16 0,99
MTS 1.172,40 0,89 Rostelecom, pr. 168,09 0,88
Rostelecom,
pr.
868,06 0,86 Autovaz 147,93 0,72
Tatneft 847,06 0,74 Tatneft, np. 108,06 0,46
ROS UPS, pr. 822,71 0,73 Surgutnefte­
gaz, pr.
177,96 0,50
2 Wedomosti. 21.11. 2205. B-6.
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On January, 24th, 2006 the first tenders by shares of “Gazprom” have 
passed on MISE. The stock exchange of RTS has started to trade in 
shares of “Gazprom” on January, 13th. Earlier non-residents could 
own no more than 20% of shares of concern and should receive 
special sanctions to transactions with shares of “Gazprom”.
“Gazprom” waits reform; conversations about it are conducted 
during many years. Developing the plan of reform, “Gazprom” made 
use of experience of re-structuring E.ON RWE. Its essence is in the 
following: from present “daughters” of “Gazprom” which are 
engaged now simultaneously in extraction, transportation and pro­
cessing of gas, will take out not main kinds of business. To re­
structuring will be subjected 17 “daughters” of “Gazprom” which 
own or rent in total 80 % of all property of gas monopoly. All the 
allocated assets, except those for extracting, will be transferred in 6 
special divisions3.
Re-structuring will pass in two stages and will take about two 
years. At the first stage “daughters” of monopoly (“company- 
donors”) will allocate not main business in special Open Companies, 
so-called “companies-buffers”. At the second stage “buffers” will be 
united by kinds of business. Extracting “daughters” and seven “trans­
companies” will keep independence.
Tab. 2. The biggest companies in the world on May 9.20064
The company Capitalization ($ billion)
1 Exxon Mobil 387,2
2 General Electric 365,6
3 Gazprom 305,9
4 BP 253,6
5 Microsoft 242,2
Reform of “Gazprom” will be drawn by analogy to reform of the 
ROS UPS where the primary goal was also consist in division by 
kinds of business on the new companies. But when in manufacture of 
energy and its marketing business it is supposed to create a 
competition, “Gazprom” from its side plans to give nothing to private 
hands for a while.
3 Wedomosti. 27.03.2006. A-l.
4 Wedomosti. 10.05.2006. A-l.
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Tab. 3. The biggest companies in the world on August 11 ^ООб5
The company Capitalization ($ billion)
1 Exxon Mobil 414,54
2 General Electric 335,51
3 Gazprom 277,87
4 Microsoft 249,22
5 Citigroup 235,53
In 2003 capitalization of “Gazprom” was estimated at $29 billion. By 
May, 2006 capitalization of “Gazprom” has reached its peak: $306 
billion (3-rd place in the world -  tab. 2). However on May, 10th,
2006 the collapse of a stock market of Russia has begun.
In the end of July, 2006 the shares of Gazprom began to rise in 
price again, and the company regained its previous position (tab. 3). It 
is necessary to note, that on July, 13th the company cost only $200 
billion. Now tens new Russian companies are ready for primary 
offering of shares.
In table 4 results of main IPO for last 10 years are shown. As we 
see many companies choose NYSE and LSE as their priority trade 
places. Advantages of public offering at the western stock exchanges 
seem obvious. It is an access to the big capital; both prestige, and 
creation of the market for existing shareholders. However 
requirements for emitters doing IPO abroad are considerably higher, 
than in Russia. Besides recently began to collapse a stereotype about 
insufficiency of the capital in the foreign market.
The new Russian companies have distinctly realized, that time of 
an open and transparent business for investors has come. In opinion 
of some participants of the market, the increase in number of primary 
accommodations tells about desire of the companies to receive money 
up to presidential elections of 2008. In reply to desire of the Russian 
companies to enter the open market the proper infrastructure was 
generated.
5 Wedomosti. 14.08.2006. A -l.
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Table 4. IPO of the Russian companies during 1996-2005°
The company
Stock
exchange Date
Placed
share
(%)
The invol­
ved sums 
($ millions)
Vympelcom NYSE 11.1996 13 107
MTS NYSE 06.2000 17 364
Wimm-Bil-Dann NYSE 02.2002 24 199
RBC IS MISE 04.2002 16 13
Irkut MISE, RTS 03.2004 23 127
Kalina MISE, RTS 04.2004 28 39,9
Mechel NYSE 10.2004 10 291
The seventh continent RTS 11.2004 13 81
The open investments RTS 11.2004 38,5 69
AFC “System” LSE 02.2005 16,5 1350
Lebediansky RTS, MISE 03.2005 19,9 151
Grain of Altai MISE, RTS 03.2005 10 8
Severstal-avto RTS, MISE 04.2005 30 135
Pyaterochka Holding LSE 05.2005 30 597,6
Evraz Group S.A. LSE 06.2005 8 422
Rambler Media AIM/LSE 06.2005 26 39,9
NOVATEK LSE 07.2005 19 966
Urals Energy AIM/LSE 08.2005 31 113,8
Amtel-Vredesten LSE 11.2005 27 201,7
NLMK LSE 12.2005 7 609
Zirax PLC AIM/LSE 12.2005 30 13,7
1M&SG AIM/LSE 12.2005 26 26,4
The highest requirements are shown at IPO on NYSE. In addition to 
the exhaustive information on activity of an emitter Americans 
demand disclosing the information about concrete industries and 
branches. At LSE such requirements are absent. In Russia all is even 
easier. The Russian prospectus of issue is, as a matter of fact, the 
marketing document.
In the beginning of 2006 everyone in Russia speaks about an 
entrance on IPO -  even comparatively small companies. But hardly 
all of them are ready for this serious step. Haste in this process 
threatens with losses to present and future shareholders. And in scale
6 Kommersant. 13.10.2005. P. 19; Wedomosti. 21.02.2006. A-6.
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of the country the serious loss of reputation of all stock market can be 
caused and lead to loss of trust of investors in long-term prospect 
toward all Russian assets.
The Russian companies not always pay proper attention to 
fundamental principles of preparation for an output on the stock 
market. Often they simply carry out official requirements in the 
minimal volume. The investment bankers preparing accommodation 
often encourage the clients only to cosmetic changes: it is important 
to them to receive the fee and consequently they are not interested in 
the real changes that demand long internal work.
Often proprietors of the Russian companies do not wish to reform 
model of management according to requirements of the public 
company for one simple reason. They fairly believe that it will limit 
their authority. But it would be error to think, that the new model of 
management contradicts their interests. It limits abusing authority, for 
what proprietors of all successful companies stand up. Besides it 
creates the structures, allowing to make active executive functions 
and to achieve results. Frequently traditional proprietors do not wish 
to depend on board of directors and to divide functions of executive 
director and chairman of board of directors.
Per 2006 the Russian companies will lead securities on stock 
exchanges approximately on $20 billion. Almost once a week the 
next new company informs about their plans to go on a stock 
exchange in the nearest couple of years, and investors literally pull 
out each other shares of the new companies. For example, top 
managers IPO of “Razguliay'’ -  MDM-bank and Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein — have collected six times more of applications than 
volume of accommodation.
Whether such behavior of investors is justified? To estimate it, 
comparison of change of stock quotes of the companies which have 
appeared in the market with behavior of other papers has been lead.
It have been studied 22 companies (that have lead IPO from the 
beginning of 2004 when IPO became the mass phenomenon in 
Russia, till March, 2006). All these companies work in Russia, 
though some of them are registered abroad and their papers circulate 
at foreign stock exchanges. 13 from 22 emitters appeared at stock 
market more than year ago.
Results (table 5) speak for themselves. The investors, who have 
bought the shares of beginners in 2004, had luck. From seven
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companies which have placed in that year only the shares of 
“Mechel” placed in December for 12 months after IPO have 
increased less, than an index of RTS (12,6% against 37,2%). But 
papers of gold mining company Peter Hambro later year after 
accommodation cost in 3,5 times more though the market for the 
same period has risen only on 17 %. Shares of company “Irkut” for 
the first year have was repaid for owners in 45,2%, and the index of 
RTS (RTSI) has lost 4,2%.
But from 2005 the situation has changed sharply. It became much 
more difficult for beginners to compete with an index which has 
added 83% during an year, and from the beginning 2006, despite of 
correction, -  20%. Of 15 companies only three -  “NOVATEK”, 
“Rambler Media” and “NLMK” have overtaken RTSI, and “NMLK”
-  more recently. But prices of shares of five companies have fallen.
Participants of the market explain weak performance of the 
majority of beginners by overestimated inquiries of their owners to 
which indulges a number of congenital defects of the Russian share 
market.
RTSI -  is a quite good reference point, but it represents the share 
market of the country which economy is warped aside oil-and-gas 
sector. The index on two third depends on the power companies 
which during the last of one and a half year grow due to promptly 
rising in price oil. In 2005 shares of such giants as “Gazprom” or 
“Lukoil” have essentially overtaken the market. It is more correct to 
compare the new public companies with branch indexes, but we have 
not them in Russia yet. As “blue chips” represent basically the oil and 
gas companies, it is very difficult to investors to diversify the 
portfolios. Because of this is a high demand for shares of consumer 
and telecommunication sectors which make the majority among 
beginners.
The matter is not only in lack of not industrial papers, that allow 
to skim the cream off by trailblazers from other branches. Under­
development of many sectors creates effect of rapid growth which 
also involves buyers. In the West retail networks grow with speed of 
inflation, and in Russia -  by 50% a year, and of course, it is 
interesting to investors.
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Tab. 5. Results of IPO of the Russian companies7
The company
Date of 
accommo­
dation
In a year or on June, 9th, 2006
Change of cost 
of papers (%)
Change of 
RTSI (%)
Comstar OTS 7.02.2006 - 2 7 2
Trader Media East 7.02.2006 -4 6 2
Zirax 16.12.2005 -7 24
NLMK 9.12.2005 38 26
1M& SG 6.12. 2005 10 27
Amtel Vrederstein 14.11.2005 -50 38
Urals Energy 4.08. 2005 65 71
NOVATEK 21.07. 2005 117 80
Rambler Media 10.06. 2005 163 101
Evraz Group 3.06. 2005 69 127
Pyaterochka 6.05. 2005 26 163
Severstal-avto 22.04.2005 26 136
Pava (Grain of Altai) 21.03.2005 -20 109
Lebediansky 11.03.2005 58 92
AFK System 9.02. 2005 31 108
The open investments 29.11.2004 262 64
The seventh continent 12.11.2004 124 46
Mechel 29.10.2004 13 37
RBC IS 17.06.2004 311 17
Peter Hambro Mining 7.06. 2004 248 17
Guelder-rose 28.04. 2004 115 0
lrkut 26.03. 2004 45 -4
Popularity of Russia and uniqueness of assets allow owners of the 
companies to involve money, not leaving a place for the big prize to 
investors.
Investors have already paid attention to weak game of expensive 
debutants. Much speaks now about slow growth of companies after 
IPO. This theme soars in air and forces to hesitate buyers. All over 
the world papers of the emitter in the secondary market usually grow 
in price. In fact this is a beginning of public history of a company. 
And in Russia they can fall in price in the first month after 
accommodation.
7 Vedomosti. 9.06.2006. A-l.
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The first warning to owners is a history with “Cherkizovski”. 
Before the accommodation the top manager (Morgan Stanley) has 
refused to participate in it. The investment bank has explained its 
position by disagreement with too high price which was requested by 
owners of “Cherkizovski” for the company. And although IPO has 
passed successfully, bank does not regret about its act: the investment 
bank should provide equally attractive conditions to owners, and to 
investors both.
On January 17th, 2006 a number of the positions is signed, which 
considerably changed rules of accommodation of securities by the 
Russian emitters. Now accommodation can be made more quickly 
and easier, but only inside of the countiy -  the limit of accommo­
dation abroad is lowered from 40% to 35%. Besides that emitters 
should “pay” for liberalization by greater disclosing of information 
about their company.
Owing to some changes in normative documents the emitter has 
an opportunity to reduce term of carrying out of issue due to more 
operative accommodation of papers among investors, and due to 
reduction of term of registration in FFMS8. Besides the emitter can 
choose the investor (with a preservation of the right of priority by 
former shareholders). It is simplified also the procedure of entry in 
quotation leaf of Russian stock exchanges by an emitter.
In the autumn 2005 the State Duma has approved the amend­
ments to laws “About a securities market”, “About joint-stock 
companies” and the law “About protection of the rights and legi­
timate interests of investors”, changing principles of public 
accommodation of securities. In particular, now the prices for shares 
at carrying out IPO will be formed on auction, instead of in advance 
as it has been registered in the former legislation.
By these measures FFMS will promote increase in capacity and 
liquidity of the stock market in Russia. Foreign investors have much 
less restrictions on purchase of shares in Russia. And here Russian 
PIFs , for example, have very rigid restrictions on purchase ADR of 
shares of the Russian companies in Britain and the USA.
K Federal Financial Markets Service of Russia.
PIF (paevoi investitsionnyi fond)—joint-stock investment fund.
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On what Russian companies spend money from IPO
By preparation of public accommodation the company informs 
investors, on what it is going to spend the received money. For 
example, “Mechel” has specified, that it plans to start up half of 
means for capital expenses, and half -  on purchase of the new 
companies and licenses. “Evraz Group” -  that it can direct money for 
purchase of new assets, development of operating capacities and the 
repayment of share at co-owners of branches. AFK “System”, for 
example, has informed what it intend to get “Svyazinvest”, 
“Uraltelecom” or “Kazakhtelecom”. The most concrete was “Amtel 
Vredestein” -  the company promised to spend money of new 
shareholders for payment of debts.
However, even these declarations concern only those means that is 
received by the company due to additional emission. Usually it is 
written in memorandums about the money obtained from sale of 
existing shares that it “does not go to the company”. Hardly probable 
not unique exception -  the memorandum “NOVATEK” in which it 
was promised, that one of shareholders -  company “Levit” -  will 
liquidate a debt in $720 million Have shareholders fulfilled their 
promise or not, in “NOVATEK” have refused to specify. And one of 
co-owners “Pyaterochka” has explained in reply to a similar question, 
that the public should not excite, where shareholders have put means
-  let even they “have dug money”.
Investments. Not too willingly companies tell about the money 
received during accommodation. Besides no one consider these 
means separately, and they are dissolved in aggregate profits. 
Nevertheless, data who managed to be collected by the newspaper 
“Vedomosti”, allow to approve, that the greatest part of money goes 
not on development existing, and on purchase of new assets.
For example, “Severstal-Avto” (has received $663 million) has 
spent $50 million for purchase the factory of midget cars and $25 
million for modernization.
AFK “System” ($1,318 billion) has not bought any of three state 
television companies (their privatization till now did not take place). 
But, as it has been declared, it has spent $600 million for purchase 
minor-shares in six Bashkir power companies, $275,5 million -  for
2,3 % of shares of MTS and only $277 million — for development of 
branches: “Intourist”, Children’s world”, IBRD and “Citronix”.
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After IPO “Mechel” ($233,1 million) became an owner of 
25% + 1 share of “Yakutskugol”, having redeemed them on auction 
for $420 million and has started at the Chelyabinsk metallurgical 
combine the first turn of new English factory that costs more than 
$150 million.
In “Evraz Group” ($422 million) have refused to do any official 
comments. However it is known, that right after IPO the group has 
bought for $79,1 million 75% of shares of Italian metallurgical 
combine “Palini e Bertoli”, and in November, 2005 -  98,96% of 
Czech company “Vitkovice Steel” for €240 million
“Rambler Media” ($30,8 million) has directed nearby $27 million 
on “the further development, and, first of all, -  on purchase of profile 
business”. “Kalina” has spent ($25,4 million) money for purchase of 
51% of shares of German cosmetic company “Dr. Scheller” (having 
spent for it $16 million) and the new equipment for the Russian 
enterprise.
Still, the companies where the most part of money has been 
invested in their own construction, exist. For example, “Irkut” has 
directed its means from IPO on modernization which will allow 
produce components under the contract with Airbus. And “Pava” 
(previously “Grain of Altai”, $4 million) has spent $2 million for the 
organization of manufacture of crackers on Achinsk factory and $2 
million on advertising of new mark of flour. The money collected by 
“Amtel Vredstein” ($153 million), as well as it was promised, has 
gone on repayment of debts.
In companies “Urals Energy” ($113,8 million) and “Open invest­
ments” ($49,5 million) have refused to do any comments.
Result. If in 2006 the Russian companies will really receive $20 
billion from accommodation, this money can be rather appreciable for 
economic growth. In fact growth of Chinese GDP on 10% per year is 
in much a consequence of 20%-s’ growth of investment in a fixed 
capital. In Russia in 2005 the investment have grown only on 10,5%. 
But in 2006 due to IPO Russia can reach 20 %. However, whether the 
boom of IPO will go on advantage of the Russian economy, depends 
on what will be spent money. Purchase of assets, especially abroad, 
will give not much for acceleration of growth of GDP.
By some estimations, in 2005 the investment of the Russian 
companies directed in development and the modernization which 
were financed due to IPO, have made less than 1% of all investments
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into a fixed capital ($122 million). Certainly, it practically will not be 
reflected in economic growth of Russia.
Results of IPO during the first half of 2006
Of 50 companies which in 2006 were going to sell the shares to 
investors, only 10 went on a stock exchange in the first half-year of 
2006. Owners of the companies have involved $3,2 billion, and in 
view of national IPO “Rosneft” and other accommodations of July- 
December the volume of this market in 2006 can reach nearby $20 
billion.
Tab. 6. Ranking of the companies -  emitters of IPO10
The company- 
emitter
Volume of 
IPO, $ million
Part of 
shares, %
Stock exchange
1 Comstar-OTS 1062 35 LSE
2 Trader Media East 515 79 LSE
3 Magnet 368 19 MISE, RTS
4 CTC Media, Inc. 346 16 NASDAQ
5 C.A.T. Oil 322 35 Deutsche Boerse
6 Cherkizovo 251 28 LSE, MISE, RTS
7 Razguliay 144 28 MISE, RTS
8 Verofarm 140 50 RTS
9 Baltic Oil Terminals 56 52 AIM/LSE
10 Amur Minerals 
Corporation
7 14 AIM/LSE
Processes of IPO in Russia grow. The proprietors requiring means for 
development of their companies, remark more frequently the interest 
of portfolio investors toward their business. In January -  June, 2004 
only two domestic companies have placed the shares at a stock 
exchange. Next year there were already 7 of such emitters, and in the 
first half-year 2006 10 Russian companies (see tab. 6) became public 
ones.
10 Vedomosti. 21.07.2006. B-3.
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These 10 companies have involved $3,2 billion in the market, and 
almost third of this sum has fallen upon the IPO of “Comstar” which 
has gained $1,06 billion from sale of 35% of its shares on LSE.
The largest accommodations (about two thirds of all volume of the 
market) in January-June, 2006 have lead the companies of 
telecommunication- and media-sectors while on metallurgy and a fuel 
and energy complex -  only 12%. Some of IPO did not take place 
because some companies, declaring their plans about IPO, simply 
gave a craze. Sometimes it is only advertising course of small and 
average players.
Now the centre of gravity of Russian IPO is abroad. Almost 80% 
of all involved during IPO money are collected from investors on the 
western platforms -  LSE, its division for small companies AIM, 
NYSE, NASDAQ and Deutsche Boerse. And the unconditional 
leader among them is LSE where has passed five of IPO (58% of cost 
volume of all accommodations). If development of the market will 
occur under the same scheme and in the future, it hardly will 
positively be reflected in the Russian share market.
IPO of “Rosneft”
The decision on necessity of carrying out of IPO of “Rosneft” was 
accepted spring of 2005. In the end of 2004 “Rosneft” has bought 
“Yugansknefitegaz”, whose extraction twice exceeded extraction of 
“Rosneft”. Purchase of “Yugansk” at once has put forward “Rosneft” 
in leaders among the oil companies though in 2004 it was only the 
seventh.
When in December, 2004 “Rosneft” has bought “Yugansk” for 
$9,35 billion, experts converged in opinion, that “Rosneft” had not 
sufficient means for this step. But the company carefully hid sources 
of financing. Even board of directors of “Rosneft” has learned about 
its large financial transactions only in February, 2005 and has 
approved them already backdating. The scheme of financing 
“Rosneft” has described completely only in the report for the first 
quarter of 2006, published on May, 15th11. More than three quarters
11 Vedomosti. 17.05.2006. A -l, B-2.
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of assets of present “Rosneft” are assets of the “Yuganskneftegaz”, 
former basic oil refining enterprise of “UKOS”.
In September, 2005 “Rosneftegaz”, parent company of “Rosneft” 
has received the mysterious loan which has allowed it to buy 10,74% 
of “Gazprom” for $7,5 billion. This purchase has restored supervising 
share of the state in “Gazprom” and that was the major step before 
liberalization of structure of the share capital of “Gazprom”.
On June, 28th 2006 the largest IPO in the Russian history has 
started: banks all over the country have started reception of appli­
cations from persons who wish to buy shares. The branches of the 
“Savings Bank”, “Gazprombank”, “Uralsib” and other banks have 
started to accept applications from the population for shares of the 
company. Closing of the book of applications planned for July, 13th, 
2006, and trade at stock exchanges on July, 14th has begun.
On July, 14th, 2006 “Rosneftegaz” and “Rosneft” have placed 
14,8% of shares of the oil company for $10,4 billion. From them of 
4,4% (400 million) shares of “Rosneft” have been let out for IPO, and 
10,4% of shares belonged to “Rosneftegaz” for which sale it has 
received $8,5 billion. As a result of sale a state company it has 
appeared the branch leader on capitalization -  almost $80 billion
As a result of IPO by volume of capitalization “Rosneft” has 
overtaken “Lukoil” and became the first in oil branch. And IPO of 
“Rosneft” took the first place in Russia and fifth in the world by 
volume of the collected money ($10,4 billion). Former Russian leader 
AFK “System” -  has collected $1,56 billion.
Strategic investors have provided 21% of demand, the inter­
national investors from the USA, the Europe and Asia -  36%, the 
Russian investors -  39%, the Russian retail investors -  4%.
The largest investors -  British BP ($ 1 billion), Malaysian Petronas 
($1,5 billion) and Chinese CNPC ($0,5 billion). Also shareholders of 
the company became 115000 of Russians whom applications for 
$750,5 million have submitted. For comparison: the general number 
of clients at all share investment funds of Russia is only in 2 times 
more.
The head of the company -  Sergey Bogdanchikov has bought 
papers approximately on $ 1 million12. The richest Russian billionaire
-  Roman Abramovitch (a fortune -  $18,3 billion) has bought shares
12 Vedomosti. 17.07.2006. B-l.
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of “Rosneft” approximately on $200 million. It is approximately
0,4% of the authorized capital of the company. The owner of “Bazel” 
Oleg Deripaska has bought shares approximately on $400 million. 
The fortune of Deripaska is nearby $9 billion (6-th place in Russia). 
Owner of NLMK Vladimir Lisin ($11,3 billion, 3-d place) has 
enclosed nearby $200 million13.
As some inspections show, about 11% of Russians are ready to 
put the savings in the share market. These 10 million potential 
investors can help to make a quantum leap to the Russian share 
market. If to take average volume of small private investors in 
“Rosneft” (nearby $6500) it will turn out, that potential volume of 
national investments is more than $65 billion. For comparison: now 
in Russia is nearby $110 billion on deposits. Experts consider as a 
normal a situation when the share of physical persons in the share 
market makes 30%. But $65 billion is only 10% of current 
capitalization of the Russian share market.
Analysts expect, that in 2006 the Russian market of IPO will reach 
$19-20 billion, i.e. minus last accommodations (11 companies, total 
amount of the involved means -  $13,6 billion) still is expected 
primary sale of shares for the sum of $5,4 billion. Thus, the 
population is quite capable to provide needs of the Russian 
companies for money.
But there is also an underside. First of all, it is necessary that 
citizens were not disappointed in the share market. Shares of 
“Rosneft” after the beginning of the tenders have started to fall, and 
analysts warn in the autumn of the quotation of “Rosneft” can fail at 
all. The falling of quotations of “Rosneft” will not strongly affect 
mood of mass investors: 63% of the citizens who have subscribed the 
shares, count on growth of quotations. The general economic 
situation is much more important .
On July, 31st, 2006 Standard & Poor’s has raised a rating of 
“Rosneft” till BB. But it still below, than “Lukoil” and the 
Multinational corporation-BP (ratings BB +).
The first month of the tenders of shares of “Rosneft” has not 
brought a big success to a paper15. Its quotations oscillate close to the
13 Vedomosti. 24.07.2006. A-l.
14 Vedomosti. 19.07.2006. A-l, A-4.
15 Vedomosti. 23.08.2006. B-l.
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level of IPO, and volumes of the tenders are far from a level of the 
most liquid Russian actions. For the present “Rosneft” bargains worse 
than “Tatneft”, and much worse than “Gazprom” and “Lukoil”.
It is known that after accommodation “Rosneft” has established on 
3-d place in the country on capitalization, having passed forward only 
“Gazprom” and “Lukoil” . However it is not so simply to develop this 
success on exchange platforms. Shares of “Rosneft” cost more than 
the price of accommodation ($7,55 for 1 piece) only few of days, and 
basically quotations were below this level. And steady growth of 
volumes it is not visible yet. If to compare total mid-annual turns on 
“blue chips” at all stock exchanges “Rosneft” will borrow on this 
parameter 10-th place with result $38,5 million, that is in 28 times 
less than volume of the tenders by shares of “Gazprom” and in 21 
times -  of “Lukoil”.
The volume of the tenders of “Rosneft” is inadequate to sizes of 
IPO. For such a big company it is a low turn. Participants of the 
market see in that some reasons. The main reason is that the most part 
of shares was bought up by long-term investors. As a result the real 
free-float of “Rosneft” is essentially less than 15%. Too high price of 
accommodation also is the deterrent. However, in opinion of experts, 
it is quite probable, that at the beginning 2007 “Rosneft” will 
overtake “Tatneft” on volume of the tenders.
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Abstract
Taking into account the rapid adoption of electronic delivery 
channels in banking during the last few years, it is important to 
understand what electronic banking (e-banking) really is as well as 
its benefits both for banks and their customers. In addition, it is 
essential to review the recent development trends of e-banking 
from the global perspective and to analyse the reasons for a high e- 
banking penetration in the countries leading in this field. It is also 
crucial to know the specific risks, which arise with the introduction 
of e-banking in order to be better prepared for their mitigation.
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1. Specifying the Nature of E-Banking and Its Benefits
Electronic banking (e-banking) can be described in many ways. In a 
very simple form, it means provision of information or services by 
a bank to its customers, via a computer, television or mobile phone. 
Electronic banking should be viewed as a high-order construct 
consisting of several distribution channels and it is in fact a larger 
platform than just banking via the Internet. The following platforms 
of e-banking can be distinguished: (a) Internet banking, (b) 
telephone banking, (c) TV-based banking, (d) mobile phone 
banking, and (e) PC banking [21].
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Schilder defines e-banking as the provision of banking services 
by means of electronic data transfer between participants [30]. The 
information is transferred via a network, which may be a computer 
network such as the Internet, or a telecommunications network.
Quite similar to the Schilder’s one are the definitions of 
Schaechter’s [29], Nsouli’s [27] and Fullenkamp’s [16]: electronic 
banking can be defined as the use of electronic delivery channels 
for banking products and services. In addition, Nsouli and 
Schaechter specify that e-banking is a subset of electronic finance. 
The most important electronic delivery channels are the Internet, 
wireless communication networks, automatic teller machines 
(ATMs), and telephone banking [29].
What is electronic banking?
E-Commerce
Conducting busress through electronic networks
E-Finance
Providing finaicial services 
throusfi electronic charnels
E-Money
Stored value or prepaid 
payment mechanisms
E-Banking
Prodding balking products and 
services throu^i electronic 
deftweiy channels
—  Internet banking
Telephone banking
Other electonic 
deüveiy channels
Other financial 
services and 
products
Insurance, опйпе 
brokenng, etc.
The difference between e-monsy and e-oarking 
is lha. vrth e-rrcnsy baar-.es are rot kept in 
finaxiel aco'jurt; »itn banks
Figure 1. The Definition of E-Banking [27]
European Central Bank specifies e-banking via the delivery 
channels characteristic to its provision: electronic banking services 
include payment cards, ATMs, POS terminals, telephone and 
mobile phone banking, and Internet banking [11]. Karjaluoto and 
Fullenkamp believe that the main delivery channel for electronic 
banking today is the Internet, and the growth of electronic banking 
as a delivery channel depends heavily on its development.
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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago [12] identified three types of 
e-banking business models:
• Hybrids: traditional banks with an alternate e-commerce 
delivery channel, also known as “bricks & clicks”.
• E-Banks: purely electronic or virtual banks. These banks 
may have no deposit or withdrawal infrastructure of their 
own, relying on other banks’ networks and ATMs.
• Alliances: strategic partnerships draw on the particular 
expertise or name recognition of one organization, combined 
with another organization’s expertise to create new products 
and diversity a partner’s product offering.
E-banking provides vast opportunities for banks and their 
customers [29]. Access to services and products is fast and available 
around the clock independent of the location of the customer. The 
electronic delivery channels increase transparency and can lead to 
higher competition among banks, and a most significant point -  
through lower costs, penetrating new markets and expanding the 
geographical reach.
According to Duisenberg [7], because of tightening competition, 
bank customers will probably get better and more efficient financial 
products and -services. The new technology should help a client to 
reduce the time and energy while buying financial services. As a 
result of the changes in banking practices, services of a wider range 
could be offered to customers. Moreover, the increase in efficiency 
enables to offer them cheaper. At the euro-zone, there would join the 
impact of the implementation of common currency, which 
accelerates the movement towards the integrated financial markets of 
the whole area.
In Nsouli’s opinion, with the implementation of e-banking 
banks can provide services more efficiently and at substantially 
lower costs. For example, a typical customer transaction costing 
about $1 in a traditional bank branch or $0.60 through a phone call 
costs only about $0.02 online.
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Figure 2. The Cost of Transactions in Different Banking Channels [3]
According to Nsouli, electronic banking is sometimes seen as an 
opportunity for countries with underdeveloped financial systems to 
leapfrog developmental stages. Customers in such countries can 
access services more easily from banks abroad and through wireless 
communication systems, which are developing more rapidly than 
traditional *4vired” communication networks. This view finds its 
confirmation also in the research of Claessens [4]: new technology, 
including the Internet, smart cards, and the use of mobile phones 
can help broaden access to financial services.
In Crockett's view, there are good grounds for supposing that 
the Internet and financial services have unique synergies [5]: the 
Internet offers convenience, price transparency, broader access to 
information and lower cost; financial services are information­
intensive and generally require no physical delivery. E-finance has 
the potential, not only to take business away from traditional, 
“bricks-and-mortaf’ delivery systems, but also to introduce new 
business models, changing financial structure and driving financial 
consolidation.
According to Husseini, “Vital changes in terms of commu­
nications between the bank and the customer will put an end to the 
problems of place and time. Consequently, this will allow 
customers to be connected to their banking information with the 
ability to complete transactions 24/7 without visiting the branch. 
This will not only drive banking sector growth, but also the entire 
economy” [8].
Innovative Financial Services and their Risks 267
2. The Development of E-Banking from 
the Global Perspective
The two most important external factors affecting the EU banking 
environment in the next 5 to 10 years are thought to be 
technological innovations and the internationalisation of banking 
activities [11]. Technological innovations relate to the already high 
and growing importance of electronic banking services (increasing 
productivity of services) and improvements in computing 
technology and data processing (allowing refinements in risk 
pricing, the development of increasingly complex financial 
instruments and the automation of credit granting procedures).
Currently, electronic banking services are already very popular 
and widespread in most countries, albeit to different degrees 
between countries. For instance, e-banking penetration is higher in 
countries with a higher Internet penetration (see Figure 3). 
According to the ECB, e-banking is widely spread primarily in the 
Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Norway). Among 10 new 
EU Member States, Estonia seems to be the leader in the adoption 
of e-banking.
e-banking (% of popUatbn)
Figure 3. Internet and E-Banking Penetration in 2002 [11]
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The Nordic countries in general have taken the lead in electronic 
banking services. They have been in the vanguard of applying 
technology to enable their customers to handle all their banking 
services online. As a result, these banks have a very high proportion 
of Internet customers, compared with banks in most other countries 
[25]. Keenan also states that the Nordic countries are pioneering 
developments in Internet banking services [22]. They are well 
ahead of their continental rivals in terms of customer penetration 
and the services offered.
Swedish banks are among the most advanced in Internet 
banking services. All major banks in Sweden offer online status on 
accounts and other assets, online payments, and the possibility to 
buy and sell units in funds and shares. Corporate customers have 
been able to bank via the Internet for many years. In Europe 
Sweden has one of the highest proportions of the population using 
bank services through the Internet.
Which of the following means do you mostly use to contact your bank?
2004  2003
3% 1%
Figure 4. Mode of Payment in Sweden 2003-2004 [33]
The share of Swedes paying their bill through Internet has increased 
from 9 per cent in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2006 [32]. One key factor 
behind the success of online banking is that ever since the middle of 
the 1990s, Swedish banks have invested heavily in developing 
efficient, customer-friendly online banking services. Another 
important reason is the large proportion — more than 70 per cent -  
of Swedish homes with access to the Internet [Ibid]. In the Survey 
of Developments in Electronic Money and Internet and Mobile
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Payments conducted by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
in 2004 the large Internet penetration ratio is also mentioned as one 
of the reasons for a rapid adoption of Internet banking in Sweden 
[1]. According to the survey, e-banking is currently a major service 
channel used by a large share of both corporate and private custo­
mers.
In the view of the Swedish Bankers’ Association [32], 
customers who start to bank online are also proving to be more 
active as they engage in more banking transactions. The growing 
use of online banking will allow banks to replace their conventional 
branch offices with ones concentrating on advisory services and 
sales.
According to McDonald, Swedish banks had apparently reached 
the conclusion that Internet banking had improved the efficiency of 
traditional banking services, increased competition in the financial 
markets and enhanced customer satisfaction [25]. New and more 
advanced services will be delivered through combining and inte­
grating Internet, mobile banking, ATMs, digital television, 
telephone banking and the branches.
The report on Banking Technology in Finland written by the 
Finnish Bankers’ Association in 2004 states that the development 
of electronic banking in particular has improved the availability of 
banking services, and thanks to the increasing popularity of debit 
cards and Internet payments, opening hours and the number of bank 
branches have become less important [13]. Self-service and 
electronic banking are changing the nature of the branch network; it 
is focusing on more demanding banking tasks.
According to Keenan, the Finns are also considered ‘tech-saw y’ 
and responded well to technological innovations welcoming the 
benefits that they can bring to their working and domestic lives. 
Finnish banks have actively encouraged people to utilise new 
technology by making it cheaper to pay bills online and introducing 
a surcharge for cheques and other traditional banking services. The 
use of pricing as a tool for inducing bank customers to use e- 
banking is mentioned also in Jyrkönen’s research [20]. The research 
of Leinonen also indicated that in addition to customers’ own 
interest in IT technology and telecommunications, banks have been 
very effective in marketing new electronic banking services [23]. 
According to the BIS 2004 Survey, as a result of a severe banking
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crisis in Finland at the beginning of the 1990s, a number of bank 
branches collapsed and, at the same time, banks encouraged 
customers to use self-service, e.g. by pricing. The survey also 
indicated the high penetration of the Internet and mobile phones in 
Finland, which is seen as a natural reason for the development of 
many payment solutions on the basis of these channels.
The results of the Survey on Saving and Use of Credit 
conducted by the Finnish Bankers’ Association in 2005 reflect the 
change in banking habits of Finns in the last 10 years [15]. Ten 
years ago 4 per cent of Finns paid their bills mainly via the Internet. 
At the moment, for 64 per cent of Finns the most common way of 
paying the bills is via the Internet and their share has continued to 
grow. Conversely, the number of Finns who pay their bills most 
commonly at the bank branch desk has gradually declined, and 
currently is 5 per cent.
Q: W h a t is th e  m ost typical w ay  you pay  yo u r bills?
% of respondents
on the Internet (via PC)
Through ATM
Via direct debt
Through payment service with 
a service envelope
At branch in cash or by giro
By telephone
0 10 
□  1994 
И  October 2003
50 60
Щ January 2003 
□  April 2005
Figure 5. Mode of Payment in Finland 1994-2005 [15]
According to the Lindquist’s research, only 14 per cent of non-cash 
payments were in electronic form in 1987, but by 2001 this had 
risen to 83 per cent [24]. Like in the case of Finland, banks’ pricing 
policy is mentioned as one of the reasons for that change also in
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Norway. In addition, Lindquist also mentioned that the banks’ 
motivation to offer electronic payment services might be due to 
both cost-saving efforts and competition. Once the necessary 
investment is made, electronic payments cost banks much less to 
produce than paper-based payments. If customers find electronic 
payment services more convenient than paper-based services, and 
hence prefer the former, electronic payment services may be 
viewed as strategic variables in the competition for customers.
According to TNS Emor, during 2006 the number of Internet 
users has increased in all Baltic countries. The share of Internet 
users continues to be the largest in Estonia -  58% of 15-74-year- 
olds [9].
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Figure 6. The Share of Internet Users in the Baltic States 2004-2006 
(Source: TNS Emor)
Modern history of the Estonian banking industry goes back into the 
year 1988 when permission for the establishment of commercial 
banks was granted for the first time in the former Soviet Union. 
Estonia was the first country on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union where the Banking Act was enforced on December 28, 1989 
for the regulation of the activities of commercial banks [10]. 
Estonia can boast the very first Internet banking products in Eastern 
Europe. Eesti Forekspank opened its Forex Direct in May 1996 and 
Eesti Hoiupank was quick to follow with its Panganet [18]. In 
January 1998, the banks raised the service fees for cash transactions 
in order to popularise the non-cash settlement system through 
telephone, Internet and telebanking [10]. The effective use of 
pricing policy by the Estonian banks is also mentioned in the
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Hansapank’s review: according to that many banks have been 
keeping remote banking charges lower from those in the branch in 
order to attract customers to e-channels.
40 per cent of the Estonian population is using e-banking, which 
is the highest rank between 10 Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) [6]. The CEEC’s average rank was 4 per cent; 
the lowest grade was in Bulgaria where according to this survey 
only 0.2 per cent of the population used e-banking services. 72 per 
cent of Estonian enterprises with Internet access used the Internet 
for banking or financial services. The high level of e-banking in 
Estonian enterprises points to a high level of trust in banking 
services.
The BIS 2004 survey indicated that the main reason for the 
popularity of Internet banking in Estonia is its convenience and low 
cost compared to other services offered by banks. Today it is 
possible to perform almost all operations through Internet banking. 
According to the Wall Street Journal [34], in addition to the lower 
price of transactions via e-channels compared to those at bank 
branches, a rapid development of e-banking in Estonia could be 
explained by some impact of the Scandinavian ICT culture on the 
Estonian development.
According to the Bank of Estonia’s data, the number of Internet 
banking contracts during the recent years increased and by the end 
of the third quarter of 2005 amounted to over a one million [2]. At 
the same time, the number of bank offices has been rather stable.
—  POS accepting bank cards (left scale) ——  Internet banking contracts (in thousands) 
~ ~  bank offices - — * ATMs with payment function
- -  post offices PO S accepting mobile payments
Figure 7. Retail Payment Channels in Estonia (as at the end of period) 
[2]
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3. Risks of E-Banking
Although the adoption of electronic finance and other e-services 
offers emerging economies an opportunity to leapfrog, it also 
carries potential risks. Most of the crimes that exploit the 
vulnerabilities inherent in these technologies are not new -  fraud, 
theft, impersonation, denial of service, and related extortion 
demands have plagued the financial services industry for years. 
However, the widespread use of these technologies exposes users to 
crimes of greater dimensions in terms of depth and scope [17].
The flip side of the technological boom is that electronic 
banking is not only susceptible to, but may exacerbate, some of the 
same risks -  particularly governance, legal, operational, and 
reputational -  inherent in traditional banking [27]. According to 
Ramakrishnan,
e-banking does not open up new risk categories, but rather accen­
tuates the risks that any financial institution faces [28].
In Schilder’s opinion, e-banking involves several specific ope­
rational risks [30]. One operational risk mainly relates to the 
security of systems and transactions, including data confidentiality 
and authentication of the parties involved. Another operational risk 
refers to the continuous availability of the Internet as a medium for 
financial transactions. According to Schaechter, system availability 
is an essential criterion to limit operational and reputational risk for 
banks. To take full advantage of the potential benefits of e-banking 
services, systems should be available on a 24-hour basis. This 
availability is prone to serious hazards, such as computer viruses 
and hackers.
Crockett identified four risk categories associated with the 
development of e-banking [5]. First, there is the risk of strategic 
and business misjudgements. In Sergeant’s opinion, e-banking is 
relatively new on strategic risk and, as a result, there can be a lack 
of understanding among senior management about its potential and 
implications. This view is also shared by Ramakrishnan. Regarding 
business risk, Sergeant believes that taking into account the 
newness of e-banking, nobody knows much about whether e- 
banking customers will have different characteristics from the 
traditional banking customers.
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The second risk is operational, resulting from reliance on 
complex technology. One of the components of operational risk is, 
according to Sergeant, the forecasts of the potential customers’ 
volume, which in the case of e-channels have proved difficult [31]. 
Many banks going online have significantly misjudged volumes. 
When a bank has inadequate systems to cope with demand, it may 
suffer reputational and financial damage, and even compromises in 
security if extra systems that are inadequately configured or tested 
are brought online to deal with the capacity problems.
The third risk arises from legal and regulatory uncertainty in e- 
finance transactions referring in particular to the difficulty of identi­
fying the headquarters of an e-finance firm. Ramakrishnan names 
the legal and regulatory risks as a compliance risk [28]. This is the 
risk to earnings or capital arising from violations of, or non­
conformance with, laws, regulations and ethical standards. This risk 
is amplified when the customer, the bank and the transaction are in 
more than one country.
The fourth risk is systemic risk. Because financial institutions 
use similar software programs, there is a risk that many large 
institutions could be simultaneously subject to a common adverse 
shock.
According to Schaechter and Karjaluoto, security is considered 
the central operational risk of e-banking. Threats can come from 
inside and outside the system. They include unauthorized access to 
the system through, for example, “back doors”, “brute force”, 
“hijacking”, “sniffing”, or “spoofing” to retrieve and use confiden­
tial consumer information, add customer assets, subtract customer 
liabilities, or interrupt operations. Similarly, “denial of service” 
attacks and injecting a virus can disrupt services and affect integrity 
of information [29]. Schaechter viewed outsourcing as an additional 
security threat, which can also have a major impact on the data and 
system integrity and availability. Outsourcing is believed to be a 
material risk in e-banking also by Sergeant. Harald believes that the 
security of e-banking should be taken seriously in order to fight 
against cyber-crime -  especially money laundering, fraud and 
virus-terrorism [19]. According to the Finnish Bankers’ Asso­
ciation's report, banking is based on trust and therefore the security 
of services offered to customers is a cornerstone of banking 
operations [13]. In Ramakrishnan’s view, the speed of change of
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technology and the fact that the Internet channel is accessible 
universally makes the security risk especially critical.
Don't forget the human touch
Wtiat prospective online banking users are looking for, % of responses
Security warraited 
Cheaper fees than offline 
Possibility to ask questions
High quality of financial services
Detailed information on terms and 
conditions
Cheap prices of financid seivices 
Personal advice 
Contact person
I57
156 
154 
154
8esii people interested In onlne ban King. Sour t c  Fittteu & 2006 D
Figure 8. Expectations of E-Banking Customers [26]
According to Deutsche Bank Research, security is the most 
important concern for many customers. Cheaper fees and the 
possibility to ask questions are not so essential compared to the 
expected level of security in e-banking.
The problem of money laundering in e-channels is addressed by 
Schaechter and Nsouli. E-banking, in particular Internet banking, 
can potentially be misused for money laundering because of the 
lack of face-to-face contact with customers [29]. In Nsouli’s 
opinion, money laundering has been greatly facilitated by electronic 
banking because of the anonymity it affords: once a customer opens 
an account, it is impossible for banks to identify whether the 
nominal account holder is conducting a transaction or even where 
the transaction is taking place [27].
According to Sergeant, reputational risk is considerably 
heightened for banks using the Internet [31]. The Internet allows for 
the rapid dissemination of information, which means that any 
incident, either good or bad, is common knowledge within a short 
space of time.
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Jyrkönen believes that the entities developing and providing 
new payment solutions should pay adequate attention to inherent 
risks, for instance, legal and operational risks [20]. Operational 
risks include e.g. IT risks, management risks and risks related to 
criminal activities. New payment solutions are very dependent on 
technology and so there may be special IT risks.
4. Conclusions
In the author’s opinion, the most complete definition of electronic 
banking is presented in the Nsouli’s research (2002): e-banking is 
the use of electronic delivery channels for banking products and 
services and is a subset of electronic finance. The best list of e- 
banking delivery channels is presented by the European Central 
Bank (2006): electronic banking services include payment cards, 
ATMs, POS terminals, telephone and mobile phone banking, and 
Internet banking.
E-banking provides substantial benefits both for banks 
themselves and their customers. For bank clients, the main gains are 
time and cost savings. Because of tightening competition among 
banks, customers will probably get better and more efficient 
financial services. For banks, with the implementation of e-banking 
financial services can be provided more efficiently and at 
substantially lower costs. Furthermore, e-banking can help broaden 
access to financial services. The introduction of technological 
innovations in banking will not only drive banking sector growth, 
but also the entire economy.
In the next 5-10-years perspective, the two most essential 
external factors effecting the development of the EU banking sector 
are technological innovations in the light of the growing importance 
of
e-banking services as well as the internationalisation of banking 
activities.
E-banking is widely spread primarily in the Nordic countries 
(Finland, Sweden and Norway). Among 10 new EU Member 
States, Estonia seems to be the leader in the adoption of e-banking.
The main reasons for an intense use of e-banking services in the 
Nordic countries are a high penetration of the Internet and an effec-
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tive use of pricing policy by the Scandinavian banks, thus inducing 
bank customers to use e-banking channels instead of traditional 
bank branches. The reasons for a wide adoption of e-banking 
services in Estonia are mostly the same as in the Nordic countries. 
In addition, there could be some impact of the Scandinavian ICT 
culture on the rapid penetration of technological innovations in 
Estonia.
Despite undoubted benefits, the introduction of e-banking can 
also lead to potential risks. According to the results of the 
conducted research, the most important risks associated with e- 
banking are operational, legal and reputational. The major concern 
for e-banking clients is a security of e-channels.
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IN WHICH (SMEs) SHOULD BE INVESTED?
Anna Stankova
University of Economics, Prague
Abstract
There are over 15 millions unemployed people within the EU and tens 
of millions worldwide. Many scientific papers presented at the ICSB 
World Conference 2005 in Washington concluded in their findings 
that there is overall world tendency for decrease in the new start- ups. 
This tendency has been confirmed in the research studies performed 
at the European Universities as well as at the USA Universities. To 
cope with these two problems would ask for more international 
cooperation and more research in finding effective solutions. The 
SMEs perform in the same global environment as big MNC but there 
are specific problems that affect SMEs more than larger businesses.
Regardless of these barriers, SMEs represent a formidable eco­
nomic force, creating 37% GDP of the Czech Republic and providing 
employment for 60% of the labor force. There has been steady effort 
on part of the Government and the EU administration to create funds 
and subsidies to support small businesses. But which one should be 
supported? The most probable answer from the economic point of 
view would be -those having profitable performance. The traditional 
methods of rating the company’s performance have concentrated on 
measuring the benefits of cash inflows.
Some research has been undertaken at the University of Eco­
nomics, aimed at problems of entrepreneurial activities of SME. The 
first question being asked by money providers deals with efficiency of 
small businesses. Logically the effort has been directed on finding 
some general performance criteria, which would include traditional 
money values, and the new ones, such as Balance Scorecard or 
EFQM. The research project at the UEA has proven overall tendency 
to models, which are more complex and cover not only monetary 
criteria but the overall activity of the firms. The authors [5],[8], define 
development potential as a set of tangible and intangible factors
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directly influencing contemporary and the future success of a 
company. Development potential in this interpretation is a vector of 
six components describing basic areas of a company’s activities 
Strategy and Planning, Marketing, Production Processes and Product 
Development, Quality and Environment, Logistics, Managing Human 
Resources, Support of MIS for Integration of All Informational 
Activities. Within each component, six characteristics follow. The 
definition of development potential and its components was by field 
research using the structured questionnaire. A sample used in the 
research consisted of fifty companies active in different industries in 
North Moravia and five companies from the Pilsen region. Conclu­
sions presented further in this study are based on data acquired from 
fifty companies from the following industries: 13 -  rubber and 
plastics, 20 -  machinery, 12 -  steel and steel products, 5 -  mechanical 
engineering.
The development potential assessment was performed in three 
steps. In the first step, the development potential of individual compo­
nents was evaluated. In the second step, the overall assessment was 
determined and in the third step the classification of the company was 
done according to its overall assessment and put into one of the four 
categories (C, AB, В, A).
Keywords: small businesses, start ups, government support, mea­
surement of performance, development potential, product develop­
ment, venture capital
Introduction
There are over 15 millions unemployed people within the EU and 
tens of millions worldwide. Many scientific papers presented at the 
ICSB World Conference 2005 in Washington concluded in their 
findings that there is overall world tendency for decrease in the new 
start- ups. This tendency has been confirmed in the research studies 
performed at the European Universities as well as at the USA 
Universities. To cope with these two problems would ask for more 
international cooperation and more research in finding effective 
solutions. The SMEs perform in the same global environment as big 
MNC but there are specific problems that affect SMEs more than 
larger businesses:
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-  they have more difficult access to capital and conclusively 
they can't invest in technological advancement;
-  they have weaker position in acquiring state contracts;
-  they don’t have enough financial means to have top experts 
on their payrolls;
-  the system approach to a product development is not 
generally practiced;
-  they have to compete veiy often with dumping prices of 
multinational corporations;
-  they do not possess enough expertise to follow and interpret 
the impact of a steady inflow of new laws, regulations and 
prescriptions which create a difficult business environment in 
the Czech Republic. (They often have to hire a specialized 
consulting agency in order to obtain funding from the EU, 
because of complexities of the application procedure).
Regardless of these barriers, SMEs represent a formidable economic 
force, creating 37% GDP of the CR and providing employment for 
60% of the labor force. Some selected indicators can be seen in the 
Table 1.
There has been steady effort on part of the Czech Government and 
the EU administration to create funds and subsidies to support small 
businesses. See Table 2.
Corresponding to the funds provided by the EU does Czech 
Government organizes several supporting programs. Among most 
important are considered the Operational Program for Industry and 
Entrepreneurship (OPPP). It consists of the following separate parts:
-  START -  supporting the start-ups;
-  CREDIT -  providing capital for development projects 
inclusive purchase of equipment and fixed assets;
-  PROSPERITY -  co-financing creation of business centers, 
incubators and infrastructure;
-  REALITY -  aims at regeneration of industrial parks, real 
investment property etc.;
-  EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES — modernization and creation 
of informational infrastructure for educational purposes;
-  CLUSTERS -  support for networking of regional branch 
entrepreneurial groups;
In which (SMEs) should be Invested? 283
-  MARKETING -  professional advice for creation of marketing 
mix aiming at increase of international competitiveness;
-  INNOVATION -  financing of certification processes which 
lead to higher addition value of products;
-  ENERGY CONSUMPTION -  support for projects decreasing 
or supporting use of alternative sources of energy;
-  RENEWABLE RESOURCES -  projects directed to the more 
efficient use of natural resources.
The administrative processes for applying this financial means are so 
complicated and cumbersome that only a smaller part of disposable 
money reaches a broad spectrum of SME. Table 3 gives us an 
overview about the real situation.
Table 1. Number of Employees of SMEs in the Czech Republic
(The data put together from the statistics o f the Czech Ministry o f
Industry and Trade, www.mpo.cz.)
Year 2003
Number of 
Employees 
0-249
Self-
employ­
ment
Total 
SME + 
Self
The Share of 
Employees of 
SME + Self- 
employment 
on the Total 
Employed Workers
Number of 
Businesses Number Total %
Manufacturing 25 641 131 608 157 249 49,70
Construction 6 517 88 756 95 273 80,18
Wholesale & Retail 55 250 194 8 57 250 107 80,40
Groceries / 
Restaurants 4 689 47 639 52 328 89,34
Transportation 5 173 40 531 45 704 29,93
Financial 901 28 998 29 899 21,74
Services 46 691 268 791 315 482 81,45
Agriculture 3 578 39 167 42 745 85,00
Total 148 440 840 347 1 988 787 62,21
284 Anna Stankova
Financial subsidies for SME from the state budget of the C R  
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Figure 1. Financial support for SMEs from the CR state budget
(The data put together from the statistics o f the Czech Ministry of
Industry and Trade, www.mpo.cz.)
D raw ing of financial m eans w ithin the O perational P rogram m e 
Industry  and E n te rp rise  (O PtE ) between 1.7.2004 and 2.5.2006
Figure 2. Initial use of financial means provided within the frame of 
OPPP in the period of July 2004 to May 2005.
(The data put together from the statistics o f the Czech Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, www.mpo.cz.)
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Which criteria should be used in order to make the selection process 
easier? Which projects should be supported? SMEs applying for the 
state support have to fulfil special criteria along with selected 
economic criteria. Those not succeeding in getting state support have 
to turn their requests to the private capital. But capital owners require 
more sophisticated measures and guarantees before they decide to 
participate. Most new companies wither and die in their first few 
years, leaving their investors in uncertainty. There has to be expected 
profit or at least growing potential in the project. The search was 
never easy. Once, business would have turned to venture capitalists, 
who invest money in return for a stake in the enterprise. But many are 
no longer interested in deals unless they are persuaded that it creates 
high added value. Even traditional providers of capital for start ups 
(“three FS”) -  family, friends and fools would hesitate in investment 
that does not generate return on invested money. And the alternative 
source -  business angels- is almost unknown option in the transition 
economies. The most probable answer from the economic point of 
view would be -  support those projects promising profitable perfor­
mance.
1. The measurement of performance of a company
The traditional methods of rating the company’s performance have 
concentrated on measuring the benefits of cash inflows rather than 
providing an answer to the above-mentioned questions. The re­
searchers at the East Anglia University [1] have undertaken a study to 
analyze the ways academic scholars analyze organizational perfor­
mance or organizational effectiveness. The research study included 
149 publications, published in the past decade. Out of 149, (100) 
dealt with business organizations, (21) with nonprofit organizations 
and a mix of (28) covered both activities. Independently on the type 
of an organization overlapping common ground issues include:
a) Efficiency and / or productivity,
b) Growth and / or market share
c) Customer orientation and
d) Quality
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The most frequent criteria utilized in 149 papers can be seen in the 
Table 2.
Table 2. Common Criteria for B, Mx and NPO.
Business Mixed NPO
Efficiency and / or productivity 36 16 10
Sales (total or per worker) 43 4 7
Profitability and / or shareholder return 37 11 0
Financial success 51 10 3
Employee satisfaction / Participation 20 13 7
Growth and / or market share 23 11 6
Customer orientation 25 13 7
Public image, goodwill, and / or 
reputation 4 4 7
Quality and / or product 
-  Service quality 25 10 8
Social performance 0 0 7
В = for-profit, Mx = mix o f  both activities, NPO = nonprofit organization
The most frequently mentioned criterion for the В set was -  financial 
success, for Mx and NPO quite logically -  efficiency / or produc­
tivity. To cope with the diversified requirements for measurement of 
companies’ performance have led to the development and proposal of 
new models such as the Balanced Scorecard [2], and also using the 
European model of E F Q M - European Foundation for Quality 
Management [3] and have therefore created a new paradigm for the 
measurement of performance. Some research has been undertaken at 
the University of Economics, aimed at problems of entrepreneurial 
activities of SME. The first question being asked by money providers 
deals with efficiency of small businesses. Logically the effort has 
been directed on finding some general performance criteria, which 
would include traditional money values, and the new ones, such as 
included in Balance Scorecard or EFQM. The research project at the 
UEA has proven overall tendency to models, which are more 
complex and cover not only monetary criteria but the overall activity 
of the firms.
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2. The First Experimental Research [4], 
Using EFQM -  Small Sample
For the first pilot study project the EFQM model was used and a
sample of two companies was acquired for implementation. (The
short description of the EFQM follows).
1. Leadership (100 points) -  mission, ethical code of behavior, dele­
gation of authority, structure, relationship with customers, perfor­
mance appraisal.
2. Policies & Strategy (90 points) -  how the strategy was imple­
mented. The overall work for supporting the information system. 
Effectiveness of market research and its use for market prognosis 
and consumer behavior. Internal reporting system and its organi­
zation.
3. Human Resources (90 points) -  planning, recruiting and skills 
development of employees.
4. Partnership & Resources (90 points) -  partnership with suppliers 
and community. Effective use of financial resources, financial 
strategy, investment in technology, R&D.
5. Processes (140 points) -  how well are the main processes organi­
zed? The detailed description of processes, parameterization of 
processes and its outputs. ISO 9001. Services and customers.
6. Customer Satisfaction (200 points) -  quality, safety and reliability 
of a firm’s product, customer loyalty, CRM.
7. Results Concerning Employees (90 points) -  motivation and 
transparent options for promotion. Performance appraisal of indi­
vidual’s effort. Working environment
8. Results Concerning Social Responsibility (60 points) -  image in 
the public, corporate social responsibility, environmental protec­
tion.
9. Performance and Results (150 points) -  summarization of key 
results covering:
-  Financial performance i.e., cash flow, liquidity, EPS, sales, 
revenues, net profit,
-  Intangibles, expertise, knowledge -  based progress etc.
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Target Company: AXIS Ltd.
Axis Ltd. is a company well established on the Czech market, 
belonging to the SME group, producing a broad spectrum o f steel 
products -  production o f steel constructions, technological facilities, 
high pressure pots, reconstruction o f machinery equipment, assembly 
o f gas equipment, machine tool shaping etc.
The company was subject to a certification process in 1999 
according to ISO 9001 norm, and gained the corresponding certi­
ficate. This research study has made use o f a standardized question­
naire o f EFQM, recommended by National Centre for Quality. The 
questionnaire consisted o f fifty questions, which were to be answered 
using a self-assessment procedure. The answers had to follow four 
grade evaluations:
A. Fully accomplished -  excellent process or result, fully 
implemented.
B. Considerable progress -  giving enough space for improvement.
C. Moderate progress -  needs further research. Bringing good results 
if  implemented.
D. There are no measurable results. There are some good ideas which 
were not seriously reviewed or practiced.
The self-assessment process has been implemented at the top and 
middle management levels o f the company. The results o f the overall 
evaluation can be seen on figure 3.
□  S co red  P o in ts  В  Maximum poin ts
Figure 3. AXIS -  Assessment According 9 Criteria o f EFQM
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Conclusions
Managers o f AXIS have to direct their attention to the improvement 
of customer satisfaction or to implement a system o f CRM. The next 
recommendation would be to pay more attention to create a clear and 
effective strategy concerning main firm processes.
3. Development Potential of a Company, 
an Alternative Approach to Measurement 
of Successful Performance
The authors [5],[8], define development potential as a set o f tangible 
and intangible factors directly influencing contemporaiy and the 
future success of a company. Development potential in this inter­
pretation is a vector o f six components describing basic areas o f a 
company’s activities. Within each component, six characteristics 
follow. The model had been originally developed at the University o f 
West Bohemia in the U-SME innovation project, supported by the 
Leonardo da Vinci programme of the EU [6]. The definition o f 
development potential and its components was followed by field 
research using the structured questionnaire. A sample used in the 
research consisted of fifty companies active in different industries in 
North Moravia and five companies from the Pilsen region. The 
Faculty of Management o f Tomäš Bafa University in Zlin performed 
Field research in North Moravia in the second quarter o f 2002 [6] and 
it was continued by the collection o f data from more companies in 
both regions. Conclusions presented in this study are based on data 
acquired from fifty companies from the following industries: 13 -  
rubber and plastics, 20 -  machinery, 12 -  steel and steel products, 5 -  
mechanical engineering. For the description o f DP have been used the 
following components:
• Strategy and Planning: strategic control system, mission and 
vision of a company. Awareness and sharing a vision by 
employees.
• Marketing: marketing costs can be today as high as 50% of total 
expenses. It is traditionally the weakest point o f many Czech 
companies. The following factors were subject to analysis: market 
research, market positioning, competitor’s analysis, and 
advertising.
3
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• Production Processes and Technology: does the company follow 
its competitors or does it set up a trend? Is there an internal 
innovation centre, or does the firm make use o f licenses? How is 
the innovation process organized? How is the technological 
development and its applications in products and production 
processes implemented? Although innovation is a central issue 
discussed in connection with the development potential, inno­
vation itself is not a goal, but only a tool in achieving company 
goals.
• Quality and Environment: these are assessed in relation to EN 
ISO standards. Quality goals are measurable and consistent with 
the quality strategy. From a microeconomic point o f view, the 
environment is treated as a public good or negative externality.
• Logistics: (Supply Chain Management) -  complete system of 
planning, organizing, realizing and controlling the flow of goods. 
The role o f outsourcing and its impact on lowering (increasing) 
costs.
• Managing Human Resources. Support o f MIS for Integration 
o f All Informational Activities i.e. approaches to information 
processing and use o f Internet technologies. Motivational systems, 
learning processes, company culture and knowledgeable manage­
ment.
The development potential assessment was performed in three steps. 
In the first step, the development potential o f individual components 
was evaluated. In the second step, the overall assessment was 
determined and in the third step the classification o f the company was 
done according to its overall assessment and put into one of the four 
categories (C, AB, В, A). The classification o f companies into the 
corresponding categories was done according to a set o f European 
Standards -  EN ISO 9000:2000, which specifies the rules and system 
terminologies and on the British norm BS 7000-1:1999, providing a 
manual for management o f development processes and innovations in 
long time periods. The classifications o f companies according to their 
development potential are shown in the following (Table 3.)
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Table 3. The Classification of Companies According to their Develop­
ment Potential
Evaluation of Develop­
ment Potential
Type of Company according to its 
Development Potential
1 .00-1.49 С
1.50-2.49 AB
2.50-3.49 В
3.50-4.00 A
Companies classified as С are not ready to implement development 
activities, to improve their performance and to better satisfy their 
customers. If  they want to develop, they should first implement 
fundamental changes in their organization and other basic company 
processes. Companies classified as AB are prepared to complete 
changes necessary for improving their performance, but must 
consistently improve their basic processes. M anagement training can 
help to achieve long-term goals. Companies classified as В can 
employ and further develop their potential and they are prepared to 
undergo a certification process according to corresponding ISO 
standards. Class A includes companies with the highest development 
potential, highly competitive, high performers successful in mid- and 
long-term horizon. Nine o f these companies were classified as AB, 
twenty-seven as B, fourteen as A. There was no company classified 
as C. The total average achieved in the four-point scale was 3.06. The 
results were processed using one- and multi-dimensional statistical 
analysis.
Multidimensional Regression Analysis
In multidimensional regression analysis, the development potential 
was treated as a dependent variable, while its components were 
treated as independent variables. The resulting regression model had 
the following form:
DP = -  0.0037 + 0.1809 * Quality and environment 
+ 0.1683 * Logistics 
+ 0.1938 * Marketing
+ 0.1488 * Information systems and human resources 
+ 0.1775 * Strategy and planning 
+ 0.1305 * Production processes and technology
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Conclusions
The development potential includes factors which can be influenced 
by the company owners and managers. They had a considerable effect 
on the financial performance and correlate with value creation. 
Although marketing is the most sensitive factor, its values in the 
sample were the lowest. It confirms the general experience, that 
Czech companies generally have a lack o f marketing expertise and do 
not collect information about customer’s behavior. (Confirmed also 
by conclusions o f the AXIS case). Production processes and the 
technologies components achieve the highest values. For firms in the 
sample this component is o f the highest importance. It was demonst­
rated that this component provides the best one-component estimate 
o f the total development potential and its correlation with ROE is the 
strongest. Companies having leading positions in technology and 
having high quality products attract employees and satisfy their 
custom er’s needs. Strategy and planning component significantly 
influences classification o f the companies according to their deve­
lopment potential, but its explaining power is low. It confirms that the 
dependence between the performance measurement and the strategy 
is rather weak. Correlation analysis has proven to be a both-sided 
statistical dependence between the development potential and ROE. It 
indicates that, when DP is growing, the value o f the invested capital 
by company owners is also growing. The results had demonstrated 
that the company with a higher DP has the potential to satisfy its 
customers, owners and other stakeholders. Finally, an important 
precondition for implementation o f the DP assessment procedure is 
the understanding, learning and willingness o f companies’ manage­
ment to practice it.
The Development Potential o f Czech SME -  Enlarged Sample
Enlarged Sample o f  SMEs and their characteristics: The sample 
consisted o f 95 SMEs [7], which were described by following 
characteristics:
Number o f Employees:
a) 1-9 ( 32 % o f the sample)
b) 10-49 ( 32 % o f  the sample)
c) 50-250 (31 %)
d) N/A (5 %)
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Sales in 2002:
e) a) < 250 mil. Czech crowns (69%)
f) b) 250-1.450 mil (14%)
g) c) more ( 16%)
h) d) N/A (1%)
SME by Industry:
i) Retailing 
j) Services 
k) Building
1) Machinery
m) Electronics
n) Metal industry
o) Chemical and pharmaceutical
p) Food and beverages
q) Agriculture
r) Power engineering
s) Wood processing
t) Textile and clothing industry
u) Transportation
v) Insurance
w) Other
x) N/A- not filled in ( or performing more different activities)
25,0%
20 ,0%
15,0%
10,0%
5,0%
0,0% ......................... IL,
ъ ъ  о Ъ <г> Ч o> 4 \  ч- 4 <S4 < > o . \ V '  
Figure 3. SME by Industry
Production Is Aimed at:
y) Domestic market (56%) 
z) International market (0%)
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aa)Both (43%) 
bb)N/A (1%)
The Evaluation o f Development Potential o f Czech SME -  Enlar­
ged Sample
In the third stage the same questionnaire was used to examine 95 
SMEs (heterogeneous group). The same six characteristics corres­
pond with categories used in the second research study were chosen.
Conclusions
The last phase o f research is still taking place, so we can make some 
preliminary conclusions. The same questionnaire has been used as in 
the previous stages as well as the same self assessment technique, so 
the conclusions are fully comparable. It gives us a sample of 145 
SMEs covering a broad spectrum of companies. The latest evaluation 
has brought evidence that more than 50% o f the companies do not 
create any vision and corresponding strategy (though we have proven 
that the dependence between performance measurement and the 
strategy is rather weak). More than 30% do not perform marketing 
activities and do not practice CRM. Almost 50% of sample 
companies produce using licenses or copying products. Only 50% of 
companies make use o f their own R&D for the products innovations. 
Just 28% underwent certification processes, 70% do not create 
integrated supply chains and logistic processes and almost 50% of the 
companies do not have MIS integrated. The motivational systems are 
not satisfactorily composed. This set o f preliminary conclusions gives 
us a clear direction o f how can we proceed with further research in 
order to help SME in the Czech Republic to increase its compe­
titiveness within the EU.
4. Challenges for future research
• HOW  TO IMPROVE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT?
The presented research findings gained by a team o f EUP have been 
supported by similar research performed under auspices o f Czech 
Statistical Office in 2003. It has proven the low innovation potential 
o f  Czech companies and especially SMEs. The new models and ways
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for product development become the top priority for the management 
if they are to be successful on the highly competitive global market o f 
the EU.
Figure 4. Innovation activities of companies expressed as % of sales 
from innovated products on the company sales in 2002-2003.
• THE PSYCHOLOGIAL FACTORS AND PERSONAL  
ATTRIBUTES NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL M ANA­
GEMENT OF SME.
The Czech Business Schools will have to focus on the development 
of more courses, focused on entrepreneurship.
Conclusions
The development potential includes factors, which can be influenced 
by the company owners and managers. They had a considerable effect 
on the financial performance and correlate with value creation. 
Although marketing is the most sensitive factor, its values in the 
sample were the lowest. It confirms the general experience, that 
Czech companies generally have a lack of marketing expertise and do 
not collect information about customer’s behavior. Production 
processes and the technologies components achieve the highest 
values. For firms in the sample this component is o f the highest 
importance. It was demonstrated that this component provides the
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best one-component estimate o f the total development potential and 
its correlation with ROE is the strongest. Companies having leading 
positions in technology and having high quality products attract 
employees and satisfy their customer’s needs. The presented research 
findings gained by a team o f EUP have been supported by similar 
research performed under auspices o f Czech Statistical Office in 
2003. It has proven the low innovation potential o f Czech companies 
and especially SMEs. The new models and ways for product deve­
lopment become the top priority for the management if they are to be 
successful on the highly competitive global market o f the EU.
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CORPORATE CAPITAL AND 
ITS STRUCTURE IN LATVIA
Elvira Zelgalve
University of Latvia
Abstract
The paper summarizes the results of the research on the structural 
change trends of the capital involved in the business of Latvia. The 
obtained results have been compared to the dynamics of the change in 
the corporate capital structure in Estonia and Lithuania. The change 
in the capital structure has also been studied in the cross-section of 
the branches of national economy. Based on the study the author 
concludes that over 10 years the capital structure in the business of 
Latvia has changed in accordance with the rules of market economy.
Keywords: equity, borrowed capital, return on equity, return on 
assets
The development o f efficient structure o f the sources o f funds for 
financing the necessary volumes o f expenses and ensuring the 
desirable level o f income is considered the key problem of financial 
management. The more efficiently the capital structure is chosen the 
more successfully the business will be able to operate.
The important role o f the capital structure in the context of 
corporate management and the fact that in Latvia, unlike the countries 
with a well-developed market economy, the practical research on 
capital structure and its influence on business are not yet sufficiently 
made provide that the topicality o f  the theme o f the paper does not 
limit itself to the author’s personal interest in the funding policy of 
Latvian businesses.
Thus the aim of the paper is to cariy out the analysis of the 
structure o f the capital involved in business in Latvia to make
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conclusions on the situation that has developed as well as design 
recommendations based on the research that would facilitate adoption 
of rational decisions on financing a business.
For dealing with the tasks o f the paper the author has used the 
methods o f economic and statistic analysis. Thus the author has 
compared and grouped data as well as calculated the necessary 
financial indicators and relative amounts to ensure that the obtained 
results would as precisely as possible establish the existing situation. 
For better perception the author has also applied some graphical 
methods.
The regularities o f the economic theory as well as empirical 
observations on corporate capital dynamics suggest that along with 
the increasingly huger development volumes the proportion o f  the 
borrowed capital in the assets increases. A similar trend can be seen 
in Latvia. Over 10 years the corporate capital structure has changed in 
accordance with the rules dictated by market economy. Thus at the 
beginning of the period -  in 1995 assets were dominated by equity, 
however at the moment the situation is completely opposite -assets 
are dominated by borrowed capital. This is due to the fact that over 
all these years, i.e., in the period from 1995 to 2004 borrowed capital 
was being drawn in funding business activity much faster than equity. 
As it can be seen in table 1, in 2004 in comparison to the beginning o f 
the period of study equity has more than doubled, however, the 
dynamics of the borrowed capital is still more rapid -  in 2004, 
compared to 1995, it has increased 4.4 times.
The diverse growth dynamics o f equity and borrowed capital has 
changed their proportion in assets as well. In the period from 1995 to
2004 in Latvia the proportion o f the borrowed capital in assets has 
increased from 43.6% to 59.1% which happened on the account o f 
equity decrease -  in the period of study it fell from 56.4% to 40.9% 
(table 2).
The point of change can be considered to be year 1998 when 
borrowed capital started to dominate the corporate capital structure 
(see figure 1).
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Table 1. Dynamics o f equity and borrowed capital in Latvia from 1995 
to 2004 [2-11]
Year Equity Borrowed capital
mln
LVL
% to 
01.01.2005
% to the 
previous 
year
mln
LVL
% to 
01.01.2005
% to the 
previous 
year
1995 2362.6 100.0 - 1826.8 100 —
1996 2329.1 98.6 98.6 2214.5 121.2 121.2
1997 2850.4 120.6 122.4 2695.4 147.5 121.7
1998 3391.3 143.5 119.0 3438.7 188.2 127.6
1999 3491.5 147.8 103.0 3742.8 204.9 108.8
2000 3571.3 151.2 102.3 4472.8 244.8 119.5
2001 3827.9 162.0 107,2 4923.5 269.5 110.1
2002 4121.0 174.4 107.7 5331.1 291.8 108.3
2003 4849.8 205.3 117.7 6346.2 347.4 119.0
2004 5524.3 233.8 113.9 7969.1 436.2 125.6
Table 2. Proportion of equity and borrowed capital in the assets in Latvia 
in the period from 1995 to 2004. [2-11]
Year Proportion of equity in the 
assets, %
Proportion of borrowed 
capital in the assets, %
1995 56.4 43.6
1996 51.3 48.7
1997 51.4 48.6
1998 49.7 50.3
1999 48.3 51.7
2000 44.4 55.6
2001 43.7 56.3
2002 43.6 56.4
2003 43.3 56.7
2004 40.9 59.1
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D ynam ics o f equity and borrowed capital
------ P ro p o rtio n  o f
equity in the  
assets 
-A— P ro p o rtio n  o f  
borrow ed capital 
in th e  assets
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 Year
Figure 1. Dynamics of equity and borrowed capital in the percentage of 
the assets in Latvia from 1995 to 2004. [2-11]
From the theoretical point o f view if borrowed capital is available to 
businesses in a sufficient amount and for a smaller price than equity 
the growth of the proportion o f borrowed capital makes a positive 
impact on the process o f business development. The application o f 
borrowed capital also assists in maximizing the business owners’ 
wealth under the condition that the return on assets exceeds the 
average interest rate on loans.
Based on the capital structure change trends described above it is 
important to establish whether the corporate decisions on raising 
borrowed capital have been well-grounded from the economic point 
of view, i.e., whether they have been based on skilful usage o f the 
effect of financial leverage, or they have just been led by the need o f 
capital for further provision for their operation and the availability o f 
funds in the financial market disregarding the probability that the 
using of borrowed capital costs more than the business ability to earn. 
To find this out it is possible to calculate and compare the return on 
equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). To determine ROA it is 
recommended to use the calculation method that implies referring the 
after-tax profit of the year of account and the interest paid for using 
borrowed capital to the average capital (assets) of the period. 
However, ROE is determined as a proportion between net profit and 
the average amount o f equity. The calculations on ROA and ROE in 
Latvia are summed up in table 3.
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Table 3. Return on assets and equity involved in business in Latvia from 
1995 to 2004.
Period ROA, % ROE, %
1995 1.3 -1.2
1996 0.9 -2.1
1997 4.8 5.6
1998 4.0 3.4
1999 3.5 2.4
2000 3.6 2.7
2001 4.9 5.9
2002 4.7 5.7
2003 5.5 7.9
2004 7.6 13.2
It must be concluded that in the period o f study the dynamics of the 
return change indicators was rather irregular, although a growth trend 
could be observed. In the period from 1995 to 2004 ROE had 
fluctuated in the range from -2 .1%  to 13.2%, however ROA had 
fluctuated in the range from 0.9% to 7.6%. In essence ROA shows the 
amount o f profit gained per one lat o f assets (investments). In our 
case if  we take year 2004 as an example we can conclude that 
businesses have gained in average 7.6 santims o f profit per one lat of 
capital. However ROE allows for determining the efficiency of using 
the capital invested by the business owners. From owner point of 
view this is the most important return indicator. It shows how much 
profit has been gained per 1 lat invested in the company by owners. 
Thus, for example, in 2004 in average among businesses per 1 lat 
invested by owners the profit o f  13.2 santims was gained.
More intensive involvement o f borrowed capital in funding 
business in Latvia has been economically justified over last four years 
o f the study (2001 -  2004) when ROE exceeded ROA that essentially 
means that in the years with such performance indicators business 
owners earn on the account o f creditors.
The periods when ROE has been lower than ROA suggest that 
borrowed capital has been so expensive that businesses have had to 
pay interest not just from the profit brought by the borrowed capital, 
but also to channel a part o f profit provided by equity for this 
purpose. At the beginning o f the period o f study -  in year 1995 and 
1996 — ROE was even negative which means that businesses have
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worked with losses -  in this case it is impossible to speak about 
efficient use o f capital.
However there is likelihood that in the period till 2001 the use o f 
borrowed capital was favourable from the economic point o f view, 
taking into account that among Latvian businesses there was a trend 
observed to decrease the reported profit. A bigger actual profit would 
increase the return as well as change the proportion between ROA 
and ROE in favour o f the latter.
Estonia and Lithuania are the countries Latvia has particular 
relations with which are based on common historic experience and 
culture heritage. Namely for this reason the author has chosen the 
corporate capital structure o f these countries to be compared to 
Latvia.
The amount o f the capital used in business in Estonia and 
Lithuania, like in Latvia, is increased year by year that suggests 
business development. From table 4 it can be concluded that the 
growth rate of borrowed and equity capital in the Baltic States is 
rather similar in the percentage. A difference can be seen in the fact 
that over all the period o f study the growth rate o f  borrowed capital in 
Latvia has exceeded the growth rate o f equity capital, which cannot 
be said about the two other countries. In Estonia the drawing o f 
borrowed capital in funding business has been very rapid in some 
years, like 1997 and 2004, however in other ones it has been slower. 
What concerns Lithuania, it is generally difficult to judge about 
capital changes there as the data collected by the Statistics 
Department of Lithuania cover the period from 2000 to 2003 which is 
too short and cannot serve as a basis for general conclusions.
A certain similarity in the dynamics of the Baltic States capital can 
be seen at the end o f 1990s when a sharp fall o f the equity and 
borrowed capital growth was observed. Such a trend could be 
explained by the fact that after August 1998 when a strong influence 
of the Russian crisis was felt in the Baltic region the production and 
service delivery volumes o f many businesses significantly shrunk and 
some business people were even forced to discontinue their business. 
Along with that the need for raising additional capital in some places 
automatically disappeared.
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Table 4. Dynamics of Equity and Borrowed Capital in the three Baltic 
States from 1995 to 2004 [2—11 ;22,1; 23,1
Year Equity capital in percentage to 
the previous year
Borrowed capital in per­
centage to the previous year
Latvia Estonia Lithuania Latvia Estonia Lithuania
1995
1996 98.6 - 121.2 -
1997 122.4 128.5 121.7 145.6
1998 119.0 135.1 127.6 117.5
1999 103.0 112.5 108.8 107.7
2000 102.3 122.1 - 119.5 111.3
2001 107.2 112.7 102.4 110.1 116.8 106.7
2002 107.7 116.2 112.7 108.3 111.3 106.4
2003 117.7 127.1 108.4 119.0 112.2 110.8
2004 113.9 128.7 125.6 129.4
Considering the change trends o f business capital all three Baltic 
States demonstrate significantly high business capital growth rates. 
However o f our interest might be the impact o f the growth rate on the 
mutual structure o f the proportion o f equity and borrowed capital in 
assets (see table 5).
Table 5. Proportion of equity and borrowed capital in assets in Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania from 1995 to 2004, %. [2-11; 22,1; 23,1]
Year Proportion o f equity 
in assets, %
Proportion of borrowed 
capital in assets, %
Latvia Estonia Lithuania Latvia Estonia Lithuania
1995 56.4 43.6
1996 51.3 43.5 48.7 56.5
1997 51.4 40.5 48.6 59.5
1998 49.7 43.9 50.3 56.1
1999 48.3 45.0 51.7 55.0
2000 44.4 47.3 54.1 55.6 52.7 45.9
2001 43.7 46.4 53.1 56.3 53.6 46.9
2002 43.6 47.4 54.5 56.4 52.6 45.5
2003 43.3 50.6 53.9 56.7 49.4 46.1
2004 40.9 50.4 59.1 49.6
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As it can be see from data in table 5, in Estonia the proportion o f 
equity capital in total assets has increased by 6.9 percentage points 
over nine years. Moreover, starting from year 2003 it gained the 
dominating role in the corporate capital structure (see figure 2). Also 
the Lithuanians, unlike the Latvians, prefer equity rather than 
borrowed capital in financing their business. However, it would be 
too early to conclude that the use o f the borrowed capital has been 
insufficiently active and the corporate capital structure has not corres­
ponded to the rules o f market economy in Estonia and Lithuania over 
these years.
Dynamics of equity and borrowed capital
t * - * - * —-k A к  ±  A A
equity in the 
assets
A 1 Proportion of 
borrowed capital 
in the assets
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 y e a r
Figure 2. Dynamics of equity and borrowed capital in percentage of 
assets in Estonia from 1996 to 2004. [22.1 ]
The Author believes that the rapid involvement o f equity capital in 
funding business in the neighbouring countries o f Latvia has been 
facilitated by the following factors:
Firstly, stock market turnover. It must be said that in the period 
from 1997 to 2005 the biggest activity was observed in the Estonian 
stock market (figure 3). In 2005 the average daily turnover in the 
Tallinn Stock Exchange reached 7.6 mln euro thus exceeding the 
respective level of Riga Stock Exchange 25 times. According to some 
Latvian experts the activity in the stock market of Latvia is 
approaching zero.
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Figure 3. Average daily turnover in Tallinn, Vilnius and Riga Stock 
Exchanges in the period from 1996 to 2005. [19,1]
The growing trade in Tallinn and Vilnius Stock Exchanges signi­
ficantly enlarges the possibilities o f domestic and foreign investors 
thus creating objective grounds for the growth o f the proportion of 
equity capital in the corporate assets.
Secondly, direct foreign investments. According to the 
international terminology direct investments are investments of the 
resident o f one country (direct investor) in a company of other 
country (direct investment company) if the resident’s participation in 
the company equity is 10% and more. Direct foreign investments 
include investments in the equity o f the businesses registered in the 
particular country, reinvested profit as well as investments in other 
capital o f the businesses [13,1]. According to this definition the 
inflow of the direct foreign investment in the country increases the 
volume of the equity capital involved in business.
At the moment the direct investments invested in Latvia have 
reached approximately 4bln euros, however in Latvia and Estonia the 
figure is still bigger -  respectively 10.37 and 5.45 bln euros. In 
Estonia the comparatively higher level o f direct investments accounts 
for the investors o f Sweden and Finland. As Estonia is closer to
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Scandinavian countries both geographically and from the point o f 
view of culture than Latvia and Lithuania the investments from the 
investors o f these countries are first directed to Estonia and only after 
that to other Baltic States.
The above mentioned makes us conclude that the domination o f 
equity capital in the corporate capital structure in Estonia and 
Lithuania has rather been created by the factors o f indirect influence 
rather than intentional action o f the business people.
Based on the capital structure dynamics in the Baltic States 
examined above it is important to find out whether the decisions o f 
business people on raising equity and borrowed capital have 
motivated from the economic point o f view. A good business 
performance indicator is represented by its profit. When comparing 
ROE indicators in Latvia and its neighbouring countries it is possible 
to tell to whom the invested resources have brought more benefit. 
ROE is summed up in table and illustrated in figure 4.
Table 6. Return on equity capital drawn in business in Latvia, Estonia 
and Lithuania in the period from 1995 to 2004. [2-11; 22,1; 23,1]
Period
Return on Equity. %
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
1995 -1.2
1996 -2.1 3.4
1997 5.6 8.6
1998 3.4 3.8
1999 2.4 -0.3
2000 2.7 15.0 -0.4
2001 5.9 12.9 0.6
2002 5.7 18.8 4.5
2003 7.9 19.4 6.6
2004 13.2 1 19.1
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Return on Equity
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
25 Year
20
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Figure 4. Dynamics of return on equity in the three Baltic States from 
1995 to 2004. [2-11; 22,1; 23,1]
As it can be seen in the period since 1996 the ROE of Estonian 
businesses in comparison to those o f Latvia and Lithuania has been 
higher with the exception o f year 1999 -  the Estonians have used 
their invested equity capital much more effectively than the Latvians 
and Lithuanians. If  in Latvia ROE fluctuated in a small range, not 
exceeding the 7% barrier, then in 2003 in Estonia it reached 19.4 %, 
which is an appreciable indicator. In Latvia ROE was neither 
particularly high, not low in the period o f study, however, in 2004 it 
grew to 13.2 thus exceeding the most optimistic forecasts.
The author concludes that Estonian businesses are still far ahead 
those o f Latvia and Lithuanian in the efficient management of the 
capital needed for business.
For the purposes o f further analysis o f the corporate capital 
structure the information was used on the cross-section of the most 
important branches o f economy in Latvia. The selection criterion 
used was the balance sheet value o f the assets o f every particular 
branch that in the author’s opinion indicates at the importance of the 
given branch in the national economy. Out o f the 15 branches 
indicated in the data collections o f the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
the Republic o f Latvia the biggest ones are [11]:
1. trade;
2. commercial services;
3. processing industry;
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4. transport, storage and communication;
5. electric energy; gas and water supply;
6. financial mediation;
7. building;
8. agriculture.
At the end o f 2004 the value o f equity capital in the liabilities o f 
business balance sheer reached its historic mark o f 5524.3 mln lats 
(see table 1). In 2004 the growth o f equity capital could be seen in all 
analyzed branches o f economy with the exception o f transport, 
storage and communication where its volume decreased from 1268.8 
to 1146.5 mln lats over one year (figure 5), however at the end o f the 
period of study it was one o f the highest. Similarly this source o f 
funding operation resources was also actively used in the branches o f 
commercial services and processing industry.
Equity
1600
Figure 5. Volume of equity capital of Latvian businesses over branches 
of economy at the end of 2003 and 2004.[10—11]
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Concerning the percentage relation o f equity and borrowed capital in 
the total liabilities o f Latvian businesses it must be pointed out that 
lately a decreasing trend o f equity capital is observed as its growth 
rate significantly falls back to that o f the borrowed funds. In the 
period from 31 December, 2003 to 31 December, 2004 the proportion 
o f equity capital significantly decreased in such branches as transport, 
storage and communication -  by 4.2 percentage points and in 
building by 4.0 percentage points (table 7). Overall only in three 
branches -  electric energy, gas and water supply; transport, storage 
and communication as well as commercial services -  the proportion 
o f equity capital exceeded the margin o f 50% in total liabilities at the 
end o f 2004. This is certainly to be considered a positive fact as the 
pay-off period o f investments in these branches is rather long. In the 
rest o f branches the proportion o f the borrowed capital and its volume 
in absolute terms exceeded those o f equity capital several times.
Table 7. Proportion of equity capital in the liabilities structure of Latvian 
businesses in branches as to the end of 2003 and 2004 [10-11]
Branch
Proportion of equity 
capital, %
Change of 
equity capital 
proportion, %End 2003 End 2004
Agriculture 47.6 46.7 -0.9
Processing industry 43.9 42.0 -1.9
Electric energy, gas and 
water supply
59.4 61.4 2.0
Building 33.4 29.4 -4.0
Trade 21.2 21.0 -0.2
Transport, storage and 
communication
61.8 57.6 -4.2
Financial mediation 16.1 16.7 0.6
Commercial services 52.0 50.5 -1.5
The big proportion o f equity capital in the processing industry as well 
as in transport, storage and communication can be explained by the 
fact that businesses o f these branches unwillingly draw in borrowed 
capital in large volumes and as a result they need large equity capital. 
Uncertainty that exists in these branches with a cyclical operation 
character as well as their uninterrupted orientation to research work, 
high proportion o f fixed assets in assets and slow turnover o f current
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assets serve as basis for the increased proportion o f equity capital in 
the assets. That is the reason why the increasing o f borrowed capital 
is risky for these businesses and consequently not useful.
It is important to establish not only the amount and proportion o f 
equity in assets used in Latvia, but also the effectiveness o f using it. 
However, after the survey o f the Latvian branches o f economy we 
must conclude that ROE is very uneven over branches. When 
comparing the ROE o f the analyzed branches the calculation results 
obtained provide the following picture -  in all the period o f study in 
Latvian economy only the branch o f building has been able to 
maintain a positive return (table 8).
Table 8. Profitability of equity of Latvian businesses in branch cross- 
section from 1995 to 2004. [2-11]
Branch 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Agriculture -3 .1 -6 .4 -0 .5 -4 .4 -1 0 .8 6.9 6.3 12. 26.9 35.0
Processing
industry
-9 .5 -7 .9 3.9 -8 .3 -5 .1 -1 .9 2.4 7.1 7.6 8.4
Electric 
energy, gas 
and water 
supply
4.9 -2 .9 8.1 17.8 3.5 -6 .0 10.1 5.2 1.8 7.0
Building 8.4 16.6 23.1 31.6 22.6 15.5 13.2 12.9 18.6 21.6
Trade 9.0 12.3 12.4 12.2 7.0 -1 .1 2.2 4.4 10.4 19.1
Transport
and
communicati
on
1.6 -2 .3 6.7 4.1 8.8 9.7 10.6 8.6 9.0 14.1
Financial
mediation
-5 .5 3.2 -1 .4 3.6 21.9 5.5 11.2 17.8 15.9 17.3
Commercial
services
-1 .7 - 0 , 0.4 0.9 0.5 -2 .1 4.0 -0 .4 4.8 13.4
Good equity return results have also been demonstrated by trade; 
transport, storage and communication; electric energy, gas and water 
supply as well as financial mediation branches. Agriculture and 
processing industry had to be assessed particularly negatively 
according to the ROE in the first half of the period. In year 1999 of 
the study period the financial return of agriculture reached its 
maximal negative value -  minus 10.8%. It means that every invested
312 Elvira Zelgalve
lat o f equity created the loss o f 11 santims. However in recent time 
the ROE o f the agriculture branch has significantly improved. In 2004 
it reached even 35.0 points which is the highest return value among 
the eight branches up to now.
For funding their assets businesses used not only the equity 
capital, but also borrowed funds, which in 2004 reached 7969.1 mln 
lats and exceeded at this the volume of equity capital by 2444.8 mln 
lats. This lets us argue that in Latvian businesses the main role is 
given to external funding sources. In 2004 the growth o f borrowed 
capital was seen in all branches o f agriculture (figure 6). In absolute 
figures the biggest borrowed capital was in trade -  2506.4 mln lats, in 
commercial services -  1355.3 mln lats as well as in processing 
industry -  1252.8 mln lats.
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Figure 6. Volume of the borrowed capital of Latvian businesses in 
branch cross-section at the end of 2003 and 2004 [10-11]
However, if  we calculate percentage proportion o f the usage o f the 
borrowed capital in the assets the picture is different -  the leading 
position in using borrowed capital in the period o f study goes to the 
financial mediation branch (83.3% o f the total assets account for 
borrowed capital), trade (79%) and building (70.6%). The biggest 
growth o f the proportion o f borrowed funds in 2004, compared to
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2003, was in the branch o f transport, storage and communications -  
4.2 percentage points.
Table 9. Proportion of borrowed capital in the liability structure of 
Latvian businesses over branches as to the end o f 2003 and 2004. [10-
П]
Branch
Proportion of borrowed 
capital, %
Change o f the 
borrowed capital 
proportion, %End of 2003 End of 2004
Agriculture 52.4 53.3 0.9
Processing industry 56.1 58.0 1.9
Electric energy, gas 
and water supply
40.6 38.6 -2 .0
Building 66.6 70.6 4.0
Trade 78.8 79.0 0.2
Transport, storage 
and communication 38.2 42.4 4.2
Financial mediation 83.9 83.3 -0.6
Commercial services 48.0 49.5 1.5
Traditionally the proportion o f borrowed capital in assets is higher in 
the branches with rapid money turnover -  in trade and building. For 
example, in trade the big proportion o f borrowed capital in assets 
(particularly long-term loans) can be explained with a regular need to 
fund commodity stocks. However, in financial mediation the 
proportion of borrowed capital is that large because o f the specific 
character o f the branch which does not require big investments in 
fixed assets -  the money is borrowed for transferring it to other 
national economy subjects on better conditions.
In 2004 the creditor structure o f Latvia was dominated by short­
term loans and loans which accounted for 4476.5 mln lats or 57.6% 
of all creditor liabilities, the long-term loans respectively accounted 
for 3301.7 mln lats, which is 42.4% of the loan obligations [11,1].
The most frequent users o f the short-term loans in 2003 and 2004 
were the branches o f building and trade (table 10). However, the 
highest proportion o f long-term creditors was in the branch o f electric 
energy, gas and water supply (in 2003 -  72.5%, in 2004 -  71.8% of 
the total debts), which can be explained by the fact that this branch 
requires long-term investment project solutions. Besides the regular
314 Elvira Zelgalve
income and big fixed assets o f public utilities companies serve as a 
good trust guarantor for the drawing o f long-term funds.
Table 10. Division of credits and loans by the term and branches of 
national economy in Latvia as to the end of 2003 and 2004 [10-11]
Branch
Long-term loans, % Short-term loans, %
2003 2004 2003 2004
Agriculture 48.7 50.4 51.3 49.6
Processing industry 37.4 34.5 62.6 65.5
Electric energy, gas and 
water supply
72.5 71.8 27.5 28.2
Building 20.6 16.6 79.4 83.4
Trade 29.9 26.7 70.1 73.3
Transport, storage and 
communication 49.0 44.7 51.0 55.3
Financial mediation 43.4 66.4 56.6 33.6
Commercial services 53.0 62.2 47.0 37.8
An important kind o f borrowed capital are bank loans as in the world 
bank loans as a funding instrument account for the biggest part of 
borrowed capital o f businesses. It can be explained by the rather 
simple procedure for raising funds (apart from the issuing o f bonds) 
and the rather large supply o f resources (banks govern a substantial 
part o f the global financial resources).
At the end o f 2004 the volume o f loans granted by the commercial 
banks o f Latvia accounted for 4380.6 mln lats or 55.8% o f the 
aggregate bank assets. 5094.3 lats were attracted as deposits. This 
means that to that moment deposits covered 1216.3% o f the total loan 
portfolio o f commercial banks [32.1].
Out o f the total amount o f the granted loans 3800.7 mln lats or 
86.8% were granted to the country residents, including the govern­
ment -  67.7% and businesses -  2406.2 mln lats, private individuals -  
1310.7 mln lats and non-profit organizations that serve private 
individuals -  16.1 mln lats. Based on the information above it follows 
that the banks most actively credited namely the businesses. In the 
branch cross-section the biggest volume o f bank loans could be seen 
in the following branches: trade -  444.1 mln lats, commercial 
services 403.5 mln lats, financial mediation -394 .4  mln lats (figure
V).
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Figure 7. Commercial bank loans granted to Latvian businesses over 
branches of national economy as to 31 December 2004 [16,1].
When analyzing the importance o f bank loans in the total list o f 
corporate creditors the author concluded that the proportion o f bank 
granted loans in the total creditor volume is very different in various 
branches of economy (table 11).
Table 11. Proportion of commercial bank loans in the borrowed capital 
in branches of economy as to 31 December 2004 [16,1]
Branch Proportion of bank loans, %
Agriculture 82.0
Processing industry 29.7
Electric energy, gas and water supply 22.3
Building 43.1
Trade 17.7
Transport, storage and communication 21.9
Financial mediation 74.4
Commercial services 29.8
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In 2004 the biggest proportion o f bank loans among creditors was in 
the branches o f agriculture and financial mediation where it 
accounted respectively for 82.0 and 74.4%. However, the smallest 
proportion o f bank loans in the borrowed capital could be seen in 
trade (17.7% o f creditors) disregarding that in absolute figures trade 
had been issued most o f loans. It means that other kinds o f borrowed 
capital, for example, debts to the associated and related businesses, 
debts to suppliers etc., still play an important role in trade.
W hen choosing funding with borrowed capital businesses have to 
consider several sources o f borrowed capital. If  the interest rates 
offered by credit institutions are rising or do not satisfy the borrower 
it is worth considering the possibilities o f issuing bonds. It might be 
particularly important for the companies with stable previous 
operation and large available loan collateral, for example, in the form 
o f liquid fixed assets, thus they can offer bonds on profitable 
conditions for themselves in the market.
Joint stock companies that do not pay dividends and thus acquire 
cheap resources for funding their capital must take into account that 
in the future it might be difficult for them to raise funds by using the 
issuing o f new shares. To attract potential investors joint stock 
companies must start the implementation o f the steadily growing 
dividend policy.
As in Latvia the proportion o f borrowed capital in the corporate 
capital structure is growing, the majority o f businesses should 
carefully control their risk that arises in the case o f using borrowed 
capital. In the case o f too big proportion o f borrowed capital 
companies may have to pay interest for using the borrowed capital 
not only from their profit but, in the worst case, to cover the interest 
payments they will have to sell their assets which might cause serious 
disturbances in the operation o f the business.
Latvian businesses must try to increase the volumes o f the profit 
gained as a result both the ROE and ROA will increase. In 
comparison with the Estonian businesses the ROE in Latvia is lower 
which suggests that in Latvia there is a potential for using capital 
more efficiently.
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THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN BANKS 
INTO A TRANSITION ECONOMY: 
A CASE OF UKRAINE
Janek Uiboupin1
Turku School of Economics, Finland
Abstract
Banking sector reforms are one of the key economic reforms in a 
transition economy. Ukraine has one o f the fastest growing transition 
economies in Eastern Europe. Despite the attractiveness o f Ukrainian 
banking market, foreign banks have rather modest role in Ukrainian 
banking market yet. The aim of the paper is to give an overview of 
the banking sector development in Ukraine and to analyze the entry 
of foreign banks into Ukraine. The eclectic framework is used as the 
theoretical grounding to explain the entry of foreign banks into 
Ukraine. The results indicate that the banking sector has well 
recovered from crises in 90s and the financial sector has become very 
attractive for foreign investors. The share of foreign ownership in 
Ukraine’s banking has sharply increased since the second half of
2005.
Keywords: foreign bank entry, transition economies
Theoretical background
There are many theories which try to explain why firms start to 
internationalize. Although there is a growing body o f literature on 
FD1, there is no comprehensive approach yet that would explain all
1 Financial support by the Academy of Finland is greatly acknowledged 
by the author.
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different types o f FD1. One o f the most general theoretical frame­
works o f firm ’s internationalization is Dunning’s eclectic theory (also 
known as the OL1 theory) (see Dunning 1973, 1981, 1993). The OL1 
paradigm explains the FDI decision to be affected by three factors — 
ownership, location and internalization. It explains the reasons why 
firms decide to start investing abroad, what the preconditions (firm- 
specific advantages) are, where they invest (where are the location 
advantages complementing their ownership-specific advantages 
available), and why they select FDI out o f many forms o f foreign 
market entry (maximization o f their rents). The important aspect of 
the OLI theory is that the location and ownership advantages are a 
necessary but insufficient condition for FDI. They should be 
complemented by internalization, which helps to take advantage o f 
such conditions.
Dunning (1988) suggests that the three main motives for 
international production, namely, market seeking, resource seeking 
and efficiency seeking can be explained by the endowment/efficiency 
paradigm. As for market seeking, the ownership advantage that can 
be exploited in the host country to get access to some specific market 
or resource defines the investment location. The market failure affects 
the location and internalization by risk distribution, several kinds of 
market entry barriers and the oligopoly-like market structure. The 
resource-seeking motivation o f FDI considers production endow­
ments and other characteristics at home and in the host country to get 
access to production resources. The efficiency-seeking argument of 
FDI looks at economies o f scale and scope, risk reduction through 
product diversification, and taxation.
In Dunning (1994) another FDI motivation is added -  strategic 
asset seeking. Strategic asset seeking is a motivation for sequential 
FDI. The aim o f the strategic asset seeking investment is to acquire 
resources that are important to enhance the capabilities and advan­
tages o f an investor. It is complex integration o f strategies that are to 
seek markets where the corporation’s general objectives can be best 
performed.
Yannopoulus (1983) applied an eclectic paradigm to the banking 
sector, suggesting that multinational banks have location-specific 
advantages which may include foliow-the-client and country-specific 
regulations. Ownership advantages can be, for example, easy access
to vehicle currency. Internalization advantages can be informational 
advantages and access to local deposit bases.
Ownership advantages are crucial in the eclectic framework, as it 
is the possession o f these advantages that allows the foreign bank to 
overcome the advantages enjoyed by the domestic banks due to 
incumbency (W illiams 1997, p. 81).
Although the eclectic paradigm is widely applied into different 
industries, there has been also a lot o f critique to Dunning’s OLI 
paradigm. OLI theory combines different earlier theories o f inter­
nationalization. In critical assessment o f  eclectic theory (Itaki 1991) 
argues that there is no need to stress ownership advantages to explain 
international activities o f multinational corporations as they are 
already captured in internalization theory. Another critique to eclectic 
theory is the lack o f causality between variables described in it. 
Williams (1997, p. 83) argues that it is incorrect to assume that multi­
national bank needs ownership advantage compared with domestic 
banks. Williams suggests that internalization alone is enough to cover 
ownership advantages. He also argues that based on eclectic theory it 
is not possible to set up testable hypotheses.
The author suggests that an integrated approach to the OLI 
paradigm and the financial liberalization framework can be used to 
analyze the internationalization process o f banks in the CEE 
countries2. The eclectic paradigm stresses the importance o f bank- 
specific factors o f the FDI decisions. The OLI theory assumes that 
internationalization location is affected by the ownership advantages 
of multinational banks. The assumption that international banks are 
more developed than domestic banks is well applicable to the 
internationalization o f transition banking markets. Ownership advan­
tages can be better management skills, better capitalization, and high 
reputation (Rugman, Kamath 1987).
But, as suggested by Bonin and Abel (2000, p. 8), foreign banks’ 
entry into the emerging markets shows that this entry is more an 
aggressive rather than defensive approach (customer-following). 
Multinational banks are often market seekers who try to enter 
transition markets to gain new business opportunities at lower costs 
(aggressive expanding). Therefore we find that the OLI paradigm
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some more empirical evidence from other CEE countries.
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could fit better for explaining the motives and strategies o f foreign 
banks in the CEE countries, although internalization theory is not 
strictly controversial to the OLI theory. The integrated approach to 
the internationalization o f banks in the CEE countries is illustrated in 
Figure 1.
In my opinion that the traditional theories o f  multinational 
banking are not always sufficient to explain the activities and 
implications o f multinational banks in transitional banking markets. 
Nevertheless, the OLI theory is quite suitable for explaining how 
foreign banks can exploit their ownership advantages in transition 
countries, growing in the growing markets with comparatively high 
margins. The OLI theory alone does not explain all the motives and 
effects o f  foreign banks’ activities in the CEE banking markets as it 
does not cover the structural changes and market liberalization effects 
in emerging markets. Although the OLI theory stresses the impor­
tance o f specific markets for FDI, it does not explain the timing of 
FDI into banking. Therefore the financial liberalization (FL) frame­
work is integrated with the eclectic paradigm.
The liberalization and opening up for foreign banks creates an 
opportunity for foreign banks to enter the market. FL thus affects the 
location o f foreign entry (see Figure 1). The FL framework explains 
the effect o f market liberalization on capital markets. Several studies 
(Gros and Steinherr 1995, Bonin et al 1998, McKinnon 1993, 
Murinde and M ullineux 1999, Abel et al 1998) have shown that 
banking market liberalization often leads to a banking crisis in the 
early stages o f  transition to a market economy. During a banking 
crisis, foreign banks can best exploit their ownership advantages 
(liquidity, capitalization, reputation, risk management) as local banks 
are illiquid and less trustworthy. A banking crisis in a specific market 
will significantly reduce the value o f domestic banks, creating an 
opportunity to take them over at a lower price. Thus, banking crises 
create additional locational advantages for foreign banks.
The Еп1гУ o f  Foreign Banks Into a Transition Economy
Figure 1. Integrated approach of banks’ internationalization in transition 
countries (compiled by the author).
The question o f the timing of foreign entry is closely associated with 
the banking crises that occur after the FL. Generally, I propose that 
foreign banks’ entry motives in transition economies can be explained 
by the OLI paradigm with enhanced location-specific advantage due 
to additional pull factors created by FL.
Overview of banking sector development in Ukraine
Next the main trends and developments in Ukrainian banking sector 
are discussed. Similarly as in many other CEE transition countries, 
there has been a rapid development of Ukrainian banking sector 
during last 10 years, but there has been also a severe banking crisis at
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the end o f 90s. The national banking system in Ukraine started in 
1991, after the adoption o f the Law o f Ukraine “On Banks and 
Banking”. The Ukrainian banking system has a two-tier structure 
consisting o f the National Bank o f Ukraine and commercial banks of 
various types and forms o f ownership. By 1997, 32 o f 195 banks 
were being liquidated, while 25 others were undergoing financial 
rehabilitation. Bad loans accounted for 50-65 percent o f  assets even 
in some leading banks. In 1998 banks were further hit by the 
government’s decision to restructure government debt. The Ukrainian 
banking system has well recovered from the crisis since 2000. The 
credit portfolio o f banks has increased up to 50% on yearly basis and 
domestic credit to GDP ratio (see DC GDP on figure 2) had 
increased to 40% by the end o f 2005. Rapid credit growth has 
continued also in 2006.
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Figure 2. Domestic bank credit in Ukraine 2000-2006. Source: National 
Bank o f Ukraine; author’s calculations.
Total banking sector assets to GDP ratio (see TA GDP on figure 2) 
was 60% at the end o f 2005. Ukrainian banking sector has still strong 
growth potential as in more developed transition banking markets (i.e. 
Hungary and Estonia) DC GDP has already exceeded 100% level.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics o f credit portfolio quality o f banking 
sector in Ukraine. The assets quality o f Ukrainian banks has signi­
ficantly increased during last five years. The share o f  problem loans 
in total credit portfolio has lowered to 2% in 2005. This indicates that 
Ukrainian banks have sound credit policy. Nevertheless, it must be
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noted that Ukrainian economy has growth rapidly during last years 
and probably not all o f  the credit risk has realized yet.
Figure 3. Problem loans in credit portfolio o f banks in Ukraine 2000- 
2005. Source: National Bank of Ukraine; author’s calculations.
Figure 4 shows the trends o f average credit interest rate (ALINT), 
average deposit interest rate (ADINT) and total spread (Spread) in 
Ukrainian banks. Loan interest rates have significantly decreased 
during last five years, although the interest rates remain relatively 
high compared with developed countries. Total banking spread has 
been quite stable at around 5-6% , while the difference between 
average loan and deposit interest rate has clearly declined, that is a 
sign of increasing competition.
—» — Spread —a — ALINT —• — ADINT
Figure 4. Total bank spread and average interest rates on credit and 
deposits of banks in Ukraine. National Bank of Ukraine; author’s figure.
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Figure 5 presents EBRD’s (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) estimates o f banking sector reforms in selected 
transition countries. Three main groups o f countries can be distin­
guished. Ukrainian banking sector is about the same development 
stage with its neighbors Russia and M oldova with 2.5 points form 
maximum five. Most developed banking sectors among transition 
countries are in Estonia, Czech Republic and Hungary with 4 points. 
The author finds that Ukrainian banking sector has still a good 
starting position to converge with more developed CEE countries as 
the banking sector is sound and rapidly developing.
Figure 5. Banking sector development in CEE countries in 2005. Source: 
EBRD 2006; author’s figure.
Foreign banks’ penetration in Ukraine
The financial sector is the second most attractive sector o f Ukraine’s 
economy for foreign investors. 12% o f total FDI stock was invested 
into financial sector by 31.03.2006 (Figure 6). The financial sector 
became attractive for foreign investors after the removal o f all entry 
barriers to foreign banks. In July 7 2005 the Ukrainian government 
confirmed a new law on “Banks and Banking Activities”, according 
to what both domestic and foreign banks are treated equally in the 
Ukrainian banking sector.
Metallurgy is the core industry o f Ukraine and therefore 32% of 
total foreign direct investments’ stock is invested into Ukraine’s
metallurgy. Other attractive sectors are trading, food industry and real 
estate business.
-----trading; 10%
other; 24% /
food industry;
7%
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Figure 6. FDI distribution in Ukraine by type o f economic activity 
(31.03.2006). Source: National Bank of Ukraine, 2006.
Foreign banks’ share in Ukrainian banking market remains relatively 
low but is increasing since 2005. From total share capital o f  banks in 
Ukraine only 10% belong to foreign residents in 2005, by September
2006, 22% of banks’ share capital was already foreign owned3, (see 
FSCapital on Figure 7). The number o f foreign banks has increased 
from 7 in 2000 to 11 in 2006, this makes 7% o f total bank number in 
Ukraine (see FBSN_100 on Figure 6). Bank with at least partial 
foreign ownership4 encountered 18% form total number o f banks in 
September 2006.
As o f 01.09.2006, there were 11 foreign banks operating in 
Ukraine: Alfabank and Vneshtorgbank with Russian origin; Kalion 
and Bank Pekao with Polish origin; XFB Bank (HVB) from Ger­
many; Raiffeisen Bank from Austia; Aval Bank owned by Raiffaisen;
3 For comparison: foreign ownership in the banking sector share capital 
of Belarus was in January 1 2006 9.3% and has decreased compared with
2005 by 2.5% points. That is the result of instable political situation in 
Belarus.
4 According to Commercial Code and the Regime of Foreign Investment 
Act of 19 March 1996, significant foreign ownership is considered from 
minimum 10% of bank’s charter capital.
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ING Bank form Netherlands, Citibank from USA, and SEB from 
Sweden.
The OLI framework discussed above suits to describe the entry o f 
foreign banks in Ukraine but with some differences with other CEE 
countries. The entry barriers were removed in Ukraine relatively late
-  after the initial banking crises. Therefore, foreign banks did not 
have opportunity to enter the market during the banking crisis in 
Ukraine to exploit their ownership advantages.
FSCapital —*— FBSNJOO - a— FBSN_part —* — NB
Figure 7. Share o f foreign banks in total number of banks in Ukraine. 
Source: National Bank o f Ukraine; author’s calculations.
Figure 8 shows the amount o f total assets o f foreign banks in Ukraine. 
Figure 8 indicates that Raiffeisen bank is currently the biggest foreign 
bank in Ukraine which also had largest assets’ growth from July 2004 
to July 2006. There has been an increase o f assets in all foreign 
banks, but the growth has been quite moderate indicating that there 
are some obstacles for foreign banks activities in Ukraine.
Figure 8. Size of foreign banks’ total assets (ТА) in Ukraine (mln UAH). 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine; author’s figure.
Figure 9 shows the market share o f foreign banks in total assets. The 
market share o f foreign banks was quite modest up to 2005. In 2005 
foreign banks share in total assets was only 7.4%. The market shares 
have increased for Alfa-Bank, Raiffaisen Bank and Citybank, market 
shares of other foreign banks have remained same or even decreased.
Figure 9. Market shares of foreign banks in Ukraine (% from total 
banking market assets). Source: National Bank of Ukraine; author’s 
calculations
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In October 2005, Aval Bank was acquired by Raiffeisen Bank and the 
bank name was changed to Raiffeisen Bank Aval in 9th October 2006. 
Mainly because o f that major investment o f Raiffeisen Bank and the 
entry o f SEB, foreign bank share in total banking market assets 
increased to 18.4% as o f September 2006. The author suggests that 
the entry o f foreign banks into Ukraine will continue also in near 
future because o f the increasing openness and attractiveness o f the 
market.
Policy implications and suggestions
The author finds the removal o f entry barriers for foreign banks in 
Ukraine to have several positive implications and good timing. The 
forthcoming entry o f foreign banks will improve the capitalization of 
banks and increases the overall stability o f the financial sector. Based 
on the experience new member states o f EU it can be hypothesized 
that there will also be clear improvement in financial services’ quality 
and access to financial services. The author suggests that the presence 
o f multinational banks in Ukraine would improve the competitiveness 
o f Ukrainian banking market, nevertheless, it this likely that the 
market concentration will increase because o f several mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector in the near future. The author 
believes that the possible increase in the market concentration will 
not remarkably reduce the competitiveness o f the banking sector.
Foreign banks tend to enter the CEE transition banking market 
during banking crises when the banks are undervalued and illiquid 
(Uiboupin 2005). Foreign banks can work as rehabilitators of 
transition banking market (Tschoegl 2003), but the cost could be that 
the local banking sector is taken over by foreign banks at very low 
price. Therefore the author finds that the timing o f the removal of 
entry barriers was suitable for Ukrainian economy. The banking 
sector o f Ukraine currently solid and therefore domestic banks will be 
sold at “fair market price”. The entry o f  foreign banks into Ukraine 
will also improve the overall business climate in Ukraine and will 
attract addiction FDI also into Ukrainian non-financial sector and 
promotes overall economic growth.
Conclusions
Financial sector reforms are considered as one o f the most important 
economic reforms for transition countries. The current paper analyzed 
the possible effects o f  the removal o f entry barriers to foreign banks 
on the development o f Ukrainian banking sector. Foreign banks are 
found to have key role in rehabilitating transition banking markets. 
The foreign ownership in Ukrainian banking sector is currently 
comparatively low, because the market was opened to foreign capital 
only in July 2005. At the end o f August 2006 there were 11 foreign 
banks operating in Ukraine, their market share in total assets 
accounted 18.4%. The foreign ownership in banking has significantly 
increased since the removal o f entry barriers in 2005. The author 
finds that the removal o f entry barriers has good timing, as the 
Ukrainian banking sector is currently well performing and solid, thus 
the banks will be sold at higher price to foreign capital. The author 
also suggests that Ukrainian banking sector will benefit from foreign 
banks’ entry by better financial services quality and more stable and 
effective financial sector.
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PROJECTIONS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN LATVIA
Edgars Vojskis
University of Latvia
Abstract
The article contains observation of three main areas in Latvia, which 
are main drivers of pension system:
(1) Social Insurance Budget, its development during last decade and 
its future projections in terms of contribution ,
(2) Limitations of pension age for males and females in Latvia and its 
future assessments,
(3) Dependency ratios between working age population and retired 
part of population.
The study provides analysis o f latest developments of social insu­
rance budget and its expected contributions towards Latvian pension 
system in the future. There is also established the analysis o f esti­
mates of social contribution rates, which would be needed to cover 
pension expenditures currently and in the future.
The article also includes short analysis of pension age legal 
limitations in the future and their comparison to average retirement 
ages in European Union. The final part of this study covers analysis 
of population structure in Latvia in terms of dependency between 
working age population and retired part of population as well as 
development trends of these ratios in Latvia and other EU countries. 
The research was based on quality and quantity analysis methods 
using published scientifical literature sources of Latvian and foreign 
authors.
K ey w o rd s: social insurance, pension system, ageing o f population, 
financial defined contribution (FDC) scheme, notional defined 
contribution NDC PAYG scheme
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Introduction
During the period o f time since regaining independence, significant 
changes have taken place in the area o f public welfare provision in 
Latvia. The most significant achievement o f the social protection 
reform is the establishment o f a national social insurance system. It 
covers social insurance in the event o f  income-loss due to sickness, 
disability, unemployment and occupational accidents and diseases, 
and provides old-age pension insurance, survivor and maternity 
benefits. This report examines the medium and long-term trends and 
developments o f the social insurance system, and particularly the 
financial situation o f public pension system, which accounts for the 
biggest part o f social spending. This article identifies also some 
outstanding issues regarding the public old-age pension system and 
latest trends in labour market in Latvia and its affect to social 
insurance collections in the future.
Social Insurance Budget
The social insurance system in Latvia is based on two key principles:
• a close link between contributions and benefits;
• solidarity' between payers o f social insurance contributions and 
recipients o f  the social insurance benefits, i.e. current social 
insurance benefits are financed from the current social 
insurance contributions.
Several activities have been carried out to ensure the cost efficiency 
o f the social insurance financing policy. The most welcomed was the 
reduction o f the social insurance contribution rate from 38% in year 
1996 to 33.09% from 2003. All social insurance contributions paid 
are individualised and registered in individual accounts. This helps 
discourage underreporting o f income. The ceiling on the maximum 
amount o f the state social insurance contribution payable, and 
implicitly covered earnings, and the minimum amount payable by the 
self-employed also contribute to the cost efficiency o f the system. 
Yet, because o f political decisions and financial turbulence in late 
1990s, the accumulated reserves in the social insurance budget in 
Latvia became negative, hence creating an additional tax for the 
system in the mid-term. However, projections show that because o f
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the more or less favourable present age structure o f population and 
continuing mandatory increase o f the minimum retirement age this 
problem, at least for the medium term future, will gradually be 
resolved and a positive accumulation o f reserves will start from year
2007. The cash surplus in the social insurance budget has become 
positive already in 2002, but there is still a debt accumulated from 
earlier years.
Accumulated Consolidated Cash Surplus of the Social Insurance
Budget, millions of lats t b3-C|iUL
b a s e lin e  w ith  low  
m o rta lity
b a s e lin e  w t h  high  
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b a s e lin e  \M th  high  
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e m ig ra tio n
Chart 1
Chart 1 shows the accumulated consolidated surplus o f  the Social 
insurance budget. Here should be noted that the calculations 
presented in the Chart 1 include also financing o f the state funded 
pension scheme as an integral part o f the public old-age insurance 
system, financed by the social insurance contributions (the subject, 
which will be described further below) and “inheritance gain” from 
the state funded pension scheme, which also will be described below 
in discussion about the state funded pension scheme. At the same 
time calculations do not include any loans to cover accumulated debt, 
if it occurs, and subsequent interest payments and repayment. 
Thereto, projections are on a current account basis, i.e. do not include 
the potential interest on funding o f the social insurance budget 
reserves to the extent that they occur. Presently there is no reserve 
fund. This option is discussed below as an essential element o f future
policy development.
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Chart 1 clearly shows that notwithstanding an eventual deficit 
which most likely might occur in years o f high demographic pressure 
and, as will be shown below, because o f the introduction o f public 
funded pension scheme with ambitiously large size o f contributions -  
the social insurance budget might be successfully managed accumu­
lating reserves in surplus to fund expenditures when the demographic 
pressure is the greatest. Under the more pessimistic scenarios an 
increase o f the social insurance contribution rate for some period 
would even be required, if the appropriate policy measures will not be 
carried out in due time.
Chart 2 below shows how large the share o f wages would be 
really needed to cover all social insurance expenditures (i.e. the 
necessary social insurance contribution rate). Here should be noted 
that these calculations do not include the cash surplus, accumulated in 
previous years. This means that a substantial part o f necessary reve­
nues in deficit years could be covered by the accumulated reserves. 
However, the risk o f an increase in the social insurance contribution 
rate during the most problematic years still exists. Therefore Latvia 
cannot afford any unfinanced amendments to the present legislation. 
In fact, as will be demonstrated below, in order to avoid increasing 
the social insurance contribution rate it may be wise to consider a 
smaller scale for the funded pension scheme.
Social Insurance Contribution Rate Really Needed to Cover
Expenditures* - » — baseline
40,0% -г---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38,0%
36,0%
34,0%
32,0%
30,0%
28,0%
26,0% -j-
24,0% baseline with
22,0% -j- -  _ _ high fertility and
20,0% high imigration
&  «J* Ф  «4* <# Л  (Ä /Л  /ik  - » — baseline with
r f  r f  V  ^  ^  ^ ^  ^  ^  r f  ^  ^  hjgh emjgratjon
* social insurance budget expenditures as a percent of contribution base 
(including gradual increase of contributions to the state funded pension scheme (up to 10%))
baseline with 
low mortality
baseline with 
high fertility
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Financial challenges to the social insurance system are illustrated also 
у examining directly the development o f the (real valued) revenues 
and expenditures in the long run.
In the more optimistic scenarios with higher real wage growth or 
optimistic demographic growth there is no deficit. In the other 
scenarios, the coming 55 years are characterized by a surplus period 
through around 2025 followed by a deficit period to around 2057, 
with a steady recovery thereafter. Under scenarios with cash deficits 
after 2025, in principle, cash surpluses acquired to 2025 can be used 
to cover the deficit and the most effective way, as noted above, would 
be to fund this money.
Total spending on social insurance appears modest by EU stan­
dards. The total social insurance budget revenues and expenditures 
(including also contributions for the state funded pension scheme) 
comprised 10.7% o f the GDP in 2002. This ratio will remain at about 
this level also in the future (Table 1). But the total spending on social 
insurance services, i.e. including also state funded pension schem e’s 
pensions (which in our calculations are separated from the social 
insurance budget, as might be provided by the private insurance 
companies) will comprise about 14-15%  o f GDP in 2050-2070s.
Table 1
Spending on Social insurance Services as a Percent of GDP
B a s e lin e
2002 2010 2030 2050 2070
Social insurance budget revenues* 10,71% 9,60% 10,23% 10,83% 10,91%
o f  which: social insurance contributions 10,56% 9,43% 9,95% 10,37% 10,44%
Social insurance budget expenditures* 10,72% 8,54% 10,56% 11,15% 8,87%
Total spending on social insurance services** 10,72% 8,54% 10,69% 14,58% 14,21%
* including contributions to the state funded pension scheme
** including social insurance budget expenditure and stste funded pension scheme pensions
The inter-country differences in the ratio o f  social insurance 
expenditures in GD P depend on a num ber o f  factors, in addition to 
the generosity o f  the system s. It also depends on the existence o f 
non-public pension schem es that substitute for social insurance, 
including com pulsory insurance, paid by em ployers (e.g. sickness 
insurance). In addition, econom ic growth, financial m arket
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developm ent ( if  state funded pensions are taken into account) and 
population aging m ake a difference in international com parisons. 
The share o f  w ages in GDP, assum ed for Latvia is also im portant. 
It could becom e higher than that assum ed, w hich w ould  also result 
in a higher ratio o f  w age-related benefits to GDP.
Pension age developments in Latvia
The politically acceptable compromise for Latvia’s people was a 
gradual increase o f the statutory minimum retirement age from 55 for 
women and 60 for men until it reaches 62 for both men and women. 
A higher limit for the minimum retirement age was considered to be 
too far-reaching while the state economy and demographic situation 
is improving. The transition to the retirement age o f 62 is carried out 
gradually.
64
rren-*-vjom en^—62
C hart 3. Statutory minimum retirement age
Assuming economic growth and prosperity will gradually affect life 
expectancy -  as we have discussed under the demographic assump­
tions -  a slight increase in the retirement age to age 63 in 2030 is 
assumed for the long-term future. We have to admit that since people 
are assumed not to postpone retirement past the age o f 62 even 
though life expectancy is increasing, such a low retirement age will 
automatically hold down the yearly pension amounts and, 
accordingly, projected income replacement ratios. There is no way of
knowing what people will do as life expectancy increases, but 
certainly some will postpone retirement past age 62 in the coming 
decades, which means that the assumption used in the calculations is 
certainly conservative.
There is a guaranteed pension minimum that establishes the 
lowest benefits that can be granted under the PAYG pension scheme. 
Such guarantees are essential especially during the transition period 
to the pure NDC scheme, but even in the long run, since there will 
always be some long-time poor. These additional costs are included 
in the calculations.
According to the law, until 2002 pension indexation was based on 
the consumer price index, but from 2002 until 2011 pensions will be 
adjusted using the actual CPI and 25% o f  the real growth o f 
contribution wage sum. From 2011 the share o f the real growth o f 
wage in indexation will increase to 50%.
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Prospects of the development 
of social insurance system in Latvia
The social insurance reform in Latvia is completed. The examination 
of the system’s development in the long-term future presented in this 
report has shown that theoretically, within the overall contribution 
rate about 33% there is a room to pay for all social insurance 
commitments, including reasonable ambition for the size o f state 
funded pension scheme. The report has stressed the need to protect 
accumulated reserves and reconsideration o f limits for the state 
funded pension scheme’s contributions, considering the system ’s 
stability securing. As long as the financial costs can be estimated 
much better with real information, the decision o f 6, 7 or 8% (or 
10%) going to the 2nd tier can in fact be postponed until this 
information is processed.
Focusing on the age groups that participate in the labour force, 
currently ageing in Latvia appears som ewhat less advanced than in 
W estern Europe. Latvia will benefit from a relatively youthful 
com position o f  the w orking-age population over the com ing ten 
or so but then this will change because the small cohorts 
bom^in the 1990s will be reaching working age and replace larger 
cohorts becom ing pensioners. This may severely hold back the
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country’s econom ic grow th and put considerable pressure on the 
social insurance system , and especially the public pension system . 
The Chart 4 below  indicates developm ents o f  age dependency 
ratios in 1999 and 2020, w hich indicates that Latvia and m ajority 
o f  others new EU jo iner states will experience drastic decrease in 
w orking age population that will result slight increase num ber o f  
retired population and em igration o f  w orking population to EU 15 
countries after liberalising the w orking m arket for new EU joiners.
1 1,1 J  N
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Chart 4. Total age dependency ratio 1999 and 2020
As at today there are already happening dramatic trends in labour 
market due to large emigration o f working age population to Ireland 
and UK. By the end o f 2005 around 40,000 people emigrated from 
Latvia (by official numbers o f State Employment Agency). The 
estimates made by Ministry o f Welfare made in 2003 showed that 
around 2060s the social insurance system in Latvia may be so loaded 
that almost one contributor will have to fully cover expenditures for 
one old-age pensioner. This creates a need for partial funding o f the 
contributions o f large cohorts to preserve them for future spending. 
The FDC scheme goes part o f the way in doing this and reduces long­
term demographic dependency. However, for the medium term it is 
important to begin now to consider the design and administration o f 
the Reserve fund as an integral part o f the NDC pension scheme and 
as a support to the social insurance budget.
Due to its construction, the new NDC PAYG pension scheme by 
itself is highly resilient to the sort o f demographic and/or economic 
shocks, examined in the report. By ensuring proper balancing mecha­
nisms, such as correct adjustment o f  pensions and pension capital, the 
NDC PAYG pension scheme in the long-term (when it will become
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pure o f  transitional costs) is able to keep costs equal to
contributions that create pension rights (i.e. 20%). This is shown by a
ypot etical calculation without the FDC scheme. In other words,
sue a system is self-financing and is able to be financially stable in 
the long run.
The main risks o f  successful realization o f the goals o f  the 
pension reform are related to the successful operation o f the NDC 
PAYG pension scheme on which relies all public pension system. It 
is important that the objectives o f the PAYG NDC scheme be 
fulfilled. This means that the minimum pension age must increase as 
presently legislated, that there should be an improvement in coverage 
in the contribution-based schemes, which will relieve the pressure on 
the guarantee, and that the principle o f contribution-based old-age 
pension benefits is not weakened by introducing advantages for 
special circumstances without appropriate financial coverage from 
outside the system.
Taking into account legislation currently in force, various sce­
narios indicate that in around 25 years there is a remarkable financial 
problem for the pension system per se -  although not for the overall 
social insurance budget. The question arises then, should the surplus 
in the overall budget be saved in order to finance the transition costs 
involved in introducing an FDC scheme with a contribution rate o f 
10% -  or should future workers be compelled to pay for this? Alter­
natively, should Latvia settle for a lower contribution rate to the FDC 
scheme -  still with necessary demographic funding (Reserve fund) 
for the NDC scheme but without creating a need to raise the contri­
bution rate in the future?
In terms o f philosophy and terminology, the FDC scheme’s 
implementation cost, strictly speaking, is not a cost, but a transfer o f 
resources in time and a form o f saving and investing current resources 
to future higher level consumption. Although, as it can be seen in this 
report, without the appropriate reserves in the NDC PAYG scheme, 
the financing o f the FDC implementation will reduce the resources 
which would be available for the other purposes for a long period.
Notwithstanding the challenges, considering economic, financial 
and social aspects, the multi-pillar system, promises more stability in 
relation to possible fluctuations affecting demographic and economic 
situation The combination o f a PAYG and a fully funded schemes 
helps to minimize the different risks inherent in each scheme. The
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financial account scheme will provide as well the basis for sufficient
accruals, which might promote the development o f the financial
markets and would have a positive impact on the economy.
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